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Diversity and Development or Fragmentation and Failure?
1.1 Introduction
Why are so many ethnically diverse societies poor? On average, ethnically heteroge-
neous societies lag behind their more homogeneous counterparts on many measures
of economic development, social well-being, and state breakdown. Numerous cross-
national studies have found evidence of a negative association between ethnic diversity
and a number of development outcomes, including slow economic growth, the under-
provision of productive public goods and government services, the relatively poor
quality of the public investments and services that are provided, bloated and inef-
ficient civil services, swelling budget deficits and government debt, corruption and
rent-seeking, political instability and civil war—the list goes on. And yet, for all the
basket cases, there are also success stories of ethnically plural countries that have
managed to avoid the poverty traps in which many of their peers languish. What
accounts for this variation in outcomes? Does ethnic diversity cause economic under-
development, and if so, how?
Despite growing interest in the development hurdles faced by plural societies
among both scholars and policy practitioners, we have only a limited understand-
ing of how diversity impedes development, as well as the conditions under which it
does so. Many of the accounts we have for the empirical regularities we observe more
closely approximate narratives than explanations, citing ethnic tensions, loyalties, and
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solidarities to account for political instability and civil war, patronage politics, poorly-
performing bureaucracies, corruption, and other undesirable outcomes. Yet doing so
merely labels what should be explained: why are these tensions, loyalties, and solidar-
ities ethnic in origin? What makes them qualitatively different from, and implicitly
more destructive than, their non-ethnic counterparts? Perhaps most importantly,
under what conditions do they arise and become detrimental to development—when
do we get basket cases, and when do we get success stories?
These empirical regularities, and the questions they beg, are the motivating ob-
servations and ideas that inspire this dissertation. The questions surrounding de-
velopment in diverse societies are large, multifaceted, and have potentially sweeping
implications, but the work contained herein is more modest in scope. My focus is
on a set of smaller, more discrete questions on ethnic politics and institutions, which
fit into a broader, on-going research agenda on diversity and development. I present
this dissertation not on the more traditional narrative model, but rather in the three-
article format, with a series of essays that develop ideas about several relatively
self-contained ideas that nonetheless contribute to a more nuanced understanding of
ethnicity and institutions and, hopefully, with implications for subsequent work on
development in diverse societies.
The three essays I present take up some of the ramifications of ethnic political
coordination according to different institutional incentives and aspirations. The first
two essays concern themselves with attitudes toward and preferences over different
elements of democratic and autocratic governance in diverse societies where institu-
tional configurations themselves are frequently the loci of political contestation. The
first essay, a study conducted in Lebanon and utilizing original survey data, addresses
attitudes toward the extension of the franchise to marginalized groups—specifically,
illiterate people—when who has the right to vote has normative, ethnic (sectarian),
and distributional consequences. The second study, again conducted in Lebanon and
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utilizing the same survey data, seeks to disentangle the competing and arguably di-
verging influences of religion—one as a nominal marker of ethnic group boundaries,
and the other as a set of behavioral prescriptions and potentially shared ideals—on
preferences over a varied set of autocratic institutional options. The final essay moves
away from preferences over institutions themselves, and begins to examine the influ-
ence of specific institutional incentives on competition within rather than between
ethnic communities, and some of the distributional consequences that result from
the strength of this competition. This study, conducted in Lebanon and Yemen and
relying primarily on original survey data collected in both countries, compares the
competitive dynamics within the different sectarian communities as influenced by the
different institutions used in Lebanon and Yemen.
Lebanon and Yemen serve as the two primary research venues and the sources
of rich empirical data used in the three essays in this dissertation. Lebanon and
Yemen are two Arab countries within which ethnic cleavages (specifically, sectarian,
tribal, and regional)1 are salient, but which use markedly different government insti-
tutions to channel them. Lebanon formally (if imperfectly) incorporates its ethnic
categories into its system of government by using a quota system and other consoci-
ational principles. Yemen, meanwhile, functions on a plurality system and explicitly
forbids partisan and political activity on the basis of ethnic categories in pursuit of
an idealized vision of national unity. For several basic processes related to ethnic
coordination, the key political actors and groups within the two countries behave in
similar ways, yet the two countries differ in the institutions they use to channel these
cleavages, and these differences enable me to assess how qualitatively similar ethnic
processes can yield different outcomes given different government institutions.
1Following the precedent set by Horowitz (1985) and subsequent scholars, I treat ethnic groups
as a broad category of social categories, membership in which is defined by ascriptive descent (or
descent-like) rules. Hence, sectarian, tribal, and regional affiliations are particular instances of this
broader set of ethnic groups. Yet see critiques of this convention in Chandra (2006).
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As I noted initially, development outcomes vary widely, not only between diverse
and homogenous societies, but also among diverse countries themselves. The under-
lying argument I make is that variation in institutions helps explain this variation
in outcomes. Cumulatively, then, these three essays help provide pieces to a larger
puzzle connecting diversity to development and fragmentation to failure via the gov-
ernment institutions used to channel ethnicity into or away from politics and the
political allocation of scarce resources. The essays each provide answers to smaller,
more discrete questions. Yet they also represent the first step in a larger research
agenda that seeks to understand the links between ethnic diversity and development
outcomes.
The rest of this introductory chapter proceeds as follows. First, I present some
suggestive cross-national evidence to help substantiate the empirical regularity of the
negative link between ethnic diversity and development. Second, I review a sample
of several lines of narrative seeking to account for this link, briefly discussing the
underlying questions they ignore or otherwise leave unanswered. Third, I present
a sketch of the theoretical framework which serves as the point of reference and
departure for the three essays that provide the body of this dissertation. Finally, I
preview the essays themselves to provide a preliminary overview of their themes and
empirical findings.
1.2 The Ethnic Empirical Puzzle
A passing glance at countries around the world suggests that there is a puzzling
disconnect between diversity and development, with diverse societies accounting for
a large proportion of the state failures and growth tragedies that we observe. But
is this because of, in spite of, or independent of the pluralism that characterizes
these societies? Casual empiricism suggests a causal link, which sits comfortably
next to the often unquestioned received wisdom that ethnic conflict is somehow more
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destructive or detrimental to development than other kinds of conflict, a view that no
doubt influenced the celebrated Lebanese poet Kahlil Gibran when he wrote, “pity
the nation divided into fragments, each fragment deeming itself a nation.”2 Pity the
nation: this is a poet’s lament, but is there a more prosaic truth contained within it?
Is there, in fact, an ethnic effect, and if so, how does it work?
The Ethnic Effect in Search of an Explanation
As one of a number of plausible ways to give more substance to this empirical regular-
ity, we can examine where various societies rank on the Failed States Index, prepared
by the Fund for Peace,3 according to a rough measure of how diverse they are.4 Draw-
ing on the 2006 index that ranks 146 states, Table 1.1 lists those countries placed in
the worst- and best-performing categories, along with measures of diversity along eth-
2A brief excerpt from Gibran’s (1933, 14–15) The Garden of the Prophet reads:
Pity the nation that is full of beliefs and empty of religion.
Pity the nation that wears a cloth it does not weave, eats a bread it does not harvest,
and drinks a wine that flows not from its own wine-press. . .
Pity the nation whose statesman is a fox, whose philosopher is a juggler, and whose
art is the art of patching and mimicking. . .
Pity the nation divided into fragments, each fragment deeming itself a nation.
It takes very little effort to apply Gibran’s passage to contemporary amoral ethnic-nationalist ide-
ologies, foreign aid recipient states, and corrupt officials running such countries.
3The Failed States Index, initially calculated for 75 countries in 2005 and then expanded to 146
in 2006 and 177 in 2007, is prepared by the Fund for Peace and published in Foreign Policy. The
index is a composite of 12 indicators, which measure among other things a legacy of vengeance and
group grievances, uneven economic development along group lines, severe economic decline, and
the deterioration of public services. In addition to their ordinal rankings, countries are classified
in one of four categories from worst to best performers according to their composite scores. All
data discussed here are from the 2006 index. Data and additional details are available at http:
//www.fundforpeace.org/.
4The data I use here come from Alesina et al. (2003), who report ethnic, linguistic, and religious
fractionalization indices for most countries. The index, calculated as 1−
∑
p2i , where pi is group i’s
proportional share of the total population, measures the probability that any two randomly-selected
individuals will be from different groups. The index ranges from 0 to 1, with more fractionalized
societies asymptoting to 1. Although these indices are imperfect and suffer from a number of
conceptual and measurement problems (Laitin and Posner 2001, Posner 2004), they do provide
broad indications of magnitude, which is sufficient for the point I am illustrating here.
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nic, linguistic, and religious dimensions. A cursory inspection of the list turns up a
suggestive number of diverse societies, with several observations immediately present-
ing themselves. The three most extreme failures, Sudan, the Democratic Republic of
the Congo, and Côte d’Ivoire, are extremely heterogeneous African countries, whereas
the three top performers, Norway, Sweden, and Finland, are homogeneous northern
European countries. More broadly, among the 13 states that place in the category
of best performers, all are OECD members, whereas among the 28 worst performers
there are 15 African countries, 11 from Asia, and a handful of others.5
Because Table 1.1 reports more information than is easy to take in at a glance,
Table 1.2 abstracts away from this detail and distills the information into a few key
summary statistics that present the empirical regularity of interest in stark relief.
In particular, Table 1.2 reports mean scores (and standard deviations) for each of
the two categories, best performers and worst, on each of the diversity indicators,
as well as the difference in means between the two groups. On both the ethnic and
linguistic dimensions (but not religious), there is a substantively large and statistically
significant difference between best and worst performers, with the latter notably more
diverse than the former. Further, the differences remain large and significant when
averaging across the three dimensions, and when considering only the most diverse
dimension: worst performers are more diverse than best performers.6
Table 1.2 thus establishes an empirical regularity, and the takeaway point is this:
5As members of the Arab League, Sudan and Somalia could alternately be classified with Yemen,
Somalia’s neighbor across the horn of Africa, and Iraq. Note, in passing, that the indices calculated
in Alesina et al. (2003) (and most others) do not distinguish between different Muslim denomina-
tions (the most salient distinction being the Sunni-Shia split), meaning that religious diversity is
dramatically underreported in Iraq and Yemen.
6Two-tailed difference-in-means tests (t-tests) assuming unequal variances: Ethnic p < 0.001,
Language p = 0.002, Religion p = 0.863, Average p = 0.006, Maximum p = 0.043. The non-
difference on the religious indicator may be an artifact of the coding scheme, in which the “Christian”
category is subdivided into denominational families (thus raising the religious diversity score of the
mostly Christian-dominant best performers) while other religious categories (e.g., “Muslim”) are not
subdivided in an analogous way, thus depressing the religious diversity score of the worst performers.
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Table 1.1: Failed States Index and Diversity
Country Failure Ethnic Language Religion Average Maximum
Sudan 1 0.71 0.72 0.43 0.62 0.72
Congo, D.R. 2 0.87 0.87 0.70 0.82 0.87
Côte d’Ivoire 3 0.82 0.78 0.76 0.79 0.82
Iraq 4 0.37 0.37 0.48 0.41 0.48
Zimbabwe 5 0.39 0.45 0.74 0.52 0.74
Chad 6 0.86 0.86 0.64 0.79 0.86
Somalia 7 0.81 0.03 0.00 0.28 0.81
Haiti 8 0.10 (NA) 0.47 0.28 0.47
Pakistan 9 0.71 0.72 0.38 0.60 0.72
Afghanistan 10 0.77 0.61 0.27 0.55 0.77
Guinea 11 0.74 0.77 0.26 0.59 0.77
Liberia 12 0.91 0.90 0.49 0.77 0.91
CAR 13 0.83 0.83 0.79 0.82 0.83
North Korea 14 0.04 0.00 0.49 0.18 0.49
Burundi 15 0.30 0.30 0.52 0.37 0.52
Yemen 16 (NA) 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.01
Sierra Leone 17 0.82 0.76 0.54 0.71 0.82
Burma 18 0.51 0.51 0.20 0.40 0.51
Bangladesh 19 0.05 0.09 0.21 0.12 0.21
Nepal 20 0.66 0.72 0.14 0.51 0.72
Uganda 21 0.93 0.92 0.63 0.83 0.93
Nigeria 22 0.85 0.85 0.74 0.81 0.85
Uzbekistan 23 0.41 0.41 0.21 0.35 0.41
Rwanda 24 0.32 (NA) 0.51 0.42 0.51
Sri Lanka 25 0.42 0.46 0.49 0.45 0.49
Ethiopia 26 0.72 0.81 0.62 0.72 0.81
Colombia 27 0.60 0.02 0.15 0.26 0.60
Kyrgyzstan 28 0.68 0.59 0.45 0.57 0.68
Netherlands 134 0.11 0.51 0.72 0.45 0.72
Japan 135 0.01 0.02 0.54 0.19 0.54
Austria 136 0.11 0.15 0.41 0.22 0.41
Denmark 137 0.08 0.10 0.23 0.14 0.23
Belgium 138 0.56 0.54 0.21 0.44 0.56
Canada 139 0.71 0.58 0.70 0.66 0.71
Australia 140 0.09 0.33 0.82 0.42 0.82
New Zealand 141 0.40 0.17 0.81 0.46 0.81
Switzerland 142 0.53 0.54 0.61 0.56 0.61
Ireland 143 0.12 0.03 0.15 0.10 0.15
Finland 144 0.13 0.14 0.25 0.18 0.25
Sweden 145 0.06 0.20 0.23 0.16 0.23
Norway 146 0.06 0.07 0.20 0.11 0.20
Sources: Fund for Peace Failed States Index 2006 www.fundforpeace.org/
Diversity (fractionalization) data adapted from Alesina et al. (2003)
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Table 1.2: Summary Differences Between Best and Worst Performers
Ethnic Language Religion Average Maximum
Best 0.23 (0.23) 0.26 (0.21) 0.45 (0.25) 0.31 (0.19) 0.48 (0.25)
Worst 0.60 (0.27) 0.55 (0.31) 0.44 (0.23) 0.52 (0.23) 0.65 (0.22)
Difference 0.37‡ 0.29‡ −0.01 0.21‡ 0.17†
Group Average (Standard Deviation), p ≤ 0.01‡, p ≤ 0.05†
worst performers are more diverse than best performers, on average. It also, however,
shows that there is meaningful variation within these broad categories. Another pe-
rusal of Table 1.1 reveals an additional aspect of the empirical puzzle: although there
appears to be a negative relationship between diversity and performance, there are
homogeneous basket cases as well as diverse success stories. In particular, amid their
homogeneous peers among the best performers, there are several plural countries—
Austria, Belgium, Canada, the Netherlands, and Switzerland—whose diversity has
not prevented them from developing.7 The question, therefore, is not only why so
many diverse societies perform so poorly, but also how some have managed to escape
the poverty and failure traps in which so many of their peers languish.
Narrating the Ethnic Effect
Let us table, for the moment, the question of diverse success stories and focus instead
on the basket cases. How do we explain these outcomes? Received wisdom suggests
that poor performance in diverse societies is a product of that diversity. There are, in
fact, a number of well-established tropes readily available to narrate this link, many
of which cite some combination of ethnic tensions and group solidarities, primordial
7Note that four of the five cases cited, Austria, Belgium, the Netherlands, and Switzerland, were
the exact cases analyzed in Lijphart’s (1977) seminal study on consociational democracies, whereas
the fifth case, Canada, also received treatment in the same study as a country that uses some
elements of consociationalism. Although we should stop short of claiming causality, the fact that 5
of the 13 best performers are diverse, and that all 5 utilize consociational arrangments, appears too
striking to be accidental.
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animosities and ancient hatreds, strongly-felt loyalties that are in turn deeply-rooted
in the psyche, and so on. Some are plausible, some are discredited, and some can be
repackaged in less contentious language to enhance their credibility among scholarly
audiences. We might consider such accounts convincing or we might consider them
specious, but a more basic problem is that these tropes narrate but they do not
explain.
In attempting to account for an ill-defined “ethnic effect,” the bulk of these narra-
tives proceed, in effect, by assuming an adjective. They commonly cite ethnic tensions
and hatreds for political instability and civil war, ethnic loyalties and solidarities for
patronage politics and misallocations of resources, and perhaps strongly-felt or deeply-
rooted sentiments to account for the ethnic hatreds and solidarities. Notwithstanding
these presumed strong and deep sentiments, however, such accounts do not tell us
how or for what reasons the tensions and loyalties originate, nor why they must be
ethnic tensions and loyalties to function the way they do. They do not tell us if
ethnic dynamics are more destructive or otherwise qualitatively different than their
non-ethnic counterparts. Citing an ethnic effect in this way merely labels what should
be explained.
Attributing poor outcomes to a conceptually imprecise ethnic effect is more an
indication of our own incomprehension of the processes at work than it is an explana-
tion of those outcomes. This ambiguity in part reflects our uncertainties about how
the processes of development themselves operate, making it more difficult to deter-
mine where and how diversity fits into the larger picture. Claiming that development
is a function of diversity advances a directional effect, but not the functional form.
It leaves unspecified the channels through which the ethnic effect operates, whether
it is direct or indirect, and whether it is unconditional or contingent.
Given this ambiguity, we now have a range of narratives available to account for
the ethnic effect, some of which simply repackage one or more of the tropes from
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above, and others that attempt to clarify the channels and processes through which
the effect influences development. Yet most of these narratives continue to suffer
from a recurring set of problems. Those attempting to identify channels generally
do so by examining how diversity impacts inputs to development outcomes. But this
merely pushes the question one step back in the logical chain: it specifies a plausible
path through which the ethnic effect influences development, but not the nature of the
ethnic effect itself. Most narratives also leave unanswered the question of what makes
ethnic processes qualitatively different from non-ethnic processes. This, in turn, leaves
ambiguous whether the stories they narrate are about ethnic conflict, or about social
conflict more generally. Finally, most attempts at explanation make the implicit
assumption that the ethnic effect is unconditional and operates essentially the same
way from society to society, regardless of the different institutional environments and
incentive structures across countries. Yet this makes it difficult to account for both
diverse failures and success stories simultaneously. To give more substance to these
narrative shortcomings, let us briefly consider some prior attempts at explanation in
slightly more detail.
Diversity increases political instability. One family of narratives posits that
ethnic diversity, sometimes discussed in terms of polarization rather than fractional-
ization, increases political instability, which in turn reduces growth and slows devel-
opment by lowering investment rates and increasing nonproductive public spending
to appease or police competing groups (e.g., Annett 2001, Montalvo and Reynal-
Querol 2005). A related strain on civil wars notes that grievance motivations (“ethnic
hatreds”) dominate public pronouncements but provide little explanatory leverage,
whereas greed (capturing scarce resources) provides a much stronger account for war
onset and duration. Ethnic links, in turn, help overcome collective action problems
and provide cohesion in these greed coalitions (e.g., Collier 2000 and Collier and
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Hoeffler 1998, but a dissenting view in Fearon and Laitin 2003).
Diversity inhibits the provision of public goods. Given that “ethnic hatreds”
appears to provide little explanatory leverage, as well as the fact that there are far
more instances of ethnic peace than of violent ethnic conflict (Fearon and Laitin 1996),
an alternate approach focuses on differences in preferences on the use of common-pool
resources. This narrative line posits that ethnic diversity inhibits the provision of
productive public goods (more precisely, public investments and government services)
such as roads and schools, both in terms of the quantity provided as well as the quality
of these goods, and via this link slows growth and retards development (e.g., Easterly
and Levine 1997, Kuijs 2000, La Porta et al. 1999). The basis of the quantity claim
is that it becomes more difficult to reach agreement on the provision of such goods
when there are increasingly heterogeneous preferences in society (e.g., Alesina, Baqir,
and Easterly 1999). Hence, failure to agree on the type and quantity of such goods
lowers the amount provided. The basis of the quality claim, less well-developed and
expressed, appears to be that when such goods are provided, they are underfinanced
and not subsequently maintained, resulting in poorer outcomes per unit of the good
available.
Diversity provokes competition over public resources. Although framed as a
discussion of public goods, the previous narrative in practice amounts to a discussion
of publicly-provided goods, rival and excludable to different degrees, which are desir-
able as well as require scarce resources to provide. Hence, a related line of narrative
postulates that diversity provokes competition, sometimes illicit, over public resources
and the related benefits of modernity (Bates 1974). Ethnic competition over state
resources (and the state itself) expands returns to nonproductive rent-seeking activi-
ties, provides greater scope for corruption, and privileges patronage expenditures, all
of which lead to fiscally irresponsible policies, bloated government expenditures, and
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large budget deficits (Alesina, Baqir, and Easterly 1999, Collier and Garg 1999, Ekeh
1975, Fearon 1999, Mauro 1995). All of these dynamics lead to a serious misallocation
and dissipation of scarce resources on nonproductive activities, which in turn retards
development.
Diversity impedes the rule of law. The emphasis on corruption and rent-seeking
also relates to a related line of argument that diverse societies are less able to provide
a legal and regulatory environment subject to the rule of law. Versions of this line of
narrative suggest that patronage appointments, often coupled with underresourced
and undermandated monitoring agencies, reduce bureaucratic efficiency as well as
accountability. This, in turn, multiplies and complicates regulatory procedures, pro-
vides additional venues for corruption, and makes property rights insecure (Alesina
1998, Easterly and Levine 1997, Keefer and Knack 2002, Mauro 1995). All of this
increases expenditures on nonproductive activities and lowers investment, both of
which reduce growth and development.
Diversity reduces growth directly. In reality, explicit claims that diversity has a
direct, unconditional effect on growth and development are rare. Implicitly, however,
this claim is made all the time when scholars simply drop a measure of ethnic diversity
into a regression equation. Doing so, moreover, makes strong implicit assumptions
about the functional form of that relationship, transforming the general statement
“growth is a function of diversity” into “growth is a linear-additive function of di-
versity with normally-distributed disturbances.” This is not commonly what scholars
wish to claim, but is in effect what they say mathematically when they include a diver-
sity indicator in their regression equations on the logic that ethnic politics “matter”
somehow.
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To summarize, several families of narratives exist that link diversity, directly or
indirectly, to poor development outcomes. The paths most often cited are via political
instability, the underprovision of public goods and the poor quality of those goods
that are provided, competition over public resources privileging nonproductive uses
of resources for rent-seeking and patronage, a low premium on the rule of law, and
even an implicit direct “ethnic effect” on development in general. Further, many of
these paths are linked to one another, either explicitly or implicitly, in the various
lines of argumentation.
Yet, with this proliferation of narratives and increasingly intricate web of links, it
is difficult to adjudicate between the various claims, especially when many of them
make roughly the same prediction, i.e., that diversity slows development. Perhaps
unsurprisingly, the empirical record has produced mixed results. Although most
studies that go looking for an ethnic effect are generally able to find one, how this effect
works, and what the estimated effects mean, are not always unambiguous. Authors
positing indirect links also find direct ones, effects appear stronger in some regions
of the world than in others, those claiming that polarization is more important that
simple diversity nonetheless find a diversity effect, prior findings can be overturned
with different model specifications, and so on (Arcand et al. 2000, Fearon and Laitin
2003, Kenny and Williams 2001, Montalvo and Reynal-Querol 2005, Sala-i-Martin
1997). These mixed results, when taken as a whole, return us to the point at which we
started: with an empirical regularity in search of an explanation. Yet the narratives
we do have, however plausible they may be, do not actually explain what we wish to
know.
Narrating Without Explaining
The first major difficulty encountered in most of these narratives is that, in describing
a path through which ethnic diversity impacts development, they do not explain
13
so much as push the question back a step in the logical sequence. Citing “ethnic
tensions” or “ethnic hatreds” as sources of political instability, for example, does not
explain the origins of those tensions or hatreds except to label them ethnic. Doing so,
however, assumes away rather than explains the background processes that produce
the tensions in question. The set of greed coalition arguments suffers from a similar
problem. Citing ethnic links as the means to overcome collective action problems in
establishing and maintaining competing coalitions—either armed groups in civil war
or patronage networks in civilian politics—generally relies on assuming the existence
of “ethnic solidarities” or “ethnic loyalties” as the basis of these coalitions. Doing so,
however, does not explain why such solidarities exist or why they prove so adept at
overcoming collective action problems when other links fail.
Yet this silence on what makes ethnic solidarities particularly well-suited to col-
lective action as compared to non-ethnic versions is a particular instance of a second
broad class of difficulties with these narratives: by and large, they leave ambiguous
whether they are about ethnic conflict in particular or social conflict more generally.
Despite an implicit assumption that ethnic conflict is somehow more destructive and
detrimental to development than other kinds of conflict, most narratives do not in
fact establish what makes ethnic processes qualitatively different from their non-ethnic
counterparts. Political instability narratives, for example, do not generally make ex-
plicit claims about why ethnic cleavages are particularly apt to cause instability as
compared to other cleavages based on, for example, class, party, or ideology. Nor, in
fact, is there always even an implicit claim to qualitative difference, as is the case when
ethnic divisions are studied alongside disputes over land ownership or the division of
wealth. Likewise, patronage networks and Chicago-style machine politics function
in a number of venues along non-ethnic and cross-ethnic lines (e.g., Despres 2005,
Mainwaring 1999). For this story to be about ethnic politics rather than patronage
politics writ large, we must examine what makes ethnic links particularly receptive to
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patronage (Fearon 1999)—without citing ethnic solidarities. Analogously, differences
in preferences are endemic to politics, not just ethnic politics, and narratives based
on heterogeneous preference models would appear to apply more effectively to class
and socioeconomic cleavages.8
Finally, a major shortcoming in most of these narratives is the implicit assumption
that ethnic dynamics function approximately the same way from society to society,
which in turn implies that the negative impact of the ethnic effect is unconditional
and applies everywhere there is ethnic diversity. Although this might account for
differences in outcome between heterogeneous and homogeneous societies in a broad
sense, such an assumption makes it difficult to account for the considerable variation
in outcomes that we observe among diverse countries themselves. Political instability
narratives, for example, must contend with the reality that there are many more
instances of ethnic peace than ethnic conflict, yet postulating an unconditional “ethnic
tensions” claim cannot account for both. In building patronage networks, politicians
use party cues to reward supporters in some societies, and ethnic cues in others, yet
an unqualified “ethnic solidarities” account does not help us specify the conditions
under which the one is more useful than the other.
More generally, an unconditional ethnic effect claim cannot easily account for both
ethnic basket cases and success stories simultaneously. It cannot tell us why countries
such as Sudan, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, and Côte d’Ivoire sit atop the
failed states index, while others such as Belgium, the Netherlands, and Switzerland
are ranked among the world’s best performers despite their diversity. Yet there is
good reason to believe, and considerable evidence to back up the claim, that ethnic
dynamics vary under different incentive structures, one of the most important sources
8One could, in fact, go farther and suggest that they apply to ethnic cleavages only to the degree
that they overlap with class or socioeconomics (i.e., to the degree that the ethnic system is ranked,
as described in Horowitz 1985).
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of which is government institutions (e.g., Chandra 2004, Horowitz 1985, Lijphart 1977,
Posner 2005). Failure to consider this important contingent effect, in turn, makes it
more difficult to identify an ethnic effect in practice, perhaps accounting for some of
the mixed results reported by the empirical studies.
To summarize, a wide range of narratives exist to account for the link between
ethnic diversity and underdevelopment: some are plausible, some are less so, but
for the most part they remain partial narratives rather than full explanations. In
general, they suffer from three recurring sets of problems. First, in attempting to
identify paths through which diversity slows development, they postulate that an
ethnic effect exists, but not how it works. Second, and along the same lines, they
generally do not explain how ethnic dynamics differ from non-ethnic dynamics, raising
the possibility that the processes they describe are not specific to ethnic politics at all.
Finally, they generally assume an unconditional relationship between diversity and
development, despite the difficulty this causes in explaining the observed variation
in outcomes between diverse societies. In the theoretical framework I sketch below, I
attempt to provide an explanation that addresses each of these points.
1.3 Ethnicity and Institutions:
Summary of the Theoretical Framework
Up to this point, I have put forward two central propositions. The first is that un-
derstanding the impact of ethnic diversity and the influence of ethnic politics on
development requires that we identify more clearly the causal processes that link
ethnicity to development, and the conditions under which these links actually take
place. Much of what we know (or think we know), at least at the cross-national level,
is based on a grab-bag of loosely theorized propositions and a few formal models that
are tenuous in their connections to the actual processes under study, which are then
tested via a series of arguably misspecified empirical models. The mechanisms are
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often uncomfortably vague, and are not necessarily specific to ethnic dynamics at
all. But leaving the mechanisms vague means we are not well-situated to understand
when and under what conditions they actually operate, and when they do not. Thus,
rather than continuing to paper over the large logical jump from ethnic diversity to
underdevelopment, we must first understand the conditions under which ethnic cleav-
ages become politically salient and ethnic groups politically relevant, and why these
cleavages and groups are qualitatively distinct from other forms of social divisions.
The second proposition follows from the first: we should not expect ethnic dy-
namics to operate in the same way across all societies as if they were unconditional
processes divorced from other aspects of politics. Instead, we should expect to see a
conditional effect that is magnified in some societies and muted in others for system-
atic reasons. In particular, we should expect the ethnic effect to vary according to the
different government institutions in place in different societies, which influence how
ethnicity is channeled into or away from politics and the political allocation of scarce
resources. To the degree that institutions help define political incentives, they can
help us explain the conditions under which ethnic cleavages and groups become more
or less politically relevant, and how they influence the development process, rather
than simply that they do so. As such, before we can achieve a better understanding
of the links between ethnic diversity and development, we must first understand how
institutions, as a key intervening variable, channel ethnic politics.
This section overviews the theoretical framework I use throughout this dissertation
to link ethnicity and institutions. The basic argument may be summarized as follows.
Out of an extremely large number of latent social categories that exist in every society,
the small number of actual groups that form do so largely through a coordination pro-
cess that takes place in predictable ways. Especially in environments where reliable
political information is scarce, repressed, or otherwise costly, group coordination on
the basis of issue preferences is unlikely to occur because such preferences are difficult
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to observe or infer. Instead, the coordination process privileges social categories with
observable membership traits that serve as focal points for group formation. Infor-
mational restrictions on the viable categories around which groups may coordinate
particularly privilege ethnic social categories, in which membership is relatively easy
to infer via observables, and whose membership rule, putative descent, is common
knowledge.
Despite this relative ease in coordination, however, ethnic groups are imperfect
substitutes for programmatic coalitions in terms of social welfare. Ascriptive mem-
bership makes them somewhat like catch-all parties, but without the option of entry
into or exit from the coalition. This provides elites with a captive audience and con-
sequently an ethnic subsidy : elites become monoposonistic buyers of their coethnics’
votes, and thus ethnic support is cheap. Given wide discretionary powers, elites can
capture greater quantities of scarce resources as they buy cheap support from co-
ethnics via selective incentives, reducing both coethnic and social welfare compared
to a non-ethnic setting. Institutions can intensify or disrupt these dynamics, how-
ever. They can magnify the importance of ethnic categories as coordination points by
closing off alternative sources of political information and other dimensions of con-
testation, and they can amplify the discretionary powers of elites with restrictions
on monitoring and competition. They can also disrupt these dynamics by lowering
the cost of information, inducing intra-ethnic competition, and providing effective
monitoring mechanisms to limit elite discretionary powers.
Below, I expand on each of these points in turn. First, I discuss coordinating on
social categories and groups in the abstract. Next, I identify conditions favorable to
coordinating on ethnic categories, and the repercussions of such coordination. Finally,
I address how institutions can modify incentive structures and consequently channel
ethnic cleavages in different ways.
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Coordinating on Categories and Coalitions
Let us first consider constraints on coordination in the abstract before examining the
process of ethnic coordination. In a simple rendition of political coalitions, office-
seeking politicians owe their jobs to the support of coalition members and, to the
degree that the value of this support is the same across individuals, politicians are
indifferent as to the composition of their coalitions provided that they are winning
coalitions. Politicians attempt to employ scarce resources efficiently by targeting these
resources to reward supporters without dissipating them on non-supporters.9 All else
equal, any two coalitions of equal size are equally viable as winning coalitions, which
implies that both politicians and potential supporters/beneficiaries face a substantial
coordination problem to overcome in selecting a winner (Hardin 1982, Marwell and
Oliver 1993, Olson 1965).
Were social category size alone the only relevant distinction between potential
coalition bases, then selecting one from such an immense pool of latent possibilities
would be intractable from a coordination standpoint.10 Social categories of course
differ in various ways other than size, but here I direct the focus to variation on two
key structural dimensions that influence the degree of ambiguity and uncertainty in
category composition: membership observability and boundary permeability. Differ-
9I use the term “efficient” here in the political sense, and emphatically not in the economic
sense. We can think of this efficient targeting as either enabling politicians to maximize the rewards
distributed to supporters, to allocate some but not all of the resources and reserve some in a political
slush fund, or the standard cynical assumption of dispensing the minimal rewards needed to maintain
support while privatizing or otherwise capturing the remaining resources.
10The number of latent categories in all but the smallest societies is extremely large, being the
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ences in the degree of compositional ambiguity, in turn, helps distinguish plausible
candidates for coordination from implausible ones. In terms of membership observ-
ability, we would expect categories to vary in the ease with which members and
non-members can be identified accurately. Greater observability reduces uncertainty
in the composition of a given social category, and by enabling members to identify one
another, helps create common knowledge about that category (Chwe 2001). In terms
of boundary permeability, we would also expect categories to vary in the ease with
which people join or leave them. Greater permeability enables easier entry and exit
(Hirschman 1970), making category composition more ambiguous over time. This
ambiguity, in turn, makes it more difficult to identify a coherent category, and thus
hampers the generation of common knowledge about that category.11
Differences in membership observability and boundary permeability provide dis-
tinctions between categories and help produce focal points for coordination (Schelling
1960, 1978). Lower levels of compositional ambiguity, both at a particular moment
and over time, help category members identify the category itself as well as one an-
other, making their common interests common knowledge. We may expect people to
leverage the focal points produced by variation on these two dimensions to focus on a
relatively small subset of categories made relevant to politics by coordination rather
than by something inherently meaningful in the categories themselves.12 Yet whether
11In the context of political coalitions, greater membership observability enables politicians to
target rewards to members with increasing efficiency. But because rewards-for-support bargains are
sequential rather than simultaneous, there is a time-inconsistency problem to overcome. Basing
coalitions on categories with low boundary permeability helps mitigate this problem by reducing
openings for opportunistic entry or exit, a particularly important trait in environments where more
formal mechanisms to enforce commitments are absent or weak.
12Although we might alternately focus on “meaningful” social categories, doing so would be a
purely static exercise, as well as potentially misleading. In the former sense, it would be an act of
labeling rather than explaining, because such a focus would ignore the dynamics by which meaningful
categories became relevant (meaningful) in the first place, as well as ignore how categories gain
and lose relevance over time. Further, it is misleading to ignore these dynamics for inferential
reasons: “meaning” is not assigned to categories in a random fashion, and ignoring this selection
process (which categories become relevant) would disrupt our ability to make sound inferences on the
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these categories form without conscious intent as emergent properties of the social
system, or else as products of purposive behavior by political entrepreneurs with en-
compassing interests seeking to direct this coordination and willing to bear the costs
of doing so, there are constraints on coordination in the form of the availability and
cost of information. Variation in information, in turn, has repercussions for the types
of categories that can become relevant through coordination, and consequently the
types of interests expressed by the politically relevant categories.
Although we typically expect people to coordinate on common interests, we also
recognize that interests in the form of ideal points on policy dimensions are difficult
to observe. And although we typically expect people to infer interests via observ-
able proxies such as party labels and other heuristic cues (Downs 1957, Lupia and
McCubbins 1998, Sniderman et al. 1991), the availability and quality of such prox-
ies cannot be taken for granted, especially in the low-information environments that
characterize many developing societies. When useful proxies for policy dimensions
are unavailable or uninformative, obtaining reliable information on these dimensions
becomes costlier, and people are limited to inferior substitutes in the form of other,
cheaper observables denoting options such as identity categories. The availability
and quality of information thus influences what kinds of social categories become
politically relevant by influencing their viability as loci of coordination, and from
this affects which policy dimensions are politically salient in competitions between
political coalitions.13
outcomes of interest (which coalitions form). Although the social construction of meaning may be a
plausible description of that selection process, focusing on membership observability and boundary
permeability is an act of abstraction away from the details and toward the underlying structure. It
is an attempt to extract the systematic variation within which meaning emerges.
13Better information makes it easier to coordinate on programmatic issues, although given the
relative ease in coordination it also means a relatively larger number of relevant categories. In lower
information environments, coordination is largely limited to a smaller set of relevant categories whose
memberships are easy to identify and whose observability is difficult to disrupt.
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Coordinating on Ethnic Categories and Coalitions
Previously, I proposed that variation in access to political information—both in terms
of its availability and its quality—influences which types of social categories and
interests are viable as points of coordination. More specifically, I suggested that
the low-information environments that characterize many developing societies compel
people to rely on imperfect substitutes for the more informative proxies found in high-
information environments. Here, I will argue that information constraints particularly
privilege ethnic social categories for coordination, with significant repercussions for
the policy dimensions that become salient. Ethnic categories utilize variations on a
simple, intuitive membership rule, with membership that is often easy to infer via
inexpensive proxies as well as relatively stable over time. Thus, ethnic categories
combine high observability, low boundary permeability, and a common knowledge
membership rule, all of which make them focal points for coordination in the absence
of higher quality, more informative cues with which to work.
Despite some surface variation, the rule structure defining membership in ethnic
categories follows the broad theme of membership by ascriptive descent.14 Unlike
potentially more convoluted and unfamiliar rules defining membership in voluntary-
based categories,15 the descent rule is simple, intuitive, and deterministic—in theory
if not always in practice. Moreover, the rule structure is common knowledge, based
on analogy to preexisting rule structures for membership in family and kin groups
14Note that I am following a long-standing convention in defining ethnic groups (Horowitz 1985).
In some cases the descent rule is explicit, as when membership theory closely tracks genealogical
logic by explicitly linking members to a common ancestor. In other cases the descent rule is implicit,
as when individuals acquire membership by birth despite the lack of an explicit link to a common
ancestor. Explicit descent is common in tribal systems, whereas implicit descent is prevalent among
nations, peoples, races, and so on. Note that I have said nothing about identity or identification
(Hardin 1995): the descent rule merely provides a means to categorize people independent of their
desires to be so categorized.
15Compare the classificatory uncertainty over whether one is a sympathizer, supporter, or member
of a political party, especially in societies where party membership is a novel or forbidden concept.
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as well as precedent set by the establishment of other ethnic categories.16 Although
actual membership is only imperfectly observable, it is relatively easy and inexpensive
to infer from a large set of covarying proxies such as name, skin color, accent, and so
on (Chandra 2004), the compounding of which creates a focal point, albeit one that is
hazy on the margins. Further, the descent rule defines a category whose membership
is stable over time, given that neither entry into nor exit from the category occur by
choice, in principle providing the continuity needed to make common interests com-
mon knowledge. This putative longevity—with ethnic ideologues tracing their groups’
origins back into the romanticized “mists of time”—helps create not just imagined
communities, but imagined, nonfinitely-lived communities (Alesina and Spear 1988,
Anderson 1983, Hobsbawm 1990, Stokes 1999).17
Ascriptive descent, in terms of its rule structure, makes the social categories it
defines comparable in terms of the characteristics and interests common to members.
In general terms, ascription grants membership irrespective of occupation, educa-
tion, ideological preferences, age, sex, and so on, making such categories societies-in-
miniature (Bates 1974, Chandra 2004, Horowitz 1985).18 This within-category het-
16Analogy builds on the logic of family relations—arguably the single most basic form of social
interaction across societies—and is an application of an existing rule rather than an innovation of a
new rule. Coordination on one ethnic category, in turn, sets a precedent: by defining the in-group
explicitly, the rule implicitly defines the out-group, as well as puts the rule structure into the public
domain. Although this precedent may be the result of a rule structure innovation, either homegrown
or imported from abroad, we may view analogy and precedent and reinforcing rather than mutually
exclusive.
17I will discuss the importance of nonfinitely-lived groups more thoroughly in the theory chapter
in the context of the folk theorem and overlapping generations models of organizations.
18Ethnic systems differ broadly in whether they are ranked or unranked (Horowitz 1985), i.e.,
whether they follow hierarchical status relationships between different categories, or whether the
categories represent approximately status-equivalent segments of the broader society. In a perfectly
unranked system, we would expect ethnic membership to tell us nothing about an individual’s
occupation, education level, and so on, whereas in a ranked system between-category variation
would enable us to make probabilistic guesses about an individual’s other characteristics, despite
within-category variation.
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erogeneity, in turn, restricts the types of interests that such categories can represent
(or at least unify around). Policy dimensions on which members’ ideal points vary
considerably do not and cannot define common interests, resulting in the deemphasis,
if not complete disavowal, of a wide range of policy dimensions. Those interests left
over after eliminating the dimensions on which members differ are generally lowest-
common denominator interests: those that benefit the bulk of the members, or the
category as a whole in an abstract way. Although such demands could, in theory,
be for the provision of true public goods—and ethnic rhetoric is full of references to
justice, equality, the rule of law, development for all, and so on—in the absence of en-
compassing interests to make such rhetoric credible, the interests devolve to demands
for the distribution or redistribution of public resources toward members. These char-
acteristics make ethnic categories roughly analogous to patronage-oriented catch-all
parties (Kirchheimer 1966, Mainwaring 1999), but with a key difference: whereas the
boundaries of catch-all parties are commonly highly permeable, there is no entry or
exit from ethnic categories.
The lack of entry and exit options, an implication of the ascriptive descent mem-
bership rule, makes ethnic categories qualitatively different from other types of social
categories that we commonly view as voluntary. In particular, as constituencies, eth-
nic categories are captive audiences. Elites become monopsonistic buyers of their
coethnics’ votes: political support is cheaper than otherwise would be the case if en-
try and exit were not blocked off, and so elites benefit from an ethnic subsidy at the
expense of their coethnics.19 This dynamic, by which elites enjoy significant discre-
19In the theory chapter, I use the logical framework of a signaling model to motivate ethnic
subsidies, and a variant of the chain-store game to further expand on ethnic monopsonies, which
eliminate “voice” from the “exit, voice, and loyalty” triad (Hirschman 1970). There is a frequently-
made claim about politics in ethnic systems that elites benefit from a wellspring of core support from
their coethnics, often explained with reference to variations on the theme of “deeply-felt” loyalties
or a desire to “bask in the glow of elite successes.” These explanations cannot easily accommodate
the evidence of disaffection and dissatisfaction of ethnic supporters at the mass level. The alternate
explanation advanced here helps account for the seeming paradox of core support and disillusionment
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tionary powers and can capture large quantities of scarce resources as they buy cheap
support from coethnics, results from political market failures in the context of low
information and minimal competition. Yet we should not expect these outcomes to
obtain unconditionally: the extent of the monopsony, the size of the ethnic subsidy,
and the scope of discretionary power may all be magnified or disrupted by government
institutions.
Institutions as Channels
So far, I have put forward two broad proposals. First, information levels influence
which types of social categories and interests are viable as points of coordination. Sec-
ond, low-information environments privilege coordination on ethnic categories, which
combine high observability, low boundary permeability, and an intuitive membership
rule. Although coordination on ethnic categories may be better for members than no
coordination at all, there are potentially undesirable ramifications in so coordinating.
First, the structure of the ascriptive descent membership rule generates an ethnic
subsidy at the expense of category members by allowing elites to act as monopson-
istic buyers of their coethnics’ political support.20 Second, high observability and
low boundary permeability, which aided in the coordination process in the first place,
also facilitate the use of selective incentives, as elites can target rewards to supporters
efficiently without dissipating resources on non-supporters. The disheartening ramifi-
cations include cheap rewards for coethnics, more captured resources for elites, and a
shift of the nonappropriated resources toward selective incentives and away from pro-
ductive public goods. The politically efficient use of these resources, in other words,
with ethnic elites by suggesting that coethnic support derives not from affection, but exists because
no viable, credible alternatives exist—the result of a coordination process that privileges ethnic
categories.
20By closing off exit and voice, the only option available to members of an ethnic constituency is
(dis)loyalty. Elites need only reward supporters just enough to make them turn out to vote, rather
than provide the higher payoff needed to retain their votes in a competitive election.
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is economically inefficient, and this misallocation slows development.
Yet these dynamics are not unconditional. In particular, we should expect dif-
fering government institutional environments to magnify or disrupt these processes,
and so channel ethnic politics into or away from politics and the political allocation
of scarce resources. First, the degree to which elites can act as ethnic monopson-
ists, which determines the size of the ethnic subsidy, depends on the availability of
viable substitutes for ethnic categories, which in turn depends on the institutionally-
influenced ease of and returns to coordinating on non-ethnic categories. Second, elite
capacity to claim a within-category monopsony—thus capturing the entire ethnic
subsidy—depends on the degree to which institutions induce intra-ethnic competi-
tion for coethnics’ votes. Third, the quantity of resources captured, and the extent to
which elites may distribute some types of selective incentives, depends on the scope of
the discretionary power they enjoy, which in turn may be influenced by institutional
monitoring mechanisms. The right set of institutions, in other words, can create the
right set of incentives to mitigate the potentially negative impact of ethnic politics
on development, and the wrong set can magnify it.
Although institutions may arguably channel ethnic dynamics in various ways, I
focus here on their impact via their provision (or non-provision) of three key con-
ceptual public goods: information, competition, and the rule of law. Institutions
can lower information costs and expand the availability and quality of information
and so enable coordination on a wider range of social categories and interests, or
they can restrict information and make coordination on non-ethnic categories more
difficult, thereby compeling people to employ ethnic classifications and coordinate
on ethnically-constrained interests. Institutions also can stimulate or stifle political
competition, both along non-ethnic dimensions as well as intra-ethnically, with ram-
ifications for the emergence of monopsonistic vote buyers, ethnic subsidies, and the
degree to which elites utilize selective incentives to win support. Finally, institutions
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impact the degree to which societies operate under the rule of law versus the rule
of personalities, with monitoring mechanisms and checks and balances expanding
or contracting the scope of elite discretionary power. Cumulatively, the degree to
which government institutions provide these three conceptual public goods impacts
shapes well they channel ethnic politics, and thus how much ethnic politics impact
development.
1.4 Outline of the Essays
As previously mentioned, the format of this dissertation follows the three-article
model rather than the traditional monograph style. As such, most of the body of
this work is composed of three essays that address discrete elements of the theory
sketch described above. Below, I lay out brief summaries of these essays, previewing
their themes, the broad propositions I advance in them, and the empirics used to
assess these propositions. I make brief mention of where these essays fall within the
broader narrative forwarded above, a point to which I return subsequently in Chapter
5, which concludes the dissertation by synthesizing the ideas and findings in these
three discrete essays into the broader themes raised at the outset of this introductory
chapter.
Chapter 2: Democratic Talk and the Democratic Walk
Coordination problems play an important role early on in the chain of reasoning
detailed in the theory sketch, in which coordination on ethnic categories provides
imperfect substitutes for more precise coordination on specific interests. This implies
that there should be considerable variation in preferences within ethnic groups over a
number of issue dimensions, but this variation is submerged in pursuit of group unity
in competition with similar groups. Among other things, this suggests that although
individuals may “toe the ethnic line” in public, their personal preferences may in fact
diverge from the claims they make.
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Because of the impact of sensitivity as well as the norm to present a united pub-
lic front on key issues, gauging the degree to which personal preferences differ from
group preferences is difficult. Here, I utilize a revised, enhanced version of the list
experiment—a data collection technique designed to nullify respondent incentives
to misrepresent themselves, now coupled with a new statistical estimator I have
developed—to investigate patterns of responses in which individual material inter-
ests would be expected to diverge in important ways from ethnic group interests.
Empirically, I examine Lebanese attitudes toward voting rights for illiterate people, a
sensitive question due both to its normative content and its sectarian implications. I
show that, when people are asked directly whether or not illiterate individuals should
have the right to vote directly, community membership determines their answers and
material conditions do not. Yet, as expected, when incentives to misrepresent them-
selves are nullified with a list experiment, the polar opposite occurs: community
membership has no influence on opinions, whereas material conditions have a strong
effect.
Chapter 3: What Divides Unites
Government institutions, as argued in the theory sketch, serve as channelers of eth-
nic politics. Given this channeling role, different sets of institutions can privilege or
handicap some ethnic groups at the expense or to the benefit of others, and conse-
quently institutional choice becomes a salient policy dimension in diverse societies.
When ethnicity is the relevant classificatory principle underlying political coalitions,
a number of implications follow. First, coalitions do not engage in serious political
contestation to win over new members—as coalitions are relatively fixed by reliance
on ethnicity’s descent principle—but rather compete over the choice of institutions
that best achieves community interests. Yet there is also surprising flexibility in the
seemingly inflexible descent principle underlying ethnic categorization in terms of the
particular community of relevance: people may invoke both the logic and the vo-
28
cabulary of the classificatory system to imagine larger or smaller communities with
inclusive or exclusive boundaries. Given these implications, preferences over different
institutional options should behave in predictable ways.
Lebanon’s sects constitute its most salient ethnic categories, yet religion provides
both the nominal markers of group boundaries and membership as well as a set of
behavioral prescriptions and shared ideals. Because religiosity and sectarianism are
conflated, I show that it is important to disaggregate the influence of religion on atti-
tudes toward democracy and autocracy. In particular, I demonstrate how politicized,
sectarian attitudes may lead some individuals to adopt positions in favor of autocratic
solutions, whereas religiosity can act to moderate attitudes by enabling the Lebanese
to invoke shared religious ideals to imagine a community beyond the sect. Hence
religion, the seemingly inflexible dimension which divides the Lebanese, also unites
them, making Lebanese of all sects less supportive of autocracy and correspondingly
more supportive of democracy as a a more inclusive means to govern themselves.
Chapter 4: Why Sunni Votes are Cheap in Lebanon but Dear in Yemen
As laid out in the theory sketch, coordinating on ethnic categories produces salient
groups that, at least in principle, do not permit entry and exit. This raises the
possibility that ethnic constituencies may become captive audiences to their elites,
making possible the emergence of monopsonistic vote buyers who benefit from cheap
support from their coethnics—an ethnic subsidy flowing from supporters to elites.
Yet the size of this subsidy depends on the degree to which institutions induce intra-
ethnic competition for coethnics’ support. An implication of this process is that,
under ethnic monopsony, constituents compete for patronage, and individuals must
find ways to signal additional and enthusiastic support to elites in order to secure
rewards comparable to what they would receive in an environment in which elites
must compete for their votes.
Lebanon’s quota system explicitly forces within-group competition between elites
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over their coethnics’ votes—although due to exogenous shocks a monopsonist has
emerged in the Sunni community. Yemen’s plurality system explicitly forbids com-
petition along ethnic lines, producing a dynamic in which the Shia-dominated ruling
party holds a monopsony over Shiite votes while facing competition for Sunni votes.
Empirically, I examine Yemeni and Lebanese assessments of the importance of politi-
cal connections in securing a government job, using an unobtrusive measure, respon-
dents’ displays of political party posters, as an indicator of signal strength. I show
that signal-sending Lebanese Sunnis are much more likely to believe that connections
are necessary to receive political rewards than are their non-signaling co-sectarians.
This dynamic, a product of the monopsonistic environment in the Sunni community,
is not evident in either the Shia or Christian communities, where there is consider-
able intra-group competition. In Yemen, in contrast, Shiites face a monopsonistic
vote buyer whereas the Sunni vote market is competitive. Here, I show that it is Shi-
ite signal-senders who are much more likely to believe in the importance of political




Democratic Talk and the Democratic Walk
Would you be upset by a black family moving in next door? Do you support
the use of suicide bombs against civilians? Have you accepted a bribe to perform
an illegal service in the past week? Which of these survey questions will be answered
honestly?
Racism, terrorism, corruption: political questions can be sensitive questions, and
what makes them interesting is also what makes them sensitive. Yet what makes them
sensitive also makes them difficult to study: illegal activities and socially undesirable
attitudes are probably not just underreported, but underreported in systematic and
unmeasurable ways. The problem is not confined to politics, of course: questions
about the prevalence of drug use, pornography consumption, and child abuse are
likely to be underreported precisely by drug users, pornography consumers, and child
abusers.
To study sensitive topics, we are often stuck taking respondents at their dubious
word. Since we do not observe their behavior or attitudes directly, we must rely on
what people are willing to tell us—and when the topic is sensitive, what they are will-
ing to tell us may very well be “not much.” This problem is especially pronounced
on formal and impersonal attitude surveys, where time constraints, non-repeated
interaction, and standardized wording all stack the deck against interviewers gain-
ing sufficient rapport with respondents to coax them into discussing sensitive topics
openly. What a respondent might be willing to confide to an ethnographer after
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months of repeated interactions may be simply unattainable in a one hour interview
with a stranger who will never be seen again.
People misrepresent themselves on attitude surveys, and one can hardly blame
them. Aside from some small satisfaction derived from adhering to the norm to
“always tell the truth,” there is little personal benefit they can gain from honesty.
Meanwhile, the costs of answering questions truthfully need not be great to outweigh
the minimal benefits: simple embarrassment at admitting to a distaste for blacks or a
penchant for pornography will be sufficient to drive down the reported prevalence of
these outcomes. The costs are even greater when the possibility of ridicule, stigma, or
legal penalties, real or imagined, enter into a respondent’s decision to discuss sensitive
topics openly.
The fact that people may misrepresent themselves about sensitive topics on at-
titude surveys should force us to ask whether or not it is worth all the trouble to
administer such surveys in the first place. How much damage do these misreports
do to the data we collect and the inferences we try to draw from them? The answer
is, unsurprisingly, “a great deal,” if we proceed näıvely as if the data we have are
not measured with bias. The intentional misrepresentation of true attitudes and be-
havior by some of our sample respondents does not just mean that our data are of
poor quality, and that our problem is simply measurement error. If this propensity
for misrepresentation is systematic, then the inferences drawn from our data are also
wrong in a systematic way. Coefficient estimates are incorrect, signs can flip, and
variables with no true explanatory power can appear to explain a lot. All this makes
response bias not just an epistemological problem, but “an epistemological problem
with teeth” (Brehm 1993, 20).
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2.1 The Problem of Response Bias
Survey questions ask people to make public declarations about private information
and, in this sense, the act of reporting what one does or believes is distinct from the
actual doing or believing. The content of these public declarations may reflect not
only the private information in which we are interested, but also other incentives and
constraints that can cause self-reported outcomes to deviate from actual outcomes.
Suppose, for example, that we wish to test hypotheses about processes leading to some
outcome y∗ but that we observe only y, which is the self-reported value of y∗. Were y∗
not sensitive, we would have little reason to doubt that y is an accurate measurement
of y∗, with deviations from the truth (due to misspeaking, misunderstanding the
question, or whatever else) being wholly nonsystematic and falling into the error
term. Yet if the processes are sensitive, then the outcomes presumably are as well,
and we would expect self-reported outcomes to deviate from the truth in a systematic
way. Supposing that this systematic deviation is the product of an incentive z∗ to
misrepresent one’s answers, then the problem appears to be one of omitted variable
bias: because what we observe is a function of both the truth and an incentive to
misrepresent the truth, ignoring the latter leads to incorrect estimates. But there is a
twist: because the true outcome y∗ is sensitive, then the incentive z∗ to misrepresent
it is surely in part a function of this sensitivity.
To see this, assume that we observe y, the self-reported value of true y∗, and that
the true model for observed y is given by y = y∗τ + z∗λ + ǫ1, where self-reported y is
a positive function of true y∗ (with τ for true) and a negative function of an incentive
z∗ to misrepresent the truth (with λ for lie, and thus λ < 0). For simplicity, assume
that τ = 1, meaning that deviation in self-reported outcomes from actual outcomes
is a product only of z∗ and the random error. Assume that values of y∗ become more
sensitive as they get bigger, and that incentives to misrepresent the truth become
greater as the truth becomes more sensitive: y∗ = Xβ∗ + ǫ2 and z
∗ is a positive
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function of y∗ such that z∗ = y∗σ + ǫ3 (with σ for sensitive, and thus σ > 0, because
the more sensitive the behavior the more likely is the respondent to misrepresent this
behavior).
For simplicity, consider a linear specification which omits z∗ and models only
y = y∗τ + ǫ1. The least-squares coefficient estimate b





















































, and this quantity is unambiguously less than one, as we have assumed τ = 1,
whereas the product of σ and λ is negative.1 Thus, if the propensity to misrepresent
one’s behavior depends solely on the degree of the sensitivity of that behavior, then
our coefficient estimates are biased downward, which can take the form of estimates
attenuating to zero or even complete sign flips.2 If we do not consider how incentives
1Recall that we have assumed that σ takes a positive value (increased sensitivity leads to increased
incentives to misrepresent the truth), while λ takes a negative value (lying leads to a reported
outcome y lower than its actual value y∗).
2The results in (2.1) are for the simplest case in which propensity to lie is related only to the
sensitivity of the behavior. Were the propensity to lie also related to some other covariates X2
(such that z∗ = y∗σ + X2ω + ǫ3, with ω referring to other covariates), the results become more








+ AX1X2ωλ, where AX1 now refers to those Xs
systematically related to y∗ while X2 refers to those Xs related to propensity to lie z
∗ but not to
y∗. The resulting situation is worse still: in this more complicated situation we do not even have
assurances as to the direction of the bias. The effect of the second term could be positive or negative
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to misrepresent actual behavior and beliefs affect what people are willing to tell us on
a survey, inferences we may try to draw from the resulting data will be inaccurate—
perhaps marginally, and perhaps wildly so.3
One common approach used in anticipation of response bias is to change the
question-phrasing somehow so that a sensitive question is no longer “sensitive.” Yet
the revised wording may or may not get at the underlying concept we hope to mea-
sure, and we might be concerned that, the more we sanitize, the less the question
actually measures what we want. An alternative approach to handling response bias
has been to consider and correct for non-response bias, i.e., unit non-response in
which potential respondents fall out of the sample in a systematic way (e.g. Brehm
1993), and item non-response in which in-sample respondents systematically decline
to answer certain questions (e.g. Berinsky 1999, 2004). If non-response is systematic,
then we could model the selection process by which we observe self-reported outcomes
given that we observe any outcomes at all. This is the procedure Berinsky (1999)
uses to study support for government efforts to integrate schools, finding that at least
some people who harbor anti-integrationist opinions hide their socially undesirable
views by selecting a “don’t know” response.
This approach is a great deal better than nothing, and probably the most useful
given data limitations, but it remains an imperfect solution to the problem. Although
the procedure may plausibly dampen the effects of response bias, it does not elim-
depending on the relationships between X1 and X2, and in principle an upward bias introduced by
the second term could overtake the downward bias of the first term.
3Simply controlling for the effect of z∗ on y is insufficient for two reasons. First, we are no longer
modeling what we say we are modeling: rather than estimating the propensity to engage in sensitive
behavior y∗, we are now estimating y, the propensity to report engaging in sensitive behavior y∗.
Although this admission may be of interest in itself, it is still a substantively different process than
simply engaging in this behavior, even though the processes are related to one another. Second, it is
extremely unlikely that we can measure z∗ accurately in any way, because the measure of sensitivity
is itself sensitive and would presumably also be subject to response bias—claiming not to engage
in sensitive behavior y∗ and then claiming that the answer reported for y∗ is false is effectively
admitting to engaging in the sensitive behavior.
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inate those effects: respondents still face incentives to misrepresent their answers,
and we can continue to expect to see false responses in the substantive categories.
Likewise, the “don’t know” category itself is subject to the effects of response bias,
as it is composed of individuals who are attempting to hide their opinions and in-
dividuals who truly do not know. Further, the option of responding “don’t know”
does not necessarily alleviate the social desirability problem, as in some cases it may
be interpretable as an intermediate category between the desirable and undesirable
responses. Responding “I don’t know” about school integration, for example, implies
that the respondent is less than fully committed to the socially desirable outcome of
integration. More starkly, responding “I don’t know” to a question on whether or
not one believes that the holocaust occurred essentially brands the respondent as a
holocaust denier.
2.2 The List Experiment
One procedure with considerable potential to nullify incentives to hide the truth from
interviewers is the list experiment (a.k.a. the item count technique), which is an
unobtrusive means of eliciting truthful responses that was brought to salience in po-
litical science in Kuklinski, Cobb, and Gilens (1997) and Kuklinski et al. (1997).4 As
originally conceived, the survey sample is split into two groups. Control group respon-
dents receive a list of non-sensitive, yes/no items and are asked to tell the interviewer
how many of the listed items they do/believe, and specifically not which items they
are. Treatment group respondents, meanwhile, receive the same list as the control
group, plus one more item that measures a sensitive topic, and receive the same in-
structions. Respondent anonymity is assured transparently because no one, not even
the interviewer or analyst, can know whether or not a treatment group respondent’s
4For an earlier treatment, see, e.g., Droitcour et al. (1991).
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answer included or excluded the sensitive item.5 We can then use difference-in-means
tests between the treatment and control groups to infer the prevalence of the sensitive
behavior/opinion.
For example, in a study on racial prejudice, Kuklinski et al. (1997, 405) prompt
all respondents with, “now I’m going to read you three (four) things that sometimes
make people angry or upset. After I read all three (four), just tell me HOW MANY
of them upset you. I don’t want to know which ones, just HOW MANY.” They then
give the following three list items to control group respondents:
1. The federal government increasing the tax on gasoline
2. Professional athletes getting million-dollar salaries
3. Large corporations polluting the environment
Meanwhile, treatment group respondents get a fourth item, “a black family moving
in next door.” In analyzing these data, they find evidence that white residents of the
South are more likely than those living elsewhere in the country to express anger at the
idea of having a black neighbor, and Kuklinski, Cobb, and Gilens (1997) report that
this prejudice is concentrated in white southern men.6 To draw these inferences, the
authors make use of difference-in-means tests across a series of independent variables
of interest: differences between the south and the non-south, between those with a
high school education against those with a college education, and the like.
This is the state of the art as it stands. Unfortunately, difference-in-means tests
5This is not strictly true: there is no ambiguity when respondents claim that they do/believe
none of the items on the list (indicating that they must have answered “no” to the sensitive item) or
all of the items on the list (indicating that they must have answered “yes” to the sensitive item). In
application, we may deal with this shortcoming by including at least one item on the list to which
a large majority of respondents would be likely to say “yes,” and/or make at least two items on the
list fairly strongly negatively correlated with each other, so that respondents are likely to respond
“no” to at least one or the other of them.
6Compare also the application of the list experiment to analyze public reactions to the nomination
of Jewish candidates for high public office in the United States in Kane, Craig, and Wald (2004).
37
are very crude procedures, and make multivariate analysis highly impractical.7 As
a data collection procedure, the list experiment has considerable potential to nullify
incentives for respondents to misrepresent themselves to interviewers. This potential
is largely untapped, however, because data analysis procedures are severely limited.
To make this technique a serious, viable option for more rigorous applications, we
need a procedure to model statistically the underlying data-generating process of the
list experiment so that we may analyze the resulting data multivariately, in the same
fashion as we would were we running something akin to basic ordinary least-squares.
Here, I detail a new procedure and statistical estimator to enable multivariate analysis
of list experiment data, which I call listit. To do this, I make one important change
in the data collection technique: although the question posed to treatment group
respondents works exactly the same as before, members of the control group are asked
each of the list items individually. This difference in application makes it possible to
model the procedure statistically.
2.3 Modeling the List Experiment
Intuitively, the data generated by the list experiment appear to analysts as a count of
“yes” responses ranging between zero and the total number of list items. This count,
in turn, is comprised of a number of Bernoulli outcomes, but we would expect list
items to differ in their probabilities of producing a “yes,” meaning that list experi-
ment data are not distributed binomially in a simple sense. Although we do not know
the individual probabilities associated with each item, we do know the sample average
probability across the entire list, which enables us to model the process as if it were
binomial. We cannot yet make inferences about the sensitive item, however, because
7Essentially the only way to achieve “multivariate” analysis is to repeatedly split the samples
and run difference-of-means tests, which quickly runs into problems with degrees of freedom and is
extremely problematic when the variable of interest is continuous (such as income) or continuous-like
(such as years of education).
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an infinite set of combinations of probabilities can produce the same average prob-
ability that we observe. It is for this reason that we ask control group respondents
each of the list items individually, which enables us to reduce the number of unknown
probabilities to one (the probability associated with the sensitive item) by estimating
the individual probabilities of the non-sensitive items on control group respondents
and using these estimates to identify the probability of the sensitive item.
Formally, the binomial distribution assumes that the probability π of observing





= Kπ. Although the assumption of independence among the K
possible outcomes is not unreasonable here, we enter the list experiment estimation
procedure assuming that each kj ∈ K may (and probably does) have its own πj . In











Treatment group respondents receive a list of K items, one of which is sensitive
and the remaining K−1 of which are not. We are only interested in the π∗i associated
with the sensitive item, and the remaining K − 1 items are present only to help us
estimate π∗i . Utilizing the notational convention whereby quantities associated with
the sensitive item are marked with a star (*) and those associated with the remaining











Rearranging terms in (2.2), allows us to express the probability π∗i associated with
the sensitive item as





We can model the data-generating process that produces π∗i by assuming that this
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but because we do not observe π∗i directly, but only π̄i, we must substitute (2.3) into
(2.4). Rearranging terms to produce (2.5), we may express π̄i in terms of β
∗, the
















Note that the right-hand side of (2.5) includes the heretofore unknow probabili-
ties π†i associated with the non-sensitive list items. Their presence in (2.5) is what
necessitates the change in the administrative procedure. Although unknown, and
although we have no data from the treatment group respondents from which to es-
timate these probabilities directly,8 we may estimate them indirectly via data from
control group respondents. More specifically, assuming that each π†i is distributed
















The crucial trick is that the parameters β† are estimated on data drawn from the
control group, and these estimates are then subsequently applied to the values of
their corresponding covariates among treatment group respondents. Doing so allows






















The task remaining is to estimate the coefficient vector β∗—the parameters asso-
8Recall that treatment group respondents receive only the list of items, to which they provide
one response, and not the individual list items one at a time.
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ciated with the sensitive item—given what we know about the characteristics of the
treatment group respondents and π̄i. We may, at this point, proceed with maximum








j , Nt, Nc
)
,9 must
account for π̄i distributed binomial, as well as each π
†






































































































































































Setting ∂ ln L/∂β to zero and solving maximizes the log-likehood with respect to the
9Where y∗i are treatment group responses to the list question, y
†
j are control group responses to
the individual non-sensitive questions, and Nt and Nc are the treatment and control group sizes.
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parameters. Note what we are estimating. The estimates of β∗ are the estimates that
would be returned if we had asked the sensitive item directly as a yes/no question
and respondents had not misrepresented their answers. Interpreting the coefficient
estimates requires no more of the analyst than the ability to interpret logit coefficients,
because they are logit coefficients.
2.4 Monte Carlo Simulations
To explore the behavior of the new listit estimator, I subjected it to a series of Monte
Carlo simulations while varying four key elements of the administrative procedure:
total sample size, the proportion of the sample size comprised of control group re-
spondents, list size, and the probabilities associated with the non-sensitive list items.
For simplicity, I focus here on simulations run in batches of 1000 repetitions with an
intercept term parameter of β∗
0
= 0 and a single covariate parameter set to β∗
1
= 1,
although results are analogous with different parameter settings and additional co-
variates.
The procedure used for each repetition is as follows. I draw individual covariate















and from these probabilities draw the yes/no responses for the sensitive and non-
sensitive items. The outcome variable for treatment group respondents is a single
list composed by adding together their responses to the sensitive and non-sensitive
items, and the outcome variables for control group respondents are the set of binary
yes/no responses to each of the non-sensitive items. I then run the listit estimator on
these simulated values—a single response vector in list format for treatment group
respondents, K − 1 response vectors in yes/no format for control group respondents,
and the matrix of covariates—and record the results.
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Although the true parameter values for the sensitive item are constant (here,
β∗
0
= 0 and β∗
1
= 1) across all administration procedure variations, I vary the param-
eter values for the non-sensitive items systematically in order to examine the effect
of greater or lesser certainty in the non-sensitive outcomes, that is, the expected





calculate appropriate parameter estimates by setting the intercept parameters to 0









Thus, for example, when the average probability of yes for a non-sensitive item is set
to 1/4, β†
1
≈ −2.197, when set to 1/2, β†
1
= 0, and when set to 3/4, β†
1
≈ 2.197.10
To present results from the simulations, I focus on β∗
1
, the parameter associated
with the covariate (hereafter dropping the subscript), and b∗, the estimated param-
eter averaged across the 1000 repetitions. These results show that, across a variety
of combinations of administrative procedures, β∗ = 1 ≈ b∗. Figure 2.1 shows a his-
togram of the parameter estimates with a sample size of 2000, half the respondents
in the control group, a list size of 4, and an average off-item (i.e., non-sensitive item)
probability of 3/4 (these constitute the baseline administrative conditions used in sub-
sequent figures). Figure 2.2 demonstrates that the listit estimator returns consistent
parameter estimates under a variety of administrative procedure regimes.
Figure 2.3 displays how different administration procedures affect the standard er-
rors of the estimates. First note that the average standard error estimate maps tightly
onto the sample standard deviation of the parameter estimate: the listit estimator
returns the correct standard errors.11 Next, note how the degree of certainty around

































11In other words, the average standard error estimate is the standard error returned by the listit
estimator and averaged over the 1000 repetitions. The sample standard deviation is the standard
deviation of the coefficient estimates over the 1000 repetitions.
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Simulation Results























Figure 2.1: Coefficient Estimate Distribution
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Dark Grey Vertical Line:  True Parameter     Light Grey Vertical Lines:  Simulation Standard Deviations
Figure 2.2: Estimates By Various Administrative Procedures
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the coefficient point estimates varies with different administrative procedures. First,
standard errors shrink at a decreasing rate at the sample size grows, as expected. Sec-
ond, there is a curvilinear relationship between point estimate uncertainty and the
proportion of respondents in the control group. Standard errors are at their smallest
when the proportion is about half of the sample size, but differences in the magnitude
of the uncertainty only become substantial when the proportion approaches extreme
values. Third, standard errors appear to increase at approximately a constant rate
with list size, implying that the uncertainty “penalty” analysts must pay to grant
respondents anonymity does not become increasingly costlier as the list size grows.
Finally, the relationship between point estimate uncertainty and the uncertainty of
the non-sensitive items is also curvilinear. Standard errors are at their maximum
when we are least certain on the non-sensitive outcomes—i.e., when there are equal
chances of a yes or a no—and shrink on either side of the midpoint.12 This result
is consistent with the intuitive idea that greater certainty in the non-sensitive items
enables us to guess answers to the sensitive item because we “know” more about the
underlying composition of the list answers than if we are more uncertain about the
answers to the non-sensitive items.
Finally, note that, under extreme conditions, the estimation procedure can break
down, returning non-credibly large or small parameter estimates or otherwise fail-
ing to converge. Although this can occur with extreme values of the control group
proportion and the off-item probability, I focus here on estimation breakdowns with
small sample sizes. Figure 2.4 charts the failure rate of the estimation procedure for
sample sizes between 100 and 1000 respondents, defining a failure as either a non-
convergence, or an estimate three (corrected)13 standard deviations above or below
12The mean of a variable distributed Bernoulli is π with variance 1−π, and consequently we have
the most uncertainty (largest variance) when π = 1/2.
13Failures resulting in non-credibly large (small) estimates cause the mean standard errors and
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Effects of Question Administration Procedures on Standard Errors
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Figure 2.3: Standard Errors By Various Administrative Procedures
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the mean.14 Note that the failure rate is large at very small sample sizes, with fail-
ures occurring in approximately 150 of 1000 repetitions for a sample size of 100, but
quickly growing smaller as sample size increases, with hardly any occurring once the
sample size reaches about 1000 respondents. Although these breakdowns are likely
to be at least partially the result of numeric limitations in the application of opti-
mization algorithms (and thus may diminish as the coding improves),15 early results
suggest that this estimation procedure is not appropriate for small sample sizes, both
due to the possibility of an estimation breakdown as well as the large standard errors
returned at low sample sizes. In application, this suggests that the list experiment
procedure may not be suitable for small-sample elite surveys, but rather works for
mainstream mass attitude surveys utilizing larger sample sizes on the order of about
1000 respondents or more.
sample standard deviations to balloon. I calculate the “correct” standard errors in the following
manner, utilizing the formula that the standard error equals the standard deviation divided by
the square root of the sample size. I first obtain the “true” standard deviation by multiplying
the mean standard error for a simulation batch with a sample size of 2000 by the square-root of
2000 (N = 2000 chosen because the procedure appears very well-behaved at this point), and then
recalculate the “corrected” standard errors for the smaller sample sizes by dividing this “true”
standard deviation by the square-roots of the sample sizes. This procedure is of course not exact,
but it is intended only to demonstrate the magnitude of the estimation breakdowns.
14Note that 1 minus the standard normal density at three standard deviations is approximately
0.001, i.e., 1 in 1000, and thus we should expect one “failure” per batch of 1000 repetitions under
normal conditions.
15All simulations were conducted using the optim function in R, utilizing analytic log-likelihoods
and first derivatives. Although the listit procedure is functional as scripted, I make no pretense that




















Control Prop. = 1/2     List Size = 4     Off−Item Prob. = 3/4
Figure 2.4: Estimation Failures
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2.5 Field Test in Lebanon
In this section, I provide an overview of the first field test of the revised list experiment
administration procedure and the new listit statistical estimator. This field test is
based on an original public opinion survey conducted in Lebanon in the fall of 2005,
designed to study mass attitudes toward ethnic (sectarian) politics and government
institutions; the specific topic of study addressed here is the extension of voting rights.
I first provide a very brief summary of the political and social context in Lebanon from
which these data arise in Section 2.5. I next overview the ramifications of different
suffrage regimes in Lebanon as a way to motivate rival hypotheses about the factors
that influence support for the broad extension of the suffrage. I then proceed to
the data analysis itself in Section 3.4, using the list experiment and listit estimation
procedure to adjudicate between these rival hypotheses.
The field test analysis is based on data drawn from an original mass political
attitude survey designed to study ethnic politics, institutional preferences, and the
distribution of resources in Lebanon. Respondents were drawn randomly from a strat-
ified sample of Lebanese adults across all provinces and religious communities, for a
sample size of 1000 individuals. Beirut-based MADMA Co. administered the face-
to-face interviews in the fall of 2005, in a period approximately equally distant from
the spring 2005 pullout of the Syrian armed forces from Lebanon and the summer
2006 Israel-Hizballah armed conflict. MADMA’s sample frame is based on household
demographics surveys conducted in the late-1990s by the Lebanese government on
tens of thousands of households, for which the president of MADMA was a consul-
tant. Given the absence of official census data due to political sensitivity—the last
census was conducted in 1932—this represents among the most reliable sample frames
available in practice. The overall response rate was 70 percent, which did not vary
significantly between members of the religious communities.
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Lebanese Sectarian Politics
Section 2.5 provides a very brief explanation of the importance of sectarian poli-
tics in Lebanon, the key points of which are as follows.16 First, sectarian (ethnic)
cleavages are among the most salient in Lebanese politics. Second, these sectar-
ian cleavages overlap with socioeconomic status differences, and despite significant
within-community variation, Christian Lebanese are generally the wealthiest and best
educated, and Shia Lebanese are on average the poorest and least educated. Third,
the quota system defining the representation of the different religious communities
in the formal institutions of the state is unequitable from a perspective based purely
on demographic weight, with Christians somewhat overrepresented and Shiites espe-
cially underrepresented. These three broad contextual factors are important when
considering attitudes toward voting rights, the subject of the data analysis.
Importance of sectarian cleavages. Lebanese society is a plural one, with its
population distributed among close to 20 religious sects—mostly various branches of
Christianity and Islam—none of which individually comprises a majority of the pop-
ulation. Although the Christian communities combined constituted the majority as
of independence in 1943, subsequent demographic changes in the form of differential
birthrates and emigration patterns have shifted the balance in favor of the Muslim
sects writ large. Particularly notable has been the growth of the Shia Muslim com-
munity, formerly the smallest of the “big three” sects (along with Maronite Christians
and Sunni Muslims), but now widely acknowledged to be the most populous single
sect in Lebanon. Although religion provides the nominal boundaries of social group
membership, political disputes are rarely over religious issues. Instead, Lebanese
16I make no attempt to cover all of the intricacies of Lebanese public life, which at times can
appear exceptionally Byzantine, but rather adopt the goal of providing sufficient background to
enable readers with minimal prior exposure to the country to follow the arguments made and the
rationale for the variables selected for analysis in Section 3.4.
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politics are largely sectarian, taking on the general dynamics of ethnic politics in
which the sects function as ethnic groups or, using the common Lebanese pejorative,
“tribes.”
Sectarian cleavages and socioeconomic disparities. A notable feature of Le-
banese society is that sectarian affiliations are highly salient, and further, these af-
filiations correlate with socioeconomic status. Despite significant variation within
communities, Christians are perceived to be richer, well-educated, and hold higher-
status occupations such as lawyers and doctors,17 and Shiites are perceived as poor,
ignorant, and to hold low-status jobs such as day laborers and farmers.18 Although
this characterization was more accurate in the first few decades of independence,
and despite the growth of a wealthier and educated middle class within the Shia
community, the basic tropes about community differences persist. These stereotypes
are based in part on conventional wisdom and in part on objective conditions, with
Shia-majority areas of the country generally much poorer, less developed, and less
connected to basic government services and infrastructure than other areas.19
17According to survey results, Christians have attained significantly higher levels of education
than have Muslims in general, as well as greater facility with foreign languages (particularly French,
the language of the former Mandatory power and the adopted language of high culture), although
there is little sampling difference between Sunni and Shia respondents on these measures.
18Anecdotally, the party newspaper of the Amal Movement, one of the two major Shia political
parties along with Hizballah, is subject to considerable dark humor. One version of a prevailing
joke is that the interior pages are blank because Amal members do not read. For more thorough
accounts of the Shia in Lebanon, see, among others, Ajami (1986), Madini (1999¨), Fahs (1996¨),
Gharib (2001¨), and Norton (1987).
19The principle areas of Shia population concentrations are in the South and Bekaa Valley
provinces, and the southern suburbs of Beirut, the capital. Compare the description of the “misery
belt” around Beirut and conditions in the South and Bekaa in Hudson (1968) with more contempo-
rary accounts in Gaspard (2004) and Makdisi (2004).
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Political malrepresentation of the sects. The Lebanese political system is based
on power-sharing arrangements and a quota system dating back to the period of the
French Mandate with antecedents in the Ottoman era, with seats in parliament and
positions in the civil service distributed among the sects, and certain high positions of
state reserved for particular communities. Decades of change upset the demographic
balance on which this power distribution was initially based, and the country resur-
rected a modified version of the original system at the end of its 1975–1990 civil war
that partially but incompletely redressed these imbalances by shifting some political
power away from the Christian and toward the Muslim communities. Despite these
reforms, however, Christians remain somewhat overrepresented in the formal distribu-
tion of power, and the Shia in particular face the largest degree of malrepresentation
as compared to their respective shares of the population.20 Most post-war political
and social issues have retained a strong sectarian character. Although the bloc na-
ture of these communities is often overstated, it is clear that the communities and
their elites guard their prerogatives with care. Christians watch with anxiety as their
population share erodes, Shiites with resentment as their population centers continue
to be provided with comparatively meager government services and infrastructure,
and non-Shiites with suspicion as Hizballah continues to grow in influence within the
Shia community.
20At independence, parliamentary representation was set to a 6:5 ratio between Christian and
Muslim deputies—based on the Christian majority in the 1932 census of dubious accuracy—with
a dominant (Maronite Christian) president, weak (Sunni Muslim) prime minister, and weaker still
(Shia Muslim) speaker of parliament. The post-war reforms changed the parliamentary deputy ratio
to parity, and strengthened the prime minister, cabinet, and speaker of parliament while diminishing
the powers of the president. No census has been conducted since 1932 due to the political sensitivity
of the results, but population estimates suggest that the Christian communities combined now
account for around 40 percent of the population, and the Shia community is now the largest single
sect (around 30 percent of the population, although estimates as high as 50 percent exist).
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Voting Rights Under Ethnic Competition
Given the ramifications of who has the right to vote on eventual electoral and policy
outcomes, we might wonder how ethnic (sectarian) competition influences attitudes
toward the extension of the suffrage. In particular, we might wonder if attitudes
are responsive to social group identity, or if they are responsive to socioeconomic
differences that overlap with this group identity. In Lebanon’s case, given the three
broad points discussed in Section 2.5—the importance of sectarian cleavages, their
overlap with socioeconomic status, and the underrepresentation of the largest and
poorest community in the state’s formal institutions—we might wonder if attitudes
vary according to sectarian identity or according to socioeconomic conditions. If the
former is true, we would expect Shiites, given their demographic plurality and their
malrepresentation in government, to be particularly supportive of the most permissive
view on voting rights, and to do so because they are Shiites rather than because they
are poor. If the latter is true, we would expect poorer individuals to be particularly
supportive of the broadest possible application of the suffrage for its redistributive
repercussions, and to do so because they are poor rather than because they are
members of particular communities.
Although these rival hypotheses are reasonably straightforward and make mutu-
ally exclusive predictions, adjudicating between them is significantly complicated by
the fact that the extension of the suffrage is a sensitive topic, and answers to direct
questions about who should have the right to vote likely suffer from response bias.
First, the extension of voting rights, apart from their distributional consequences, is
a normative question for which there is a clear socially desirable response in favor of
universal voting rights.21 Yet apart from these normative considerations, universal
21Although restrictions on certain classes of individuals—resident aliens, minors, expatriates, and
so on—are common across democracies and differences of opinion on these restrictions are accepted as
legitimate, most countries have constitutional clauses against discrimination based on race, religion,
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(or near-universal) suffrage also has significant redistributive repercussions, as the
nineteenth-century debate in Europe over the extension of voting rights beyond the
propertied classes demonstrated. Given the stylized fact that poorer people prefer
more redistribution, we might expect wealthier individuals to be sympathetic to at-
tempts to restrict the impact of the poor vote, but to be restrained from saying so
given the normative implications of such a discriminatory restriction.
Given the discussion above, we might expect questions about the extension of the
suffrage to be sensitive in Lebanon, and particularly so for Shia respondents. Recall
that, despite the prevailing conventional wisdom that Shiites are generally poor and
uneducated, there is nonetheless significant variation within this community, includ-
ing a relatively new middle class as well as an upper class composed of both old and
new money. In a recent study on the Shiites of the South (considered among the
most backward in the community), one researcher noted that the individuals most
disapproving of her choice of topic were well-heeled, educated Shiites “who embraced
traditional urbane Lebanese formulas and prejudices with even more francophone fer-
vor than their Christian compatriots” because the topic “touched an unhappy chord
in their own identity” (Chalabi 2006, 1). Such individuals are caught between possi-
bly conflicting influences: community-based interests to grant the broadest possible
voting rights given their community’s underrepresentation in power, and economic
interests to limit the impact of the poor vote and thus the scope of redistribution.
Given the importance of sectarianism in Lebanese politics and political discourse,
however, it is particularly difficult to express support for policies that could dis-
advantage one’s community against the others, making restriction of the franchise
particularly sensitive for Shiites.
ethnic group, sex, and so on.
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Data analysis
Given the sensitivity due to the sectarian implications of extending or restricting the
suffrage, as well as the normative implications that make broadly extended voting
rights the socially desirable answer, I employ a list experiment procedure to analyze
Lebanese preferences over who gets the right to vote. In particular, I use this pro-
cedure to adjudicate between the two rival hypotheses outlined in Section 2.5, the
first being that preferences follow from sectarian affiliation, and the second being that
preferences follow from material conditions regardless of sectarian affiliation.
I conducted this experiment in the context of important political changes in
Lebanon which made debates over government institutions and electoral procedures
particularly widespread. After the domestic political balance was upended by the
assassination of former Prime Minister Rafik Hariri in February 2005, the subsequent
mass demonstrations, and the Syrian pullout from the country, the public debate
over electoral institutions and electoral laws took on added salience in the lead-up
to the parliamentary elections held in late-spring of that year. Although the main
discussion was over the relative merits of small versus large districts and proportional
representation versus plurality voting, a sub-thread of this debate was a discussion of
who should be allowed to vote at all. In particular, the question centered on young
Lebanese and expatriates. Although the voting age is 21, many wanted it reduced to
18, while others pressed for the extension of voting rights to expatriates. Although
both proposals would have sectarian implications, proponents and detractors on both
issues discussed their positions openly.22
22In particular, the more vocal supporters of reducing the voting age to 18 tended to be Muslim
given that the Muslim communities are younger than the Christian communities, although numerous
Christian leaders made public declarations of support for reducing the voting age as well. Meanwhile,
the most vocal supporters of extending voting rights to expatriates tended to be Christian given
the large size of the Christian expatriate community, although numerous Muslim leaders expressed
willingness to support expatriate voting as well.
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The list experiment was conducted as follows. After splitting the sample randomly
into treatment and control groups on a 3:1 ratio,23 all respondents were read the
following prompt:
There has been some debate recently over who should have the right to
vote in Lebanese elections. I’ll read you some different groups of people:
please tell me if they should be allowed to vote or not.
Respondents were then given the following list of options:
1. Young people between the ages of 18 to 21
2. Lebanese expatriates living abroad
3. Illiterate people
4. Palestinians without Lebanese citizenship
Control group respondents were asked to give yes or no responses to each of the items
individually. Treatment group respondents were asked to answer how many of the
groups should be allowed to vote and not which ones.24
I selected the first and second groups, young adults and expatriates, based on
the fact that their voting rights were salient and openly discussed in Lebanese public
discourse, and thus helped to validate the prompt for respondents that there had
23I chose to put three-quarters of the sample in the treatment group to ensure a sufficiently large
number of responses should treatment group respondents not understand the procedure or else refuse
to answer, although in retrospect these cautions were unnecessary and a more optimal 1:1 ratio split
would have not have caused problems in practice.
24More specifically, treatment group respondents were prompted with the following statement,
which replicates the prompt used in older applications of the list experiment:
I’m going to read you the whole list, and then I want you to tell me how many of the
different groups you think should be allowed to vote. Don’t tell me which ones, just
tell me how many.
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recently been debate over who should have the right to vote.25 I selected the fourth
group, non-citizen Palestinians, to provide respondents with a group to whom most
would not grant voting rights, and thus minimizing the chance that a respondent
would say yes to all of the list items. The third group, illiterate people, is the sensitive
option. Although there are plausible and socially-acceptable reasons for restricting
the franchise in the cases of the other options listed, preventing people from voting
simply due to low educational status is difficult to justify in normative terms. Further,
in addition to the distributive implications of voting rights for illiterates—who are
almost certainly poor and sympathetic to redistribution—there are also sectarian
implications. In particular, “illiterate people” can be perceived as an indirect way
of discussing Shiites given the conventional wisdom and stereotypes that persist in
Lebanon’s sectarian rank-ordering.
To adjudicate between rival hypotheses and to assess the impact of sensitivity
on responses, I analyzed attitudes toward voting rights for illiterate people when the
question is asked directly, and when it is asked indirectly via the list experiment. The
former comes from control group yes/no responses to the “illiterate people” item on
the list. Note that responses to this question are unnecessary for the purposes of
analyzing the list experiment data (and thus ordinarily it need not be asked at all),
but I asked it of control group respondents in order to provide a comparison between
the direct and indirect means of eliciting respondent attitudes. For both estimation
procedures, logit for the direct question and listit for the indirect list question, I
utilized the same set of explanatory variables.
The first set of covariates comprises three community dummy variables, Shia,
Sunni, and Muslim Minority (for Druze and Alawi respondents), making Christians
25It is plausible that, without at least some list items grounded in actual public debate, respondents
may be prompted by the novelty of the list options to look for the indirect rationale for asking the
question—precisely what the analyst does not want. This point is an administrative rather than
mechanical issue, and as such should be subject to further social psychological inquiry.
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the baseline category. Because the question asks about voting rights for illiterate
people, I control for Education, a five-point indicator rescaled 0–1 for ease of inter-
pretation.26 As a measure of material well-being and access to basic government
services, I used Electricity, which is the average number of hours per day the elec-
tricity is off in the respondent’s home, modeled with a square-root transformation.27
Finally, I included Deconfess, an indicator variable taking on the value of 1 when
respondents cited “the people” in an open-response question to who they believe
would benefit most from the deconfessionalization of the parliament (i.e., removing
the sectarian quotas for seats), and 0 otherwise.28 Deconfess provides a measure of
respondent attitudes toward fuller democratization in the majoritarian sense.29
If the sectarian affiliation hypothesis is correct, we should see a positive, statis-
tically significant coefficient on Shia, indicating that Shiites are relatively more sup-
portive than Christians (the baseline) of allowing illiterate people to vote—indicating
26The question asks for the highest level of education the respondent has reached, with the fol-
lowing categories: Illiterate, Primary, Secondary, Bachelor’s Degree, and Master’s Degree or Higher.
27Using an alternate transformation of the natural log of one plus the number of hours produces
qualitatively similar results. Note that electricity is provided by the much-maligned state-run elec-
trical company, 	àA 	JJ. Ë Z AK. Qê»–Électricité du Liban (www.edl.gov.lb). Note also that, unfortunately,
large numbers of respondents refused to answer standard income questions, making it infeasible to
measure material well-being with such an indicator.
28The open-response question text reads as: “Which Lebanese group do you think benefits the
most from deconfessionalization of the parliament? This could be any group, for instance, a political
party, a sectarian group, the middle class, or whatever.” I categorized answers as “the people” when
respondents used clear variants on that phrase, including such options as “citizens” or “the nation”
(other answers given included particular parties, leaders, sects, and social classes). In the full sample,
705 respondents (70 percent) gave this answer, whereas in the community sub-samples, 66 percent of
Shiites, 87 percent of Sunnis, 61 percent of Christians, and 46 percent of Muslim Minorities answered
with “the people.”
29Note that 241 of 251 (96 percent) of control group respondents answered in the affirmative
for extending the suffrage to youths age 18–21, and 9 of 210 (4 percent) supported non-citizen
Palestinian voting rights. Due to the fact that youth nos and Palestinian yeses are rare events
which makes modeling with covariates unstable, I use the covariates described in the main text as
predictors only for attitudes on voting rights for illiterate people and expatriates, whereas the youth
and Palestinian list items are modeled with intercept terms only.
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that they are more supportive precisely because they are Shia. If the material wel-
fare hypothesis is correct, we should expect to see no significant results on any of
the community indicators, but rather a positive coefficient on Electricity, indicating
that poorer individuals who lack access to basic services are more likely to support
illiterate voting rights, and to do so because they are poor rather than members of a
particular community.
LOGIT LISTIT
b se(b) b se(b)
Shia 2.017 0.775 † −0.351 0.953
Sunni 0.372 0.500 −0.517 0.949
Muslim Minority −0.577 0.772 −0.439 1.365
Electricity 0.259 0.172 0.880 0.310 †
Deconfess 0.531 0.440 1.619 0.968 
Education −1.279 0.953 −0.348 1.332
Intercept 0.936 0.824 −1.341 1.036
ln L −92.182 −951.918
Nt 238 714
Nc · · · 195
p ≤ 0.01† p ≤ 0.05⋆ p ≤ 0.10
Table 2.1: Experiment Results
Table 2.1 reports results in two columns: estimates from a standard logistic re-
gression procedure applied to responses to the direct question asked of control group
respondents (left), and estimates from a listit procedure applied to treatment group
responses to the indirect question asked in the list format (right). Note that, because
the coefficients returned by the listit procedure are in fact logit coefficients, the pa-
rameter estimates are directly comparable between the columns. Let us first examine
what happens when we ask the question directly as if it were not sensitive and sub-
ject to response bias. As the left column of Table 2.1 reports, the only statistically
significant factor influencing attitudes toward illiterate voting rights is membership
in the Shia community. The very large, positive coefficient on Shia indicates that
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Figure 2.6: Probability Differences, Deconfess = 1
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are no statistically discernible effects associated with material conditions, to be more
supportive because they are Shiite than because they are poor. These findings, if
taken at face value, provide evidence in favor of the sectarian affiliation hypothesis,
and against the material conditions hypothesis.
Let us now compare this first set of findings with what happens when we acknowl-
edge and attempt to neutralize the sensitivity of the voting rights question by asking
it indirectly via the list experiment. A brief glance at the two columns indicates
that the estimates differ in substantively crucial ways and yield qualitatively different
interpretations. First, after accounting for the sensitivity of the question, there are
no direct sectarian community effects. The Shia coefficient shrinks dramatically to
less than a fifth of its original magnitude, and the point estimate actually becomes
negative. No community effects are even close to statistical significance, with stan-
dard errors that are roughly two to three times the size of their respective coefficient
estimates. Second, the effect of material conditions is now both statistically and sub-
stantively very significant. The coefficient on Electricity is more than three times
larger than reported in the direct question model, indicating that increasing depri-
vation leads to greater support for illiterate voting rights. Further, Deconfess, the
effect of which was modest and statistically insignificant in the direct question model,
is now substantively large as well as statistically significant (albeit at the marginal
p ≤ .10 level), indicating that individuals predisposed to fuller democratization in the
majoritarian sense are also more likely to support voting rights for illiterates. Fig-
ures 2.5 and 2.6 illustrate these effects graphically as first differences with 95-percent
confidence intervals around those differences.30
30The left panel in either figure is the difference in probability of support between the named
community and baseline Christians with Education set to the sample median and Electricity set
to the sample mean. The right panel tracks the differences in probability compared to a baseline
respondent whose electricity was never off, with Education set to the sample median. Figure 2.5
shows the effects when Deconfess is set to 0 (i.e., the respondent did not cite “the people”), and
Figure 2.6 shows the effects when Deconfess is set to 0 (i.e., the respondent cited “the people”).
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In short, when asking a direct question about illiterate voting rights as if it were
not sensitive, we get a sectarian answer: Shiites are more supportive of illiterate voting
because they are Shiites. If, however, we acknowledge the question’s sensitivity and
attempt to do something about it by asking it indirectly, we find that support does
not vary according to community membership, but according to individual material
conditions. Shiites on the whole might be more supportive of illiterate voting, but this
is because they are poorer than members of the other communities, and not because
they are Shiites—and analogous conclusions follow for Christians, Sunnis, Druze, and
so on. Hence, attempting to neutralize the sensitivity of the voting rights question
via the list experiment yields polar opposite inferences from the ones we can make
when we do not attempt to account for this sensitivity.
2.6 Discussion
In this paper, I have discussed some of the problems we encounter when attempting to
study sensitive topics with self-reported survey data, and demonstrated how such data
can be exceedingly misleading when we attempt to draw inferences. Although the
list experiment (item count technique) provides a promising means for data collection
when dealing with sensitive topics, this promise has been largely untapped due to a
lack of adequate means to analyze these data. Here, I have extended the usefulness
of the list experiment by improving our capacity for data analysis by deriving a
new statistical estimator, listit, that enables us to employ multivariate analysis on
list experiment data. I explored the properties of this estimator with Monte Carlo
simulations, showing that listit returns consistent coefficient estimates, and that the
degree of certainty about these estimates depends in part on how we administer the
procedure to respondents. I then provided a first, practical application of this new
procedure using original survey data from Lebanon, demonstrating how inferences can
change dramatically when we acknowledge and attempt to neutralize the sensitivity
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of the questions we ask.
Although I used Lebanese survey data to study attitudes toward illiterate voting
rights when conducting the first field test of the new procedure, readers will undoubt-
edly have little difficulty in imagining applications of the list experiment to substantive
questions and research venues chosen to fit their specific interests. Given the wide
range of sensitive topics studied in the social sciences—race and politics, corruption,
drug use, tax evasion, sexuality, support for terrorism, and the list goes on—there
is clearly a large and diverse body of work that can make use of the improved list
experiment procedure to address one of the most glaring and seemingly intractible
problems on the practical data analysis side: question sensitivity. As the theoretical
development of the response bias problem and the results from the Lebanon field test
demonstrate, attempting to neutralize these sensitivity effects can have very marked
effects on the inferences we are able to draw.
In particular, this suggests that those stylized facts about sensitive topics that
have emerged iteratively from self-reported empirical data—findings that originated
in data exploration, followed by theorizing, followed by more data exploration, and
so on—should probably be reexamined with a procedure such as the list experiment.
Although the original findings may very well hold up, if the initial data-derived expla-
nations were in fact derived from faulty data suffering from sensitivity and response
bias, a significant rewrite of the stylized facts may be in order. Further, question
sensitivity may also help account for hypotheses originating in well-grounded theory
that inexplicably have not held up well to empirics. Although it is always possible
(albeit disappointing to its author) that a given hypothesis is simply wrong, it is also
possible that the hypothesis is correct but response bias prevents the analyst from
finding empirical support for it. This is not meant to be a call for a wholesale reexami-
nation of discarded hypotheses, but rather to suggest that a common difficulty—good
theory, no reliable way to test it—may no longer be quite so insurmountable if the
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primary difficulty is question sensitivity.
The extended list experiment procedure developed in this paper is not without
costs and limitations, of course. First, there is an unavoidable precision cost associ-
ated with using the list experiment procedure. Although the list experiment may help
us neutralize incentives for respondents to misrepresent themselves and thus enables
us to estimate consistent coefficients, the standard errors around these point esti-
mates are non-trivially larger than they would be if we were able to ask the question
directly and there were no response bias. This comparison is a somewhat misleading
one to make, however, because we really do not have this choice to make in practice.
If sensitivity is a characteristic of the data-generating process, we cannot assume or
wish it away, but we can do something about it by acknowledging and attempting
to neutralize it. Hence, larger standard errors are simply the cost of doing business
when the question is sensitive. Further, it is a cost we should gladly pay: precise
estimates around the wrong answer are precisely wrong, and far worse than more
tentative estimates around the right answer.
Further, the precision of these estimates may be manipulated by changing ele-
ments of the question administration procedure. In some senses, precision is one of
those rare issues that may, all else equal, be improved simply by throwing money at it:
paying to administer more interviews increases the sample size and thus decreases the
size of the standard errors at the familiar rate of quadrupling the sample size to halve
the standard errors. Two other manipulations are available: changing the size of the
list itself, and selecting non-sensitive list items that are more or less “sure things.”
Monte Carlo results show that standard errors are at their lowest when the list size
is small and we are almost certain of the answer to non-sensitive items. Yet there is
an important note of caution to make before choosing these administrative procedure
parameters: the anonymity of the list experiment must appear credible to the respon-
dents, not to the analysts. This, in turn, is no longer simply a mechanical issue, but
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rather a social psychological one. The list size must be big enough for respondents to
feel comfortable that their answers to the sensitive question are unidentifiable, and
how big “big enough” must be is a question that requires psychological study.
Likewise, how respondents perceive the non-sensitive list items is a psychological
rather than mechanical question. Items that are practically “sure things” are me-
chanically desirable because they increase the precision of the estimates in which we
are interested, but may not be credible to respondents. If respondents do not believe
that the non-sensitive items are sufficient to provide anonymity to their responses to
the sensitive item, then the whole purpose of administering the list experiment has
been compromised. In other words, an important next step is to research the psy-
chology, rather than the mechanics, of the list experiment. This research is necessary
to investigate how large a list is required to convince respondents of their anonymity
(and if that size varies from question to question), as well as the composition of the
non-sensitive items necessary to maintain the credibility of the list experiment.
Despite these limitations and unresolved questions, however, the revised list ex-
periment procedure presented herein holds considerable promise as a means first to
elicit honest responses to sensitive questions, and then to analyze these responses in
a rigorous way. Although further research and successful field tests will of course
increase our confidence in the procedure, the initial findings contained in this paper




Institutional Choice in Lebanon
Democracy is, by and large, scarce in Arab and Muslim countries. Is this because
of, independent of, or in spite of Islam? Autocracies rule most states with large
Muslim populations, and the democracies that do exist are new, fragile, or both.
Casual empiricism suggests a link between authoritarianism and Islam, but the de-
gree to which this form of government reflects the political preferences or cultural
predilections of Muslims is the subject of a lively debate. Is Islam compatible with
democracy? We have considerable evidence of what Muslim theologians and politi-
cians think: the answers are yes, no, and maybe. Interpretation of doctrine could
go either way depending on who does the interpreting and what pieces of doctrine
are privileged. Yet this debate may be missing the point: Islam neither votes nor
stages coups nor demonstrates—Muslims do. The more accurate question, albeit still
polemical, is this: are Muslims compatible with democracy?
Systematic studies of what ordinary Muslims believe that use representative sur-
vey data rare. Those that do exist provide exploratory evidence demonstrating that
the empirical link between religiosity and democratic attitudes among Muslims is
weak and spotty—pious Muslims are only mildly more autocratic in their opinions, if
at all. Yet there is an epistemological limitation inherent in these initial explorations:
by and large, they only study Muslims, and furthermore, only Sunni Muslims. Put
another way, in most existing studies examining the links between religion and democ-
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racy, a key explanatory variable, religious doctrine, does not vary.1 But without this
variance, we cannot know if what we observe is actually the result of Islam at all.
If we examine only Sunni Muslims in Sunni-dominant societies, we cannot infer, one
way or the other, if the attitudes we observe are specifically Sunni attitudes, if they
are common to Islam in its several doctrinal branches, or if they generalize across
religions.
We must have variance in religious doctrine in order to make causal inferences.
Islam may influence attitudes toward democracy among ordinary Muslims, but to
find out we must also study non-Muslims. Further, Islam’s effect on preference for-
mation may be contingent on political context, but to know we must also study
non-Muslims in the same context. We cannot meet these epistemological require-
ments simply by surveying a Shia- or Christian-dominant society and comparing the
patterns of relationships with those found in a Sunni-dominant country. Not only
would these societies differ in terms of religious traditions, but also in a host of other
contextual and structural ways—types of government institutions, characteristics of
salient political cleavages, levels of economic development, colonial experiences, and
so on—that would hopelessly confound our ability to draw inferences on the specific
influence of religious doctrine on attitude formation. In other words, to study the
“Islam effect,” we must have within-society comparison groups to introduce variation
on the “religious doctrine” variable.
In this paper, I utilize the plural society found in Lebanon as a living laboratory to
investigate the degree to which attitude formation toward democracy reflects specific
1Compare, for example, Al-Suwaidi (1995), Grant and Tessler (2002), and Tessler (1997, 2002,
2003). More precisely, the surveys used have primarily targeted Sunni Muslims in Sunni-dominant
societies. When non-Sunni minorities are present in the target population, such as Christians in
Egypt, Jordan, and Palestine (i.e., the West Bank and Gaza), or Shiites in Kuwait, they are usually
dropped from the sample or dropped from the analysis to aid comparability between Sunnis. Most
studies focus on Sunni Islam at least in part because it is the doctrinal tradition of the majority of
Muslims worldwide, as well as the tradition of the rulers in most Muslim countries.
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doctrinal backgrounds, actual religious practice, and political incentives. Using data
from an original political attitude survey, I show that religiosity has only a mild effect
by itself, but, in conjunction with political awareness, helps moderate the impact of
sectarianism on preferences over government institutions, thereby reducing support
for a variety of autocratic options. I show, further, that when people express support
for the use of religious law in public life, this support follows from a desire for religious
guidance in economic rather than political affairs—religion for the sake of social justice
rather than its own sake. These dynamics, furthermore, operate across religious
doctrines.
Studying attitudes toward democracy in Lebanese society yields considerable epis-
temological gains. In particular, we find important variation in religious traditions
among the Lebanese: in addition to Sunni Muslims, there are also sizable Shia Mus-
lim and Christian populations, enabling us to assess the effects of doctrinal variation
while holding political incentive structures constant. Yet these potential epistemolog-
ical gains come with a complication. As is the case in many other religiously-diverse
societies, religion enters politics in Lebanon only partially via doctrine per se. It also
influences political competition via sectarianism, in which nominal religious group
identity marks membership in the country’s sects, or, to use the Lebanese pejorative,
the “tribes.” Although we must have variation in doctrine and therefore a multire-
ligious research venue, we must also be able to disentangle the effects of adherence
to religious doctrines with membership in religious groups. We must, in other words,
parse out the effects of nominal religious group affiliation from personal religiosity,
and personal religiosity from sectarianism.
Privileging Lebanese society for analysis means, of course, learning something sub-
stantive about Lebanon, but what Lebanon can teach us about a more general set of
issues makes it of theoretical utility in a broader sense. Via study of this particular
society, we can learn more about not only democratic attitudes and institutional pref-
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erences in the Arab and Muslim worlds, but also politics in plural societies and the
interaction of religion and politics. While such issues are perhaps most salient today
in Iraq, there are clear applications to societies as different as those found in Northern
Ireland, Nigeria, and the Balkan states, where religion helps define the boundaries of
competing political groups, and more broadly to ethnically diverse societies however
group boundaries are defined. Section 3.1 summarizes some of the main arguments
about democracy and autocracy within Muslim tradition and Arab culture, as well as
more general propositions about the interaction of religion and politics. Section 3.2
provides an overview of Lebanese society, focusing on key contextual aspects (govern-
ment institutions and sectarian competition) we should expect to influence Lebanese
institutional preferences, with hypotheses presented more explicitly in Section 3.3.
Section 3.4 presents the data and analysis, and Section 3.5 discusses the implications
of the findings.
3.1 Religion and Politics, Religion in Politics
Although democracy in Muslim societies appears to be a rarity, the Arab Middle East
in particular stands out cross-regionally as an apparent bastion of autocracy. Among
the competing explanations for this Arab exceptionalism is a recurring narrative that
cites Arab culture and Islam as central and intertwined elements contributing to au-
tocratic outcomes.2 Such arguments are based, to greater or lesser degrees, on three
broad planks: first, Arab (and Muslim) political culture is authoritarian in nature
and biased toward veneration of strong leaders, second, Islam is incompatible with
democracy, and third, Islam does not separate religion and politics. Yet these three
broad points, either taken together or in isolation, do not provide adequate explana-
2For a sampling of Arab and Islamic culture arguments, see Ajami (1981), Harik (1994), Kedourie
(1992), and Korany (1994). For a sampling of arguments rejecting these narratives in favor of political
economy explanations, see Crystal (1994), Posusney (2004) and contributors to the same symposium
edition of Comparative Politics, and Waterbury (1994).
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tions for the autocratic outcomes—or at least their uniqueness—that we observe. I
discuss each point in turn.
Cultural predilections for strong leaders. Arab political culture is widely cited
as authoritarian in nature, with presumed negative consequences for the emergence of
an autonomous civil society, a politically-active middle class, and internally-democratic
political parties. According to this narrative, such cultural authoritarianism leads to
the veneration of charismatic leaders and excessive deference to authority. Yet au-
thoritarian political culture, to the degree that it exists, is not unique to the Arab
world. Such claims have been advanced at various times about other world cultures
that appear to suffer from a democratic deficit, with similar assessments surfacing
over the years to account for autocratic outcomes in Latin America, Africa, and Asia.
Although we might question the explanatory power of cultural arguments, to the de-
gree that they are valid, by themselves they cannot account for the uniquely pervasive
autocracies in the Arab Middle East because authoritarianism is not unique to Arab
political culture. This has led many observers to focus on Islam as one of the defining
features of the cultural and political heritage of these societies that make them, if not
exactly unique (compare the prevalence of Islam in the non-Arab societies of Africa
and Asia), at least significantly different from Western societies.
Islam is incompatible with democracy. One prominent view holds that Islam is
an anti-modern force that is incompatible with modern democratic political systems.
Kedourie (1992, 5–6), for example, elaborates this view:
The notion of popular sovereignty as the foundation of governmental le-
gitimacy, the idea of representation, of elections, of popular suffrage, of
political institutions being regulated by laws laid down by a parliamentary
assembly, of these laws being guarded and upheld by an independent ju-
diciary, the ideas of the secularity of the state, of society being composed
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of a multitude of self-activating, autonomous groups and associations—all
these are profoundly alien to the Muslim political tradition.
Yet others observe that significant diversity has always existed within interpreta-
tions of Islam. Muhammad Fadlallah, one of Lebanon’s most senior and influential
Shia religious leaders, observes that “Islam is Islam: we do not have theoretical Is-
lam or applied Islam, nor do we have extremist Islam or moderate Islam. . . For our
purposes here, the understanding of Islam varies according to differences in interpre-
tation.”3 Furthermore, although some traditionalists and fundamentalists do hold
beliefs, consistent with Kedourie’s assessment, that democracy directly contradicts
Islamic thought because it relies on human rather than divine legislation, other Mus-
lim intellectuals, variously labeled as reformists, modernists, and accommodationists,
have sought to synthesize Muslim values and traditions with new, non-indigenous
practices. This synthesis sometimes takes the form of citing Islamic doctrine as “an-
ticipating” democracy, and builds on well-established Islamic principles of consulta-
tion, independent reasoning, and consensus.4 More generally, the diversity with which
Islam may be interpreted has clear analogues with other spiritual traditions. Bellin
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4Compare (Abed 1995) and (Esposito and Piscatori 1991). Finding Islamic precedents for demo-
cratic practice follows from more than a desire to express democratic concepts in locally-relevant
parlance. As Choueiri (1996, 24) notes, “in contemporary Islamic thought, democracy is denuded
of its neutral connotations and descriptive attributes. Like socialism, it is considered to rest on a
comprehensive worldview. Being an expression of a philosophical substructure, it cannot be con-
fined to administrative procedures.” Given the often-stated comprehensiveness of Islam, this implies
that reconciling Islam and democracy is in part a theoretical exercise in reconciling two worldviews,
rather than simply practicing Islam through democratic channels.
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(2004, 141), for example, notes that other religious traditions, notably Catholicism
and Confucianism, have faced claims of their incompatibility with democracy, yet
have not prevented countries in Latin America, southern Europe, and East Asia from
democratizing. Likewise, the Judeo-Christian tradition was once made consistent
with political absolutism and the divine rights of kings, and was only later reinter-
preted to accommodate democratic ideals. Islamic doctrine, in this regard, is similar
to the doctrines of other faiths: one may find elements consistent with democracy
and elements consistent with autocracy, and the religion’s compatibility in principle
with either depends on which points one stresses and which points one deemphasizes.
Islam does not separate religion from politics. Despite this room for inter-
pretation, considerable bodies of both Western and Muslim scholarship continue to
emphasize the inseparability of religion and politics within Islam, often contraposing
the Christian “rendering unto Caesar” to an implicit Islamic “God is Caesar.” Yet
not everyone would cede even this distinction. Musa al-Sadr, the religious figure who
played the leading role in mobilizing the Lebanese Shia into politics in the 1960s and
1970s, noted at one point that “both Islam and Christianity reject the separation
of church and state. . . Christ said ‘render unto God what is God’s and unto Caesar
what is Caesar’s,’ yet he refused to turn everything over to Caesar.”5 The exten-
sion of religion into politics is again not unique to Muslim societies, as evident by
the proliferation of religious and reliopolitical movements around the world since the
1970s and 1980s. Eickelman and Piscatori (1996, 56) note that the presupposition
of the union of religion and politics exaggerates the uniqueness of Muslim societies,
5Sadr quoted in (Fadlallah 1997¨, 87). The original Arabic:
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citing movements as diverse as the (Protestant) Moral Majority in the United States,
(Catholic) liberation theology and base ecclesiastical communities in Latin America,
Sikh activists in India, and Buddhist monks in Burma and Vietnam as practitioners
of religious politics that sometimes assert the indivisibility of religion and politics.6
Yet despite the common refrain that Islam does not separate religion and politics,
the programs of Islamist movements, rest in many cases on particular, distinctive
interpretations of religious doctrine that are at odds with ordinary Muslims’ under-
standings of their faith, often disparaging the traditional religious practices that form
the basis of popular faith and the rule of religious law (Nasr 1995). This dynamic
suggests that political support for Islamist political movements may not necessarily
follow from personal religiosity. One explanation for the divergence of Islamist pro-
grams from more mainstream interpretations of Islam is that, although some move-
ments are headed by religious scholars, they are often led by lay individuals with little
systematic training in Islamic law. Keddie (1998, 715) notes that, although the Ira-
nian revolution gave impetus to the further growth of Islamist movements outside of
Iran, these movements were nearly always headed not by clerical figures but rather by
individuals with Western or Westernized educations. Al-Suwaidi (1995, 93) attributes
the “quasi-totalitarian” character of Islamic opposition movements in part to the fact
that their leaders are versed in neither Islamic jurisprudence nor even Islamic history.
Furthermore, there is growing evidence that popular support for Islamist programs
is based more on the political and economic conditions of the societies in which they
operate rather than the religiosity of their inhabitants, and that personal religiosity
may in fact act as a check on political radicalization. Although some Islamist move-
ments may interpret Islam in ways inconsistent with democracy, Al-Suwaidi (1995,
93) notes that not everyone accepts these interpretations, and that their programs are
6For overviews on the issue of religious revival and religion and politics more generally, compare,
among a vast literature, Gill (2001), Iannaccone (1998), Juergensmeyer (1995), and Keddie (1998).
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often too political to appeal to traditional mainstream Muslims. Tessler (1997, 93,
110–111), meanwhile, notes that some survey evidence exists suggesting that higher
degrees of personal piety makes individuals less supportive of the political aspects of
Islamist programs, a finding which contradicts the assessments of movement leaders
themselves, who in most cases insist that their popular support derives from the reli-
gious faith of their mass constituencies. Popular support, in other words, may not be
an unqualified endorsement of the political or religious programs of these movements,
and may not have much to do with personal religiosity at all.
Given all of the above, there is at least some reason to be skeptical of arguments
that link autocratic outcomes in Arab and Muslim countries primarily to the cultural
and religious beliefs of their inhabitants. First, authoritarian political culture, to
the degree that it does explain individual preferences over systems of government, is
not unique to these societies. Second, Islam shares with other spiritual traditions a
multiplicity of interpretations, with doctrinal elements that can be used to bolster
support for autocracy as a political system as well as elements that are supportive
of democracy. Third, contemporary Islamist movements present programs providing
interpretations that amount to a mixture of religion and politics, some elements of
which are outside of the mainstream of the religion as non-activists understand it.
Evidence suggests, further, that popular support for these movements may not have
much to do with the religiosity of the inhabitants of the societies in which they operate.
Cumulatively, these points suggest that, to understand Muslim political views and
preferences, we should look to the incentive structures generated by the political
context in which Muslims live. In particular, to understand institutional preferences,
we should examine the incentives created by prevailing political institutions as well
as salient social and political cleavages.
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3.2 Religion, Politics, and Sects in Lebanon
Lebanon, as a multireligious society with large Sunni, Shia, and Christian popula-
tions, provides a useful venue in which to adjudicate between competing explanations
over the source of institutional preferences—that is, between arguments that such
preferences are formed on the basis of religion, and those arguing that preferences are
formed on the basis of political incentives. In particular, because religious doctrines
vary and political context does not, we can parse out the degree to which prefer-
ences reflect simple community membership, religiosity across the different spiritual
traditions, and political awareness and activism across the communities.
In this section, I present a brief overview of Lebanese political institutions and
social cleavages in order to provide motivation for the hypotheses described in Section
3.3 and ground the subsequent analyses presented in Section 3.4. The key elements of
public life on which I focus here, I argue, help define the incentive structures faced by
members of the different religious communities. I first describe the pervasiveness of
sectarian cleavages in Lebanese politics. I focus on the important point that sectari-
anism and religiosity overlap only imperfectly, arguably with countervailing influences
on individual preferences and attitudes. I next discuss the governing institutions of
the Lebanese state, noting in particular how they underrepresent the country’s largest
and poorest community, the Shia, in the allocation of formal political power. Cumu-
latively, these dynamics arguably influence individuals’ preferences over democratic
and autocratic institutional configurations. I discuss each of these points in turn.
Sectarian Cleavages
Independent Lebanon emerged in 1943 a mosaic society, the product of a “polite
fiction of national unity” and elite-level compromises that were designed to substi-
tute for (and hopefully build) a sense of common Lebanese identity. Although the
power-sharing system adopted to reconcile conflicting visions of the polity survived
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significant regional and domestic turmoil for the first three decades after indepen-
dence, the country collapsed into a civil war lasting from 1975 to 1990, only to res-
urrect a modified version of the original system at the war’s end.7 A key aspect of
Lebanese society is its plural nature, with numerous Muslim and Christian religious
sects, none individually comprising the majority of the population, cohabitating in
the country—with ramifications for the nature of salient social cleavages and political
competition.8
Although the most prominent cleavage in Lebanese society is nominally religious,
political disputes are only rarely about religion per se. Rather, Lebanese politics are
essentially sectarian (or, more politely, “confessional”), in which political cooperation
and competition either revolve around or are channeled through the religious commu-
nities and their elites. The centrality of the sects in Lebanese political life is lamented
ad nauseum, with observers repeatedly using the pejorative terms “tribe” and “tribal-
ism” to describe them. Salibi (1988, 55), for example, notes that, in the development
of Lebanese politics, “the religious communities in Lebanon were essentially tribes, or
in any case behaved as tribes, and the game that came to be played between them was
a tribal game.” More generally (and colorfully), Muhammad Fadlallah notes that:
When we examine Lebanon, we see a society of advanced culture. . . But
sectarian Lebanon, the Lebanon which nourishes its cultured people with
sectarian sustenance—and here I of course do not mean religion, because
7The quote is Salibi’s (1988, 2). Lijphart (1977) cites Lebanon as an example of a consociational
democracy, although both theory and application came under fire after the country’s collapse.
8Lebanon’s sectarian society is significantly richer (and more Byzantine) than the simplified ver-
sion I present here. In addition to the Sunni and Shia communities, there are small heterodox Muslim
sects (most notably the Druze) and, although I speak here of the Christian community, it would be
more accurate to speak in the plural, as Christians in Lebanon are divided up among some dozen
sects. Theoretically relevant distinctions between, for example, Maronites, Greek Orthodox, and
the different Armenian communities are plausible, but due mainly to survey sample size limitations
I consider the Christian “spiritual family” as a whole—though a useful extension to this research
would oversample smaller Christian and Muslim groups and consider them separately.
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sectarianism is a tribal condition while religion is a spiritual, intellectual
one—roots the affiliation of each person within it in a given sect, and
creates for each person the impression that his interests may only be
advanced within this sect. It makes the cultured or religious person a
sectarian animal who thinks instinctively and forgets all of what he has
learned when sectarian feelings are aroused. Lebanon is highly cultured
and advanced. . . yet this Lebanon exists in a state of effective political
backwardness to a degree we might not have found among the first Arabs!9
Sectarianism and Religion
As these statements allude, sectarianism, as an expression of communalism or group
loyalties, is not synonymous with religiosity. Speaking of his own party’s recruiting
successes, for example, Hizballah’s deputy secretary-general has noted that interest
in party membership increased greatly due to the successes of its resistance to Israeli
occupation of the south, but that some aspirants “have found that the membership
9Fadlallah interview with al-Hasna’, reprinted in Fadlallah (2001¨, 127–146), quote at page 128.
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conditions form an objective barrier. They believe in the party’s resistance activity
but are not committed to its Islamic though, or they believe in the party’s political
movement but do not observe Islamic practices and behavior.”10 More generally, sec-
tarian individuals are not necessarily religious, and it is common to find Lebanese with
extremely sectarian attitudes that are otherwise not particularly religiously observant
in their daily lives. In noting the “great difference between religion and sectarianism,”
former Prime Minister Salim al-Hoss observes:
Religion is a message which unites, while sectarianism is a chauvinism
which divides. Islam and Christianity concur in their calls for shared hu-
man values, among them love, compassion, and brotherhood. . . [Sectarian-
ism] is a chauvinism that rules over individual behavior and thought. . . It
is among the remnants of tribalism in the psyche, and in reality is the
modern face of tribalism.11
Thus, as these statements suggest, while religion provides the nominal boundary
of group membership, that membership rather than religiosity per se is the key.
10Naim (Qasim 2002¨, 87–88). The original Arabic:
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More generally, Keddie (1998, 708–710) notes that communalist movements do not
necessarily involve high levels of religious belief, but utilize or invent popular reli-
gious symbols, stressing religion less and cultural heritage more in order to appeal
to both more and less religious individuals, with the goals of strengthening one com-
munity at the expense of the others. In this respect, religion and sect are frequently
conflated, sometimes incidentally due to imprecise use of the terms, but frequently
purposively—Amil (1986¨, 130), for example, formerly one of Lebanon’s foremost
Marxist theoreticians, noted that sectarian thought is based on camouflage and the
adroit confounding of religion and politics.
Governing Institutions
Lebanon’s power-sharing institutions reflect (and, arguably, perpetuate) the salience
of sectarian identification in political life. A system of explicit sectarian representa-
tion, written into the French Mandate-era constitution in 1926 with antecedents from
the Ottoman period, was reinforced by the unwritten National Pact of 1943, which
reconciled the Christian and Muslim “spiritual families” to a system of power-sharing
based on population figures from a 1932 census of “dubious accuracy.” The most im-
mediately recognizable feature of the Lebanese system is the permanent allocation of
seats in the Chamber of Deputies, cabinet posts, and civil service positions among the
sects, with key senior positions the preserve of certain communities.12 In addition to
the most visible aspects of the power-sharing arrangement, the system was designed,
first, to prevent direct electoral competition between members of different commu-
12Considerable manipulation of census figures produced a balance favorable to Christians—the
actual Christian majority was probably closer to 500 persons (Maktabi 1999). At independence the
ratio of Christian to Muslim deputies was set at 6:5 based on the 1932 census, although the post-war
settlement changed this to a 1:1 ratio to better (though still not accurately) reflect demographic
changes. The 1943 pact was an unwritten gentlemen’s agreement that designated the allocation of
key positions by custom to different sects, but was written into the Document of National Accord
(effectively a constitutional annex) explicitly upon the settlement of the civil war.
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nities, second, to promote moderation in the candidates themselves, and arguably
third, to maintain the political influence of notables and elites.13
The 1943 National Pact was clearly an imperfect solution to a seemingly in-
tractable problem, although arguably the best (or perhaps “least worst”) option
available. Nonetheless, the “elite compromises” that produced the pact were not,
in fact, compromises among elites of all the sects, but rather primarily between lead-
ers of the Maronite Christian and Sunni communities. This partnership produced a
dynamic in which their elites tended to view Lebanese politics through a bisectarian
lense, especially given the degree to which the two communities lined up on opposite
sides of the debate over Lebanon’s identity in the era of pan-Arab nationalism. While
Christians and Sunnis (and also the Druze) were active participants in the “tribal
game,” fighting for access to resources and patronage and contesting the future of
the state, one key community, the Shia, remained essentially on the sidelines.14 The
Shia, as a community, neither won nor lost much of anything at all since they were
accorded almost no political relevance by leaders of the other sects.
The Shia had long been impoverished, uneducated, isolated, and politically quies-
cent, nominally represented by a small number of traditional land-owning notables.
Yet in the course of modernization, many Shiites had become increasingly aware of
the contrasts between the poverty and neglect of their communities and the relative
prosperity of other areas of the country, and were increasingly targeted for recruit-
13Seats are allocated by sect within each electoral district—hence only Maronites may run for a
Maronite seat, Sunnis for a Sunni seat, and so on—yet voters cast ballots for each seat in their district
regardless of sect, privileging candidates who can generate cross-sectarian appeal. In practice, voters
cast ballots for (open) lists of candidates in their district but, partly due to the weakness of political
parties and the strength of the patron-client system, office-seekers commonly seek access to a “safe
list” headed by a notable or boss, meaning that power nominally shared among the sects is also in
practice shared among the country’s elites. For a discussion of elections and parties, see el Khazen
(2000¨, 2002¨, 2003), and Hashishu (1998¨).
14For helpful studies of the Lebanese Shia community, refer to, among others, Ajami (1986),
Madini (1999¨), Fahs (1996¨), Gharib (2001¨), and Norton (1987).
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ment by various leftist and Arab nationalist organizations. It was within this context
that new Shia elites, headed by Musa al-Sadr, a reformist religious leader, began mo-
bilizing the Shia for political action to represent them as a sect in competition with
the leftist groups—who according to Sadr exploited his community, and wanted “to
fight the Christians to the last Shiite.”15 This organization, which eventually became
the Amal Movement, adopted a relatively moderate line in demanding the reform
rather than abolition of the Lebanese system, with a redistribution of power and re-
sources to the Shia community. After the 1982 Israeli invasion, however, Amal was
compelled to compete with the radical organization that became known as Hizballah,
which provided a vehicle for Iranian-influenced radical Shia religious leaders who,
at least initially, sought to extend the Iranian revolution to Lebanon and create an
Islamic republic.
The Taif Accord, adopted to end the civil war, amended the original power-sharing
system to better reflect demographic realities, as well as Lebanon’s “special relation-
ship” with Syria, whose armed forces had been present in the country since the early
period of the civil war. Although the accords reduced the Christian-to-Muslim par-
liamentary ratio to parity and redistributed some of the president’s prerogatives to
the prime minister and cabinet, in formal terms the system still overrepresents the
Christian sects and especially underrepresents the Shia—due to differential birth and
emigration rates now the largest single community in the country—according to popu-
lation share. Yet post-war Lebanese politics has often taken place outside the bounds
15Karim Pakradouni (1984¨, 118), the current head of one of the rival Kataib Parties, recalls how
Sadr accused the leftist and Arab nationalist forces fighting the government at the beginning of
the civil war of using the Shia masses as cannon fodder in their struggle with the Christians. The
original Arabic:
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of formal government institutions and within the context of informal arrangements
overseen by Syria, which often served to compensate the Shia (via the strategic al-
liances of the two main Shia parties with Syria) for their underrepresentation in the
formal system. The so-called Troika system16 elevated the Shia speaker of parliament
(the head of Amal) to de facto parity with the Maronite president and Sunni prime
minister (with Syria often called in to break the inevitable deadlocks), and manipula-
tion of electoral laws and districts privileged Syrian allies and kept Syrian opponents
out of parliament.
While this overview by necessity simplifies Lebanese political and social dynamics,
it is hopefully sufficient to clarify several points of importance in pursuit of the goal
of assessing Lebanese institutional preferences. First, the political environment to
which Sunnis, Shiites, and Christians are exposed is one in which sectarianism is
the primary social cleavage, the centrality of which to public life is such that it
is enshrined in the formal institutions of the state. Second, although sectarianism
makes religion the nominal boundary of group membership, it is not synonymous with
religiosity—sectarian individuals may indeed be religious, but they may not be. Third,
the different religious communities face different degrees of malrepresentation in the
country’s formal institutions, with the Shia, long the poorest and now the largest
community, being most underrepresented. These points are relevant for determining
the factors which influence individual attitudes toward different governing systems.
The following section presents hypotheses about Lebanese institutional preferences
as influenced by religious and political factors.
16Literally " A¾K
ðQ
Ë @\, the Troika system is the informal, extra-constitutional arrangement that ap-
proximately equalizes the influence of the three presidents—of the republic, the council of ministers,
and the parliament—on government policy and appointments.
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3.3 Theory and Hypotheses
My core contention, from which the hypotheses in this section follow, is that insti-
tutional preferences over democratic and autocratic systems of government reflect
political incentives the choosers face—that is, those generated by the prevailing in-
stitutions and predominant social cleavages. Religion, to the degree that it is part
of the political context, can influence the choice, but we should not expect a sim-
ple relationship along the lines of “more Islam, less democracy.” The implication of
this general proposition for Lebanon is that Lebanese institutional preferences follow
from incentives generated by sectarian competition and the institutions available to
channel it, rather than something inherent to the various religious traditions found
in Lebanon.
It is important to distinguish between the influence of religion and that of sectari-
anism. Sectarian political competition, in Lebanon as in other societies in which such
cleavages are prominent, is only nominally religious: religion defines the boundaries
of social group inclusion and exclusion, independent of the degree to which members
observe or practice the tenets of their faiths. Membership is ascriptive, practically
speaking, causing sectarianism to fall under the more general categorization of eth-
nic politics. When Lebanese decry the degree to which subnational loyalties trump
identification with Lebanon as a whole—a familiar lament in many of the world’s
plural societies—they generally refer to the most visible elements of zero-sum sec-
tarian political competition as held against an idealized vision of national unity and
public-spiritedness.17 Identification with Lebanon as the broader community beyond
the sect has always been weak—or at least allegedly so—in part due to the multitude
17This loaded comparison is of course not unique to societies in which ethnic groups form the pri-
mary collectivities of political competition: compare the negative connotations of “playing partisan
politics” and the positive ones associated with bipartisanship in the United States, and more gener-
ally the lament of partisanship in societies in which parties form the vehicles of political competition
but fall short of the higher ideals (usually vague) set for them.
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of conflicting visions among the Lebanese of what Lebanon is and should be. Yet in
the absence of a clear and compelling vision of a unified community, the Lebanese
utilize, I argue, an imperfect substitute to moderate the centrifugal influences of sec-
tarianism by invoking the shared values contained within their religious doctrines.
Doing so enables them to create a shared, consociational community beyond the sect,
encouraging positive-sum compromises in place of zero-sum outcomes. Religion, in
other words, provides both the nominal markers defining group differences as well as
the shared ideals to lessen the sharpness of those differences.
I take up these ideas more fully in what follows. Note that I discuss the hy-
potheses presented below in terms of autocratic rather than democratic systems. I do
this to align the terminology presented with the survey data used to test them. Un-
surprisingly, there are few differences of stated opinion in Lebanon over democratic
systems—practically everyone approves of democracy—whereas there is important
variation in opinions over autocratic systems that provides leverage to test the hy-
potheses. I discuss this issue in greater detail in Section 3.4.
Hypotheses 1 and 2: Politics and Sectarianism
The first set of hypotheses follows from incentives generated by the centrality of sec-
tarianism in Lebanon’s formal institutions and salient political cleavages, which I
contend influence Lebanese institutional preferences. As described in Section 3.2, the
Lebanese political system—variously described as “sectarian,” “constrained,” “conso-
ciational,” and other types of democracy-with-adjectives—is nominally democratic
but not fully so in the majoritarian sense. As is generally the case with systems that
utilize consociational elements, various institutional arrangements and practices de-
viate from pure majoritarianism, and, to the degree that we privilege majority rule in
the definition of democracy regardless of checks on the rule of that majority, consoci-
ational systems are by definition less democratic than British-style systems (Lijphart
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1977, ch. 2). Further, the “sectarian balance” does not represent all of Lebanon’s
communities proportionally, much less equally. Unsurprisingly, those seeking redress
for this maldistribution of representation often implicate Lebanon’s institutional ar-
rangements, as when Amil (1986¨, 33, 43), for example, noted that the hegemonic
balance in the distribution of power in fact made it a minoritarian system, and that
those opposed to the adoption of majoritarianism in place of consociationalism be-
lieve that such a switch would amount merely to the replacement of one hegemonic
sectarianism with another.
Previous to and in the middle of the civil war, Amil’s implication was Christian
fear of Muslim hegemony, and although this remains a notable element in Lebanese
political discourse, after two decades of demographic change and political maneu-
vers, one could argue that there is now more specifically fear of a Shia hegemony
among non-Shiites, who often build working majorities willing to oppose Shia inter-
ests (Norton 1999, 21 and passim). In particular, the Shia community is both the
most populous sect in Lebanon18 as well as the most underrepresented in the formal
allocation of political power. Indeed, el Khazen (2000¨, 89–91, 177–178) shows that
their demographic weight makes the Shia community decisive in as many as 17 more
seats than the 27 (of 128) allotted to them formally.19 The Shia, further, are also
arguably better organized via political parties relative to the other communities, and
both Amal and Hizballah have the dismantling of the sectarian quota system as well
as the adoption of large electoral districts (ideally one country-wide district) with
18According to voter rolls published in the daily As-Safir between 25 April and 12 May 2005
(according to the compiler, Interior Ministry figures), Shiites and Sunnis each accounted for 26
percent of the population eligible to vote, followed by Maronite Christians at 22 percent. Note that
because of differential birth rates, these figures underreport the size of the Shia community, which
is disproportionately young with a large cohort of members not yet old enough to vote.
19Note further that, despite the 1:1 Christian-to-Muslim ratio in parliament, the Shia must share
the Muslim allocation with the Sunni, Druze, and Alawi communities, the latter two, regardless of
doctrinal disputes, considered Muslim for the purpose of allocating parliamentary seats and civil
service positions.
87
proportional representation as their preferred electoral system, all of which would en-
hance Shia representation and magnify the influence of the Shia parties.20 Due to the
size of their population share—the Shia would “win the census” were one to occur—as
well as their political organization, the Shia would be the greatest beneficiaries of a
fully democratic system and, we might expect, would be relatively unsupportive of
political systems that constrain the influence of their demographic plurality.
Blanket statements about preferences at the aggregate community level must be
approached with caution, however, as they can imply the existence of a political
consensus within communities that differs between them when such a consensus does
not exist in practice. Suggesting that members of the Shia community have particular
reasons to support democratic systems does not imply a lack of committed democrats
within other communities, but merely that Shiites are subject to community-specific
incentives on top of those influencing Lebanese attitudes more generally. Nor does this
imply a uniformity of preferences among Shiites, or that all members react similarly
to the same incentives. Given the history of the politicization of the Lebanese Shia,
there are, in fact, reasons to expect autocratic rather than democratic responses from
a subset of this population.
There has always been considerable diversity of opinion within the Shia commu-
nity, dating back to the beginning of its political mobilization in the 1960s. Whereas
initially many politicized Shiites joined the various leftist political organizations op-
erating at the time, by the mid-1970s the large majority were either affiliated with or
expressed support for the Amal Movement. Yet Amal was essentially a Shia catch-all
comprised of numerous political and ideological trends, the more militant and revo-
20It is presumably no accident that Michel Aoun’s Free Patriotic Movement, currently allied with
Hizballah and Amal in the opposition, is the only major Christian party to advocate the abolition of
the sectarian system as well as the use of large electoral districts with proportional representation:
it is arguably better organized than its major competitor for Christian votes, the Lebanese Forces,
and could further hope to benefit from Shia votes whereas the Lebanese Forces could not.
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lutionary of which began to split off in the early-1980s in response to a combination
of the Israeli invasion of 1982, Iranian material and ideological support, and Syrian
efforts to forestall Amal leaders from engaging in separate peace negotiations under
American or Israeli auspices. Although Khomeini’s controversial theory of the rule of
the jurist (wilayat al-faqih) has provided the ideological backdrop to this militancy,
the theory provides a distinctive interpretation of the religious texts that does not
represent the mainstream of lay Shiites or religious scholars.21 Arguably, however,
the finer details of the theory may, like the radical leftist ideologies previously in
vogue, be beside the point for many of its adherents. Instead, it provides an alternate
path to political power, and although some supporters may in fact subscribe to the
religious interpretation behind the theory, it also provides a communalist vision justi-
fying Shia ascendancy regardless of the particulars. Thus, although we might expect
Shiites in general to be particularly supportive of democratic political systems given
the incentives stemming from their population plurality, we might also expect to see
a subset of politicized Shiites favorable to autocratic options, particularly given the
difficulty of reforming the existing system that underrepresents the Shia community.
Lebanon’s power-sharing institutions are unlikely to change in the near term, at
least by democratic means. Although both the National Pact of 1943 and the Taif
Accord both call for the eventual abolition of political sectarianism, these clauses
are mostly treated as statements of ideals rather than acted upon, while checks and
balances within the system give members of other communities the capacity to block
change should it arise. Further, as one critic notes, because the Lebanese system is
one “where political offices become an expression of the interests of the sects and
21Hizballah, formerly the foremost proponent of wilayat al-faqih in Lebanon, has withdrawn this
slogan from circulation as the party has become more mainstream, possibly due to party leaders’
recognition of the difficulty of implementing it in Lebanon, but certainly due to their recognition that
the slogan does not sell well in the mainstream public. On this point, Norton (1999, 20) observes
that the new Shia middle class “does not yearn to live in the Islamic Republic of anything, not least
in the Islamic Republic of Lebanon.”
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their roles in political life,” it “creates structural constraints which prevent any se-
rious or root change, and obstructs any modification that disturbs the balance of
power” upon which the system is based.22 The explicit division of power among
the sects was intended to take sectarianism off the table in day-to-day politics, but
this in effect has meant that sectarian problems are often taken up outside established
institutional channels. Though it may encourage coexistence under non-crisis circum-
stances, it hinders incremental change and means that modifications to the system
can only occur as the result of major crises or via extra-constitutional means: the
result has been a series of existential shocks occurring every 15 years or so throughout
Lebanon’s modern history.23 This feature of the political system, as Madini (1999¨,
29) notes in a study of Amal and Hizballah, “makes it impossible to achieve a radical
democratic solution except via a process of root change to the sectarian structure of
the state.”24 In other words, despite the fact that the Shia are disproportionately
22The original Arabic:
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23Compare the mass demonstrations and Syrian pullout in 2005, the civil war’s end in 1990
and start in 1975, the mini-civil war of 1958, independence in 1943, and the promulgation of the
Mandate-era constitution in 1926.
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underrepresented by the current sectarian system and would benefit electorally (and
hence distributionally) from a more fully democratic system in a majoritarian sense,
they are in effect blocked from implementing tangible reforms to the current system. I
argue that, given this institutionally-defined inability to bring about reform by demo-
cratic means, politicized, radicalized Shiites, in light of their recognition that they
are blocked from achieving comprehensive change via democratic channels, may be
more willing to consider more radical options and autocratic systems.
Given the arguments detailed above, we should expect two propositions to follow:
Hypothesis 1 Shiites are less supportive of autocratic systems than Sun-
nis and Christians.
Hypothesis 2 Politicized Shiites are more supportive of autocratic sys-
tems than unpoliticized Shiites.
Hypotheses 3 and 4: Religion and Consociationalism
As discussed in Section 3.1, Islam, and religion in general, may be used to justify many
types of political systems—from democracy to the divine rights of kings—depending
on which elements of doctrine are privileged and which are deemphasized. Within
Lebanon, Gharib (2001¨, 198–203) has noted a diversity of views among three broad
trends of Islamic thinkers and activists, from those seeking the establishment of a
full Islamic system, to those seeking one conditionally and in stages, to those who
see coexistence between religions as a historical reality and claim that nothing in
the religious texts calls for the establishment of an Islamic state. In addition to this
doctrinal ambiguity toward political systems, personal religiosity—to the degree that
it connotes concern with spiritual welfare, morality, observation of religious tenets,
and so on—does not address political preferences directly, and one may be personally
pious within a wide variety of different political systems. In other words, religious
doctrine can be interpreted to provide not one but several blueprints for political in-
stitutions, and to the degree that it provides a blueprint for personal life and practice,
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its influence on political attitudes is likely to be mild. The knowledge that someone
is personally pious may not, by itself, tell us much about his or her institutional
preferences.
Due to the sectarian nature of Lebanese social cleavages and political institutions,
religion is part of politics, but may not be the primary source of political conflict.
Sectarianism, as opposed to religion but like ethnic politics more generally, is often as-
sociated with zero-sum and even negative-sum conflicts, and is occasionally discussed
in those exact terms. Religion, meanwhile, is most often held in sharp contrast for
its unifying, bridging properties that, in effect, help transform zero-sum conflicts into
positive-sum outcomes. In emphasizing these shared elements, Muhammad Fadlallah
notes that “religiosity means seeking out the vital elements in one’s religion, which
inevitably coincide with the vital elements of another’s religion,” and that, although
there are differences between Christianity and Islam in the nature of their views on
God, the prophets, and so on, the values they espouse “are very largely shared val-
ues.”25 Ghassan Tueni, the longtime publisher of the liberal daily Annahar, echoes
this when he notes that “nothing will make sectarianism, and the heretical holy war
fought in its name, vanish more than the deepening of true religious belief. . . in Islam
as in Christianity, and strengthening the religious virtues found in both creeds.”26
25Fadlallah interview with Awraq Siyasiyya, reprinted in Fadlallah (2001¨, 443–356), passage at
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One prominent political expression of sectarianism, as is the case in many other
plural and segmented societies, is via political parties and traditional political leaders,
who act as spokespersons for their communities and guardians of their interests (often
vaguely defined). One analyst, for example, describes the maximalism of the parties,
most of which are sectarian in their structures and issue orientations, and observes
that “the sectarian parties exploit what has been called consociational democracy in
order to strengthen their positions. . . and employ sectarian solidarities in the political
field, in which parties of a single sect engage in a sectarian bidding war” between
themselves and with the traditional politicians over who can best defend the sect’s
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é K. Qj. J Ë @\ ), Annahar, 26 June 1996, reprinted
in Sulayman (1998¨, 120–126), quote at pages 124–125. Although some ideological parties operate,
even organizations that started on an explicitly non- or anti-sectarian basis have over time become
largely identified with a single religious group—the small but active Communist Party transformed
over the course of the civil war into a Shia-majority party (with around 60 percent of members coming
from that community), while the Progressive Socialist Party, formerly Druze-led but multi-sectarian
in membership, is now almost exclusively Druze. See el Khazen (2002¨) for details.
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that religion may in fact help ameliorate this conflict between sectarian partisans
over group political interests by invoking positive-sum interests and principles of
compromise between the religious communities that have developed to enable coop-
eration and coexistence in daily life. In a major study of Lebanese political parties,
el Khazen (2002¨, 157) compares this culture of compromise to the maximalism of
partisan practice by noting that, outside times of sharp crises, Lebanese sociopolit-
ical culture is oriented toward unity and compromise, usually stressing cooperation
and seeking shared positions between the spiritual families. Yet in Lebanese partisan
political culture, he notes, the elements of conflict and sharp conflicts predominate,
and that “the principle of compromise in political activity, generally speaking, is
absent from the partisan political heritage in Lebanon.”28 The centripetal influ-
ence of compromise between religious communities, in other words, may help offset
the centrifugal politics associated with sectarian group disputes. This proposition
is consistent, in turn, with anecdotal evidence suggesting that, particularly among
the politically aware, religiosity can encourage support for a live-and-let-live attitude
between members of different faiths.
Taken together, the above points suggest two broad propositions. First, in view of
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us much about the political preferences of individual adherents. Among the politically
active and aware, however, we may in fact see religiosity as a moderating rather than
polarizing influence, able to counteract the centrifugal influence of sectarian politics.
This, in view of Lebanon’s sectarian society, may translate into greater support for
democracy and reduced support for autocratic solutions, in recognition of the fact
that the Lebanese power-sharing system cannot function well outside of a democratic
context. We thus might expect to see the following:
Hypothesis 3 Personal religiosity by itself does not influence attitudes
toward autocratic systems.
Hypothesis 4 Personal religiosity and political awareness combined de-
crease support for autocratic systems.
Hypothesis 5: Religious Guidance and Social Justice
The pervasive positive-negative dichotomy between religion and sectarianism in Lebanon
carries over to assessments of religious versus political leaders. As is the case in prac-
tically every society, politicians and political parties writ large are distrusted and
held in low esteem, although this view is particularly prevalent in Lebanon due to
the activities of the parties’ militias during the civil war and what many see as their
complicity in the Syrian-directed post-war order which purported to restore political
pluralism but amounted to little more than the distribution of spoils at the expense
of public welfare. One critic, for example, echoes this view by stating that “conso-
ciational democracy is the codename for the abominable system of sectarian quotas,
and the weapon which the sectarian politicians use to attack the sectarian system
as well as demand a share in it. It is a disingenuous catchphrase for the division of
spoils and the distribution of benefits and jobs.”29 Further, it is not only the “sectar-
ian” politicians and parties subject to this condemnation, but also the “ideological”
29The original Arabic:
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parties as well. An activist from the anti-sectarian Syrian Social Nationalist Party,
in noting that many such parties have allied with leading sectarian figures and have
themselves come to resemble the sectarian parties in internal structure and leader-
ship, states that “there is no doubt that a number of the ideological parties have
come to take on the attributes of a sect. Their rhetorical attacks on and resistance
to ‘sectarianism’ do not help them, for they practice the logic of sects in politics. . . in
addition to operating within the sectarian system as sects!”30
Political leaders and parties are thus distrusted for their participation in the sec-
tarian spoils system which, although a cornerstone of Lebanese public affairs since
before independence, has become in the post-war era unambiguously larger in scope,
more corrupt, and more detrimental to public finances and welfare. But whereas po-
litical leaders personify sectarianism as politics in practice, religious leaders represent
the statement of ideals found within Lebanon’s various religious traditions, and are
often idealized as the country’s conscience. In this regard, Abd al-Amir Qabalan,
the vice-president of the Supreme Shia Council, noted in a Friday sermon that “we
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men of religion must rectify the paths of the politicians. A politician works for his
own private interests while a man of religion has no interests except the approval
of God and the welfare of the flock.”31 Although this statement is of course more
rhetorical than it is factual, it encapsulates a common refrain: politicians following
narrow sectarian interests produce poor social outcomes, whereas individuals guided
by religious tenets are better able to provide social justice. What “social justice”
means conceptually is, of course, usually left hazy, but one of the main themes that
accompanies it is the demand for a fairer distribution of resources (also ambiguous)
and cleaner, more ethical government.
Arguably, then, when people express a desire for more religious guidance in public
affairs, they refer to the idealized vision of public-spirited social justice and welfare
contained within the doctrine rather than a desire to live under religious law writ
large. This is likely to be the case especially in the context of a segmental system
such as that found in Lebanon, in which the religious communities have long had
autonomy over family law and largely manage their own educational systems, and
thus where religious guidance already plays a prominent role in the key components
of Lebanese life in which the extension of religious law is relatively straightforward.
Whereas it is easy to imagine how religious tenets apply to marriage, divorce, and
inheritance, it is much less easy to imagine what it means to extend religious law to
the administration of, say, the public electricity company or the department of public
works, except perhaps to say that it must be “clean” and “fair” administration, or


















YË@ ÈAg. P 	ám
	'
. XAJ.ªË @
éjÊÓð é<Ë @ A 	P B@
éjÊÓ C 	̄ 	áK
YË@ Ég. P
“Qabalan responds to Bishops’ statement. . . ” (
é 	®J

	m× é«YK. : Q














X ñK ), As-Safir, 14 May 2005.
97
religious guidance becomes approximately analogous to “good government.”
Thus, to the degree that people desire religious guidance in public affairs, they do
so, arguably, out of desire for social justice and the ethical distribution of resources
rather than out of desire for the application of religious law to all aspects of political
life. We might thus expect the following:
Hypothesis 5 Desire for religious guidance in economic rather than po-
litical affairs increases support for governance according to religious law.
The next section presents data and analysis of factors influencing institutional
preferences among Lebanese of different sects. To test the degree to which these hy-
potheses outlined above are consistent with reality, I utilize two unobtrusive measures
of personal religiosity and politicization—and the opportunity to compare preferences
between Sunnis, Shiites, and Christians—and also assess the degree to which a re-
ligion effect, should it exist at all, is specific to Islam or more generalizable across
spiritual traditions.
3.4 Empirical Analysis
Section 3.4 presents an empirical assessment of the hypotheses just laid out. I first
describe the data used, then present the rationale for the mapping of particular survey
items onto the concepts discussed in Section 3.3. After presenting summary statistics
for key dependent and explanatory variables, I describe the statistical models and
present results from the main models, as well as robustness checks. The subsequent
section discusses the implications of these findings.
The Data
To conduct these analyses, I draw on data collected via an original mass political
attitude survey designed to examine linkages between religion, sectarianism, the dis-
tribution of resources, and institutional preferences. Respondents were drawn ran-
domly from a stratified sample of Lebanese adults across all sectarian communities
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and provinces, with a sample size of 1000 individuals. Beirut-based MADMA Co.
administered the face-to-face interviews in the fall of 2005, roughly equidistant in
time between the pullout of the Syrian armed forces from Lebanon in the spring of
2005 and the Israel-Hizballah conflict in the summer of 2006. MADMA’s sample
frame is based on household demographics surveys conducted in the late-1990s by
the Lebanese government on tens of thousands of households, for which the president
of MADMA was a consultant. It is among the most reliable sample frames available
in the absence of official censuses, which are too politically sensitive to conduct. The
response rate was 70 percent, which did not vary significantly between Shia, Sunni,
and Christian respondents. Note that I have dropped the Druze and Alawis from
the analysis because their small sub-sample sizes make it difficult to draw reliable
within-community inferences.
Measuring Dependent Variables
Because “democracy” is not a value-neutral term, gauging democratic attitudes is
not a matter of simply asking people whether or not they support democracy. First,
the content of the term is open-ended: upon hearing the term “democracy,” some
may think “elections,” others “civil rights,” and still others may simply associate it
with other desirable outcomes such as justice or even economic prosperity. Second,
the normative connotations of the term make it difficult to express skepticism—this
is a question with clear socially desirable answers. With these difficulties in mind, we
may consider results presented in Figure 3.1, which reports proportions of responses
to a battery of questions asking respondents to evaluate, on a four-point scale, how
good or bad different political systems would be to govern Lebanon, asked in the
following order:
• Having a strong head of government who does not have to bother
with parliament and elections (Strong Leader)
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• Having experts, not government, make decisions according to what
they think is best for the country (Experts Rule)
• Having religious leaders make decisions for the country according to
religious law (Clerics Rule)
• Having a democratic political system (Democracy)
As is evident in the leftmost panel in Figure 3.1, the overwhelming majority of
respondents give democracy the highest rating on the scale, with a negligible number
giving it low marks. These responses, if taken at face value, would appear to indi-
cate that virtually all Lebanese, regardless of religious community, are committed
democrats. It also presents a practical methodological problem: we cannot analyze
variation in support for democracy when no variation exists to explain. To address
this particular methodological problem, we can instead examine respondents’ assess-
ments of a variety of autocratic systems, which belie the apparent total commitment
to democracy suggested initially. Responses to the strong leader option, for example,
are not the mirror images to the responses about democratic systems one might ex-
pect. Although it is true that just over half of respondents rate this system as “very
bad,” the flip side to this is that just under half of respondents rate it higher than the
lowest point on the scale, and over 10 percent actually rate the strong leader option
positively. The overwhelming Lebanese support for democracy becomes still more
tenuous when respondents are asked to gauge the option of rule by experts: less than
half of respondents rate this option at the lowest point on the scale, and over a quarter
of the sample rates it positively. Further, some differences by sect appear to emerge:
the Shia are least supportive of the option of rule by experts, Sunnis are significantly
more so, and Christians fall somewhere in between. Some differences also exist when
asked about clerical rule. As with expert rule, about half of respondents rate this
option at the lowest point of the scale and another quarter of the sample rates it




























































Figure 3.1: Support for Different Governing Systems
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or Christian respondents.
Results from a set of simple ordered probit models (results not shown) using
dummy variables for community membership reflect these mixed results at the aggre-
gate community level. They indicate, first, that the three communities are statisti-
cally indistinguishable from each other on the strong leader option; second, relative to
Christians, Shiites are noticeably less supportive of rule by experts and Sunnis notice-
ably more so; and third, Sunnis are more supportive of clerical rule than Shiites and
Christians, who are statistically indistinguishable. Were we concerned only with raw
comparisons between the three communities, we could simply stop here: these data
provide tenuous evidence that Shiites are somewhat less supportive of autocratic op-
tions than are Christians (one of three indicators), and that Sunnis appear to be more
supportive of such systems (two of three indicators). Yet these results, based as they
are on extremely aggregated figures, rest on an implicit and false assumption of ho-
mogeneity within the three communities. Lebanese attitudes are, unsurprisingly, far
richer than raw aggregates can capture, and in what follows I focus on a key aspect of
that bigger story. I next present unobtrusive measures of religiosity and politicization
as means to distinguish between the attitudes of the religiously devout, the politically
engaged, and those who are both, as well as more conventional measures of support
for religious guidance in public affairs.
Measuring Explanatory Variables
Measuring religiosity and politicization is not the simple matter of asking respondents
how religious or politicized they are. The first problem is one of awkward metrics:
these are latent concepts with no naturally-occurring or otherwise obvious scales
on which to measure them. We may speak casually of individuals as more or less
religious (or politicized), but we generally do so while leaving the metric vague. Most
ordinary people are probably familiar with the latent concepts, but are unlikely to use
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agreed-upon scales that are common from person to person—two self-identified “very
religious” people, for example, may have quite different ideas about what it means to
be “very religious.” Further complicating the issue are differences between doctrines
regarding prescribed religious rituals that we might otherwise use to measure religious
practice. One common indicator (see, e.g., the citations in fn. 1), for example, is a
count of the number of times per day that an individual prays. While such a measure
is reasonable when studying members of single faith, it is unclear how to to make it
comparable across doctrines: Sunnis are, in theory, obligated to pray five times a day,
Shiites consider it permissible to elide some of them together such that only three
separate prayers are said per day (although all five are also permissible),32 and the
number of daily prayers are not so explicitly defined for Christians. Similar concerns
arise for other measures, such as frequency in attending religious services and how
often one reads the religion’s holy book or supplemental texts.
The second plausible issue that arises is that self-reports on religiosity and politi-
cization may suffer from social desirability and response bias effects. Especially in
environments where religiosity enjoys the positive connotations of piety, morality, and
the like, respondents may simply report themselves to be “good Muslims” or “good
Christians” even if, by some less normatively-charged standards, they are not. This
may take the form of piety inflation—overly flattering reports of how often one prays,
attends services, and so on—as well as refusals to respond at all, given the sensitiv-
ity of the matter.33 In contrast, politicization is often associated with partisanship
32At least among the Twelver Shia (the branch found in Lebanon), believers may run together,
first, the noon and afternoon prayers, and second, the evening and night prayers, resulting in three
rather than five daily prayers (Momen 1985, 178).
33This non-response is likely to be systematic as well. Fully 10 percent of the Lebanese sample
refused to answer questions about how frequently they pray, attend religious services, or read the
Bible or Quran. Simple models of propensity to respond using the unobtrusive indicators described in
the main text show that, among all three communities on all three indicators, politicized individuals
are significantly less likely to offer a response, as are religious Sunnis.
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and sectarianism, both of which are held in low esteem, as well as inflexibility and
radicalism.
Because of the measurement problems associated with self-reports, I utilize unob-
trusive means of measuring religiosity and politicization that do not require respon-
dents to use artificial and unfamiliar scales or discuss sensitive topics, or even tell us
where they stand at all. For this, I draw on the propensity of Lebanese to reveal their
religiosity and party affiliations via icons and symbols displayed around the home. As
one travels around the different quarters of Beirut or among the mountain villages,
one is struck by, first, the variety of religious iconography displayed above doors and
in windows such as Quranic verses, the hand of Fatima, crucifixes, and figurines of
the Virgin Mary. Second, one is subject to a bewildering array of party flags and
militia symbols, as well as posters and photographs of political leaders. Some house-
holds have religious icons but not political symbols, some have political symbols but
not religious icons, some have both, and some have none. These icons and symbols
become useful tools in explaining differences in attitudes within and between sects
because they allow us to measure religiosity and politicization unobtrusively.34
Figure 3.2 reports the proportional distribution of households displaying religious
(R) and/or political (P ) icons. These data were collected by instructing interviewers
to note and describe any religion items (“such as pictures of religious leaders, Quranic
inscriptions, or crosses,” as described in the instructions) or political items (“such as
political party flags, campaign posters, or militia symbols”) displayed about the home.
These basic summary statistics reveal intriguing differences between the sects. While
34Although one might question the degree to which these icons reflect the opinions of the ac-
tual respondent rather than those of the head of household, there is good reason to believe that
these are not large problems in practice given the degree to which families continue to be close-
knit and play central roles in social life, and the degree to which partisanship and party loyalties
are “inherited”—see for example Khashan (1992) and el Khazen (2002¨, 61-62 and passim), who
describes contemporary party support as resulting primarily from “biological growth” based on
inherited support from traditional forces such as family and village.
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Figure 3.2: Religious and Political Symbols by Community
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half of Shia and Sunni respondents display at least one type of icon or the other about
their homes, only about a third of Christians do so. Within the Shia community, those
displaying any symbols at all are roughly evenly distributed between those displaying
only a religious icon, only a political icon, or both. In contrast, Sunnis displaying
both religious and political symbols are far more prevalent than those displaying only
religious or only political icons. Christians, meanwhile, are more inclined (relative
to each other) to display religious symbols as opposed to political ones. Between
communities, these figures could suggest that religion and politics are most tightly
interwoven among Sunnis and significantly less so within the Shia community, while
Christians are less expressive overall, and particularly in political symbology.35
Because a wide range of opinions on the role of religion in public affairs are ac-
cepted in Lebanon, social desirability is less of a concern and I turn to more con-
ventional measures. In particular, I use responses to a battery of questions asking
respondents to rate, on a five-point scale, the importance of religion as a guide to
several aspects of public life—using the phrasing of religion as “providing guidance”
rather than “the extension of religious law” to avoid any lingering sensitivity issues
attached to the application of Islamic law.36 Figure 3.3 presents summary statis-
35This survey was administered approximately half a year after the February 2005 assassination of
former Prime Minister Rafik Hariri. Note, however, that although most of the Sunni political symbols
were, in fact, Hariri-related, the Sunni connection of religion and politics still stands: the number of
respondents displaying only political symbols is actually lower than those displaying only religious
symbols and far lower than those displaying both. To the degree that there was a specific Hariri
effect for Sunnis, it induced them to display more of both religious and political symbols rather than
one or the other. The relative dearth of Christian political symbology presumably reflects, in part, a
forced depoliticization of the community in the aftermath of the civil war when the Lebanese Forces
militia/party was banned and its leader, Samir Geagea, imprisoned, the Free Patriotic Movement
banned and its leader, Michel Aoun, in exile, the Kataib Party split and discredited, and other
key leaders were either in exile or prison. Although there was a considerable amount of Christian
political symbology during the massive demonstrations in the spring of 2005, it is noteworthy that,
when this survey was conducted only half a year after the most dramatic events occurred, there were
still relatively few displays of political symbology compared to Shiites and Sunnis. For details, see
el Khazen (2002¨).
36The question text reads, “in your judgment, how important a role should religion play in pro-
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tics in the form of population proportions of responses for economic (Rel. Econ.),
political (Rel. Pol.), and family (Rel. Fam.) affairs. These responses show signifi-
cant variation within communities on economic and political affairs—opinions range
widely—and between sects: Shiites appear to consider religious guidance somewhat
less important than Christians, and Sunnis somewhat more so. There is far less
variation in opinion, meanwhile, on religious guidance on issues of family law, with
responses in all three communities clustering at the “important” end of the scale (al-
though Christians in the aggregate consider it slightly less important than the other
two communities). This is consistent with the observation made earlier that religious
law is more explicit on family and personal status issues and, further, already plays
a large role within Lebanon’s sectarian system.
Model Results
I first assess the effects of religiosity and politicization by estimating three groups
of ordered probit models in which the autocratic systems indicators, Strong Leader,
Experts Rule, and Clerics Rule, act as the dependent variables. These models are
reported in Table 3.1 and the first two columns of Table 3.2. Within each group,
I first report results from a model using a parsimonious set of covariates, which
includes the unobtrusive religiosity (R) and politicization (P ) indicators, community
indicators (Shia and Sunni, making Christians the baseline category), and their
interactions. I then report an expanded model that includes a set of control variables
as a robustness check.37 Additional covariates for the Clerics Rule models, extended
viding guidance in each of the following areas of public life?”
37 In particular, Rural and Female are dummy variables indicating if the respondent lives in
a rural area and if the respondent is female. Education is a five-point measure of educational
attainment (rescaled 0−1 for ease of interpretation). Age is the respondent’s age utilizing a square-
root transformation. Electricity is a measure of how many hours per day the electricity is off
in respondents’ homes (also with a square-root transformation). The latter is a broad measure
of socioeconomic status, used because the more standard income measure suffers from the fact
that many Lebanese respondents refused to declare their income. As an alternate indicator for
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Figure 3.3: Religion as a Guide in Public Life
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to test Hypothesis 5 and presented in the last two columns of Table 3.2, include the
three religious guidance scales (rescaled 0 − 1 for ease of interpretation), interacted
with community.
Table 3.1: Model Results, Strong Leader and Experts Rule
Strong Leader Experts Rule
b se(b) b se(b) b se(b) b se(b)
R 0.27 0.16 0.22 0.16 0.24 0.15 0.21 0.15
P 0.14 0.27 0.00 0.28 0.04 0.26 −0.03 0.27
R × P −1.14 0.43† −0.97 0.46⋆ −1.37 0.44† −1.39 0.47†
Shia −0.80 0.15‡ −0.75 0.16‡ −1.11 0.15‡ −1.02 0.16‡
Shia × R 0.47 0.25 0.45 0.26 0.59 0.25⋆ 0.54 0.26⋆
Shia × P 1.75 0.34‡ 1.77 0.35‡ 1.46 0.33‡ 1.37 0.34‡
Shia × R × P −0.67 0.52 −0.80 0.56 −0.07 0.53 −0.21 0.56
Sunni 0.34 0.12† 0.00 0.14 0.93 0.12‡ 0.53 0.14‡
Sunni × R −0.49 0.26 −0.36 0.27 −0.83 0.26‡ −0.72 0.27†
Sunni × P −0.26 0.36 −0.21 0.37 −0.23 0.35 −0.23 0.36
Sunni × R × P 0.59 0.54 0.48 0.57 0.64 0.55 0.71 0.58
Rural 0.30 0.10† 0.17 0.10
Female −0.34 0.09‡ −0.25 0.09†
Education −0.69 0.22† −0.71 0.21‡
Age −0.03 0.04 0.07 0.04
Electricity −0.23 0.04‡ −0.31 0.04‡
Intercept 1 0.16 0.08 −0.96 0.36† −0.07 0.08 −0.92 0.35†
Intercept 2 1.15 0.09‡ 0.07 0.36 0.60 0.08‡ −0.20 0.34
Intercept 3 1.41 0.10‡ 0.35 0.36 1.39 0.09‡ 0.64 0.35
N 940 901 923 885
lnL -903.16 -834.95 -997.81 -909.41
p ≤ 0.001‡, p ≤ 0.01†, p ≤ 0.05⋆, p ≤ 0.10
Estimated results are broadly supportive of the hypotheses outlined in Section 3.3.
Turning first to differences between communities, recall that Hypothesis 1 posited
that members of the Shia community, at base, would be least supportive of auto-
cratic systems. Evidence supporting this contention comes from the Shia coefficient
socioeconomic status, I also used a measure of room density (number of residents per bedroom)
in place of Electricity, with substantively the same results for the variables of interest, but no
discernible room density effect.
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Table 3.2: Model Results, Clerics Rule
Clerics Rule
b se(b) b se(b) b se(b) b se(b)
R 0.25 0.16 0.20 0.16 0.27 0.16 0.25 0.16
P −0.17 0.29 −0.12 0.29 −0.20 0.29 −0.15 0.30
R × P −0.73 0.44 −0.91 0.46⋆ −0.75 0.44 −0.81 0.46
Shia −0.78 0.15‡ −0.62 0.16‡ −0.71 0.57 −0.74 0.58
Shia × R 0.53 0.25⋆ 0.45 0.26 0.40 0.27 0.34 0.27
Shia × P 1.71 0.35‡ 1.50 0.36‡ 1.37 0.36‡ 1.30 0.37‡
Shia × R × P −0.27 0.52 −0.33 0.55 0.05 0.54 −0.12 0.56
Sunni 0.87 0.13‡ 0.34 0.14† 0.03 0.49 −0.45 0.51
Sunni × R −0.36 0.26 −0.18 0.26 −0.23 0.27 −0.17 0.27
Sunni × P 0.24 0.37 0.13 0.38 0.41 0.38 0.30 0.39
Sunni × R × P 0.33 0.54 0.53 0.57 0.41 0.56 0.38 0.58
Rural −0.17 0.10 −0.13 0.10
Female −0.11 0.09 −0.06 0.09
Education −1.04 0.22‡ −0.73 0.23†
Age 0.00 0.04 0.02 0.04
Electricity −0.33 0.04‡ −0.25 0.05‡
Rel. Econ. 0.77 0.41 0.87 0.42⋆
Rel. Pol. −0.17 0.39 −0.41 0.39
Rel. Fam. −0.25 0.28 −0.31 0.29
Shia × Rel. Econ. 1.19 0.73 0.82 0.77
Shia × Rel. Pol. 0.30 0.68 0.32 0.72
Shia × Rel. Fam. −0.27 0.63 −0.06 0.65
Sunni × Rel. Econ. 1.20 0.61⋆ 0.60 0.63
Sunni × Rel. Pol. 0.68 0.57 0.54 0.59
Sunni × Rel. Fam. 0.02 0.58 0.48 0.60
Intercept 1 0.29 0.09‡ −1.34 0.35‡ 0.24 0.23 −0.89 0.45
Intercept 2 0.96 0.09‡ −0.61 0.35 0.98 0.23‡ −0.12 0.45
Intercept 3 2.19 0.12‡ 0.74 0.36⋆ 2.38 0.25‡ 1.33 0.46†
N 934 895 913 874
ln L -957.11 -854.55 -872.57 -804.85
p ≤ 0.001‡, p ≤ 0.01†, p ≤ 0.05⋆, p ≤ 0.10
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estimates—indicating Shiites who are neither religious nor politicized—which, for
each dependent variable in both the parsimonious and expanded models, is strongly
negative and statistically significant. Substantively, this suggests that Shiites, at base,
are less supportive than Christians of the three autocratic systems analyzed. Further,
this is specifically a Shia rather than a Muslim effect: in five of the six models, the
Sunni coefficient is positive and statistically significant, indicating that Sunnis, at
base, are more supportive than Christians of the autocratic systems. Recall, how-
ever, that Hypothesis 2 contended that politicized Shiites would be more supportive
of autocratic options than their unpoliticized cosectarians. These data also strongly
support this proposition. In particular, the Shia×P coefficient estimates are always
positive, of very large magnitude, and statistically significant, indicating a radical-
ization effect among this subset of the Shia community, which is significantly more
supportive of autocratic options than are their cosectarians and members of the other
communities.38 This effect may be seen graphically at the top-left of Figure 3.4.39
We now turn to Hypotheses 3 and 4, which discuss the effects of religiosity and the
intersection of religiosity and politics. Because the posited interactive relationship is
difficult to see in the tables, I clarify the interpretation by presenting results from the
Strong Leader model (others are substantively similar) graphically in the form of first
differences—the change in probability associated with a change in the covariates—
along with 95-percent confidence intervals around these differences in Figures 3.4, 3.5,
and 3.6.
38Note that the estimates on P and Sunni × P are always of small magnitude, occasionally flip
signs, and are never statistically significant. This suggests that this radicalization effect is restricted
to members of the Shia community.
39Note that Khomeini’s theory is consistent with the three autocratic systems described here: the
strong leader option in the form of the jurisconsult himself, rule by experts interpreted as religious
scholars specializing in the interpretation and application of religious law, and most obviously in
the option of clerical rule. This is not to suggest that politicized Shiites adhere to the particulars of
wilayat al-faqih, but rather that this communalist vision of Shia ascendancy provides a framework
consistent with these autocratic options.
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Recall that Hypothesis 3 posited that personal religiosity, by itself, would have
no significant influence on attitudes toward different institutions. As the bottom row
of Figure 3.4 suggests, the data support this proposition, but with a major qualifier.
Although there is little evidence of a religiosity effect among Sunnis and Christians—
the only exception is among Sunnis on rule by experts, where the religiosity effect
is actually negative rather than positive—there is a significant one among Shiites
for all three autocratic systems. This implies that there may be doctrinal elements
in Shia Islam as it is currently interpreted that are receptive to more authoritarian
institutions. Particularly notable, however, is the interactive effect of religiosity and
politicization. In broad terms, their intersection makes people less supportive of auto-
cratic systems, consistent with Hypothesis 4. Among Shiites, politicization may make
community members considerably more supportive of autocracy, but religiosity tem-
pers this effect and sharply reduces these radicalizing effects. And although neither
religiosity nor politicization alone, for the most part, influence Sunni and Christian
attitudes toward these different institutional options, the processes in these communi-
ties are analogous to those among the Shia: combining religiosity and politics makes
Sunnis and Christians less supportive of autocracy.
Turning now to Hypothesis 5 on support for religious law, first note that a care-
ful comparison of results from the Strong Leader and Experts Rule models against
the Clerics Rule results reveals that the simple model used so far is comparatively
less strong in explaining support for rule by religious leaders, implying additional
influences are at work. Although the broad dynamics detailed above are also evident
for clerical rule, the effects are milder and not always statistically significant. Recall
that Hypothesis 5 suggested that support for the use of religious law is based on a
desire for religious guidance in economic rather than political affairs. Results pre-
sented in the last two columns of Table 3.2 are consistent with this proposition. The
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Figure 3.6: Clerics First Differences
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estimates related to Rel. Pol. or Rel. Fam. are even close to statistical significance.40
Note also that there are no longer any raw differences between the communities on
their preferences toward clerical rule: Christians, Sunnis, and Shiites are, at base, not
distinguishable from one another simply by virtue of community membership.
Robustness Checks
Two sets of robustness checks suggest that the dynamics described above are gener-
ally discernible across alternate model specifications. In the first check, I reestimate
the models with a set of basic control variables as indicators for age, sex, rural res-
idency, education, and socioeconomic status (see note 37 for details). Results are
substantively the same for the main dynamics of interest.41 In terms of the con-
trols themselves, increased education always decreases support for autocratic systems.
Likewise, increased poverty (proxied by Electricity) always decreases support for au-
tocratic systems, with the interpretation that autocracy reduces the influence of the
poor relative to democracy, with which they might hope to vote themselves a redis-
tribution of resources. Women are less supportive than men of the strong leader and
experts rule options, but with no discernible difference on clerical rule. The oppo-
site dynamic occurs according to residency, with rural dwellers more supportive than
urbanites of strong leaders and experts rule, but with no real difference on clerical
rule.
The second check is for party affiliation effects, of particular interest among Shia
40Also note that, in the third column, there is a very large, statistically significant coefficient on
Sunni × Rel. Econ. (as well as one of similar magnitude on Shia × Rel. Econ. that just misses
statistical significance at p = 0.102), indicating a very large effect for both communities above and
beyond the effect for Christians. This additional effect disappears, however, when adding the control
variables (column four).
41The only notable difference is that the religiosity effect among politicized Christians is significant
at the p = 0.10 rather than p = 0.05 level. These dynamics are easiest to see via graphical means,
but due to space constraints cannot be displayed here. All figures are available upon request, or on
my web site.
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respondents, given that one might plausibly argue that different dynamics occur
among Hizballah supporters. As indicators, I use party (or party leader) identifi-
cation as cited in open response questions.42 Among the Shia, the major parties
are Hizballah (Nasrallah) at 71 percent of respondents and Amal (Berri) at 22 per-
cent. Among Sunnis, 70 percent of respondents identified with the Future Movement
(Hariri), with no other major political competitor. Among Christians, the major par-
ties are the Lebanese Forces (Geagea) at 26 percent and the Free Patriotic Movement
(Aoun) at 47 percent.43 Including these party indicators in the basic models leaves
the results largely the same (results not shown). There is a substantial anti-autocratic
Amal effect for all three systems, and no significant Hizballah effect. Lebanese Forces
supporters are less supportive of rule by experts, and Future Movement supporters
are more supportive of clerical rule. Further, the results of the basic models are
substantively similar when estimated on subsamples of supporters of Hizballah, the
Future Movement, and the Free Patriotic Movement, the three largest parties in the
sample.44
42The question reads, “please tell me which political party, political movement or gathering, or
political leader you feel closest to politically.”
43Practically speaking, party identification does not transcend community membership. Within
this sample, 72 of 73 (99 percent) of declared Amal supporters are Shiites, as are 237 of 249 (95
percent) of Hizballah supporters. Among Future Movement supporters, 222 of 229 (97 percent) are
Sunnis. Lebanese Forces supporters are all Christian (82 of 82), and Christians comprise 151 of 157
(96 percent) of Free Patriotic Movement supporters.
44All results are the substantively the same among Hizballah supporters. As is generally the case
for Sunnis, the model performs less well for clerical rule, but is substantively unchanged for the
strong leader and experts options. Among Free Patriotic Movement supporters, there is now an
additional significant politicization effect (i.e., politicized but not religious) in favor of strong leaders
and rule by experts (but not clerics).
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3.5 Discussion
The results reported here indicate that Muslims do not comprise a monolithic bloc,
either between or within Islam’s doctrinal branches. It is not true that Lebanese
Shiites and Sunnis share similar attitudes toward democracy and autocracy that are
starkly different from those of Lebanese Christians. In fact, these data show that, in
the aggregate, Shiites and Sunnis represent either end of the spectrum in Lebanon,
with Christians falling approximately between them. Yet it is also clear that we
must move beyond raw aggregate figures, which can tell only a very rough story:
within-community variation produces both democrats and autocrats among Shiites,
Sunnis, and Christians alike. These data have suggested that, in accounting for
some of this variation in preferences over government institutions, members of all
three communities respond in predictable ways to incentives generated by the salient
political and social cleavages in their society, and the existing political institutions
used to channel them.
Although differences between the sectarian communities exist, the more interest-
ing processes are those that transcend sectarian lines. Two important dynamics, both
related to the intersection of religion and politics, operate among all three communi-
ties. Given the characteristics of Lebanese social cleavages and political institutions,
sectarianism is the defining feature of political life in Lebanon. Yet sectarianism is
distinct from religion and religiosity. For while religion may be part of politics—
by providing the nominal boundaries of group membership—it is not necessarily a
part of political conflict. Like ethnic politics more generally, sectarian competition in
Lebanon often plays out as a zero-sum conflict, or at the very least is perceived that
way. Yet, in the absence of the ideals of public unity and strong identification with
the broader, national community in Lebanon, religion provides a means of bridging
sectarian differences, enabling the Lebanese to invoke shared religious values to create
a shared community beyond the sect. The centripetal influence of compromise be-
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tween the religious communities helps offset the centrifugal politics of sectarian group
disputes: overlap among the faiths provides an imperfect substitute for the secular
religion of patriotism. The implications are evident, first, in preferences over institu-
tions, where, among the politically active and aware, religiosity acts as a moderating
rather than a polarizing influence and decreases support for autocratic solutions. The
evidence suggests, further, that preferences for religion to play a role in public life does
not necessarily follow from a desire for the application of religious law writ large, but
for the guidance of religious ideals in economic rather than political affairs—religion
for the sake of social justice rather than religious law for its own sake. Adding weight
to these findings is the fact that the dynamics they describe occur in all three com-
munities, suggesting that the response results from shared political incentives in spite
of differing doctrines.
Two key themes from this study resonate beyond Lebanon. Methodologically,
there is a clear epistemological gain to studying the “Islam and democracy” question
by analyzing the attitudes and preferences of ordinary, lay Muslims rather than re-
lying solely on elites and movement leaders. Studies of religious parties, movements,
and theorists—especially comparative ones—are of course helpful, but they cannot
do everything, and can tell us only obliquely how their putative mass constituen-
cies respond to the agendas such elites hope to set. Further, we can magnify this
epistemological gain by studying Muslims and non-Muslims together so that we may
assess Muslim attitudes in comparison to others rather than in isolation. By studying
similarities and differences between members of different religious traditions, we are
better able to understand when findings are community-specific and when they gen-
eralizable across communities—that is, when an effect is an Islamic one, a religious
one, or something else entirely.
Substantively, these findings suggest that blanket generalizations about Arabs or
Muslims may be only mildly helpful in understanding the politics of the societies in
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which they live. Instead, focusing on the impact of political institutions and political
economy, rather than assuming that politics must follow from culture or religion, will
provide a more informative way to understand actual or potential political outcomes
in these societies. More broadly, the results presented here reiterate that “religion
and politics” is not synonymous with “politicized religion.” In Lebanon, religiosity
appears to moderate the influence of sectarianism, acting as a substitute for an ide-
alized, public-spirited patriotism where the latter is allegedly weak—a condition that
is pervasive in many societies in the developing world. This is not a call to cultivate
religious organizations—especially those movements that represent group political
interests under a religious veneer—as a panacea to the political disputes found in
divided societies, but rather to acknowledge that the ideals they espouse can help
create shared communities comprised of members of different faiths.
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Chapter 4
Why Sunni Votes are Cheap in Lebanon but Dear in Yemen
Chapter 4 examines why ethnic patronage coalitions form in many diverse so-
cieties, and why politicians can buy off their coethnics on the cheap. It addresses
a curious combination of empirical regularities found in many ethnically plural so-
cieties. First, a norm of ethnic favoritism appears to be endemic, with politicians
distributing state resources as patronage to members of their own communities, who
in turn provide political support to their own elites. Second, the benefits distributed
to mass constituents along ethnic lines are often trivially small. These two empirical
regularities appear difficult to reconcile, at least at first glance: how can a dynamic
of ethnic favoritism coexist with a dynamic of ethnic neglect? Why, and under what
conditions, does a dynamic of ethnic favoritism, or at least what we observe to be
ethnic favoritism, emerge? Similarly, why, and under what conditions, can elites get
away with distributing cheap rewards to their coethnic mass constituents?
I present the following claim here. Ethnic coalitions represent a solution to a
severe coordination problem where, under low-information conditions, ethnic cues
and categories provide focal points around which to coordinate for political activity.
Ascriptive, descent-like rules defining membership in such categories make ethnic
coalitions somewhat similar to broad catch-all parties, but without the crucial options
of entry into or exit out of such coalitions. The lack of entry and exit options makes
mass constituents a captive audience, and thus subsidizes support for their elites.
Elites, to the degree that they can act as monopsonistic buyers of their coethnics’
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votes, can capture this ethnic subsidy and provide inexpensive payoffs to supporters
rather than return the subsidy to constituents in the form of greater benefits paid
out to compete for their political support. This framework helps explain observations
of both ethnic favoritism and poorly-compensated mass constituents simultaneously:
coethnics get rewards not because they are coethnics, but because elites can buy their
votes on the cheap. Yet government institutions can either magnify or disrupt these
dynamics to the degree that they stimulate coordination on other, non-ethnic social
categories to encourage inter-ethnic competition, or else by inducing intra-ethnic
competition between elites for their coethnics’ support.
Here, I develop this claim and tests some of its implications using original mass at-
titude survey data collected in Lebanon and Yemen. Lebanon’s consociational system
explicitly incorporates its sectarian communities into the formal institutions of the
state by defining quotas in the legislature, executive, and civil service, and by strongly
promoting intra-sect competition between elites for their cosectarians’ support—yet
due to exogenous shocks a monopsonist has emerged in the Sunni community. In
contrast, Yemen’s plurality system and explicit disavowal of sectarian, tribal, and
regional divisions has enabled the Shiite-led ruling party to act as a monopsonis-
tic buyer of votes in the minority Shia community, whereas it faces competition for
support among the Sunni majority.
Empirically, I first show show that perceptions of the need for connections to ob-
tain a government job (as a proxy for patronage) do not differ by sectarian community
in Lebanon, whereas Yemeni Sunnis are much more likely to cite connections than
are Yemeni Shiites. This dynamic provides supporting evidence that Lebanon’s quota
system prevents elites from making patronage appointments at the expense of other
communities, whereas in Yemen it is possible for the ruling party to reward Shiite sup-
porters disproportionately with state jobs at the expense of potentially more qualified
(and more expensive) Sunni aspirants. Second, I show that the propensity to signal
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support for elites, proxied here by publicly displaying political posters and photos of
leaders, varies by the degree to which individuals perceive a need for connections to
obtain government rewards—but only among Lebanese Sunnis and Yemeni Shiites.
This dynamic provides evidence that, in a monopsonistic environment, coethnics re-
alize that their votes come cheap and must find additional means to signal stronger
support in order to obtain more lucrative politically-allocated rewards.
The rest of this essay proceeds as follows. I begin by addressing the two seemingly
inconsistent empirical regularities cited—ethnic favoritism and ethnic neglect—using
motivating examples from Lebanon and Yemen, suggesting a possible resolution to
the apparent inconsistency in the competitive environments that prevail in either
society. I then expand on the theoretical sketch outlined above, utilizing a signaling
framework to help explain elite decisions over the value of rewards to despense, and
to whom. I next show how this framework applies in Lebanon and Yemen, indicating
how their institutions influence the degree of competition for votes, with ramifications
for the rewards paid out for political support. Finally, I present empirical tests of
some of the theoretical implications of this signaling framework using original survey
data from both countries.
4.1 Ethnic Favoritism and Ethnic Neglect
Casual inspection of the political processes in many ethnically plural societies suggests
the existence of the following apparent empirical regularity. The “who gets what”
question of day-to-day politics—which group predominates in the civil service, where
the roads get paved, who gets an import license—appears to be largely determined by
ethnic connections. This appears to be so much the case that ethnic favoritism has
become a standard narrative trope, alongside ethnic tensions and ethnic solidarities,
used to describe politics in such societies and explain why they seem to perform
poorly compared to their more homogeneous counterparts.
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Yet there is, in fact, more compelling evidence available than a simple flip through
the newspaper to support this received wisdom. A large body of scholarly research
shows how, in many societies where ethnic cleavages are highly salient, competition
over scarce resources commonly runs along ethnic lines to the detriment of society as a
whole. Ethnic links, according to the broad themes in these studies, provide the means
for politicians to distribute patronage—whether in the form of jobs, contracts, public
works projects, or whatever else—to members of their own community at the expense
of non-members, as well as to engage in non-productive and counter-productive activ-
ities such as rent-seeking and corruption which remove scarce resources from produc-
tive use.1 The implication of these narratives is that, when competition over resources
occurs between ethnic communities, intra-ethnic unity and solidarity is desirable for
members because it enables their community to compete more effectively against rival
groups—despite the negative repercussions for society writ large.
Yet there is another, less-often noted empirical regularity found in plural soci-
eties that is difficult to reconcile with the first: despite the apparent prevalence of
ethnic favoritism, the rewards paid out to coethnics are often trivially small. The
simple narrative that community members benefit from intra-ethnic solidarity largely
ignores how the returns to solidarity are shared out: who benefits, and by how much?
Although a narrative based on ethnic connections determining where resources flow
may help account for the empirical regularity of ethnic favoritism that we observe, it
cannot easily explain the discontent so often evident among mass level constituents
at what their coethnic elites do in fact provide. Such a narrative, in other words, may
suggest why benefits flow along ethnic lines, but not why these benefits are often so
meager.
Consider, for example, the dynamic in Lebanon, where the Future Movement
1See, for example, Annett (2001), Bates (1974, 1990), Chandra (2004), Collier and Garg (1999),
Ekeh (1975), and Mauro (1995).
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of assassinated former Prime Minister Rafik Hariri (now headed by his son, Saad)
is hegemonic within the Sunni community and, in principle, has access to sizable
quantities of state resources that could be distributed as patronage. Yet many mass
constituents see little of this potential largesse, a dynamic that is emphasized in a
speech to residents of a Sunni-dominant city made by one of Hariri’s rivals for the
community’s leadership:
Where in Tripoli is the state, which had showered promises upon it just be-
fore the last elections? Where is the state’s electricity and water? Where
are the health and educational services, and relief for the poor?. . . Are you
not the inhabitants of the biggest Sunni city in Lebanon? Do you not live
in the poorest city in Lebanon?2
Notwithstanding the traditional rivalry between Sunni elites from Beirut and Tripoli,
it is difficult to reconcile Hariri’s unprecedented support within his community with
the apparent neglect suffered by his mass constituents.
In Yemen, meanwhile, Zaydi Shiite tribesmen can ask themselves much the same
question. Despite the widely-held perception that the ruling regime and ruling party
are dominated by influential tribal figures, the Zaydi regions are among the poorest,
least developed, and most lawless in the entire country. In speaking on the devel-
opment challenges facing the tribes, the paramount shaykh of the powerful Hashid
2Omar Karami, head of Tripoli’s most prominent political family, is ostensibly Hariri’s most
credible competitor for leadership in the Sunni community, but lacks a political machine that even
roughly approximates the Future Movement. Further, Karami’s credibility suffered considerably
from his tenure as a Syrian-backed prime minister after Rafik Hariri’s resignation from that office
and subsequent assassination. Karami, addressing supporters, notes:
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“Karami launches harsh attack on Geagea: we are the Sunni Unionist Arabs,” (
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tribal confederation has claimed that, “transforming a tribesman from a warrior to
a farmer is very easy to achieve, especially if agricultural and irrigation projects are
established, wells are dug, and roads are run to his lands,” noting that the provision
of such services and infrastructure would encourage stability and enterprise.3 Yet, as
another important tribal shaykh with a senior post in the ruling party admitted, “no
doubt about it: right now no services or infrastructure are going out to the tribal
areas. . . [even though] everyone wants to put down his gun, go to school, take his kid
to a clean clinic, and drink clean water.”4 The tribesmen, who ostensibly form a core
constituency for the ruling party, have seen only minimal rewards at best for their
political support. Whatever the returns to unity, few of the material benefits appear
to reach the mass constituents whose votes put their coethnic elites in office.
As the examples above illustrate, we are faced with two related empirical regu-
larities that appear inconsistent, if not contradictory. First, in ethnically plural so-
cieties, competition over resources commonly proceeds between communities rather
than across them. To most observers, ethnic favoritism appears to be the norm:
politicians pack the civil service with coethnics, build schools and pave roads in their
own neighborhoods, and distribute contracts and licenses to supporters from their
own communities. Second, however, the purported beneficiaries of this patronage,
3Shaykh Abdallah bin Hussein al-Ahmar is both speaker of parliament and the titular head of
the country’s largest opposition party, as well as President Ali Abdallah Salih’s tribal shaykh, at
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4Interview, Sanaa, 18 February 2006. That these regions are so poor compared to the rest of the
country is attested to by the fact that foreign aid agencies have begun to target the “big five” tribal
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2005 and 2006.
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the mass constituents whose votes put their coethnics in power, appear to benefit
only minimally from their community links. They may get jobs in the civil service
but are paid a pittance to do them, a school for their village without desks or even
roofs, or a dirt-floor building for a health clinic without staff or electricity. Ethnic
favoritism appears to coexist with ethnic neglect.
Although the patronage relationships found in ethnically plural societies often do
appear to follow ethnic links, citing “ethnic favoritism” merely labels the phenomenon
rather than explains it. It does not explain why the favoritism occurs along ethnic
lines, nor is it clear what makes these dynamics particularly ethnic at all: switching
in the terms partisan or crony yields the familiar description of machine politics the
world over. Nor does it explain why mass constituents should continue to support
their coethnic elites when they get so little out of it—except perhaps by citing ethnic
loyalties or ethnic solidarities, which is tautological if not misleading. Yet these
are the questions we should be asking rather than assuming away: why, and under
what conditions, does competition over resources occur specifically along ethnic lines?
Why do constituents support their elites despite the little they get to show for it?
Do the dynamics that make ethnic competition qualitatively different from its non-
ethnic counterparts really make it, as is often assumed implicitly, more destructive
than competition along other cleavages, such as party or class? The resolution, as I
propose below, is found in the coordination environments from which ethnic coalitions
emerge, and the competitive environments within which they operate.
4.2 Ethnic Constituencies and Subsidized Support
Let us begin with a simple rendition of political coalitions, in which politicians reward
coalition members for their political support, which they require to obtain and retain
office. To the degree that the value of this support is the same across individuals—
e.g., that a vote is a vote regardless of who casts it—politicians are indifferent to the
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particular composition of their coalitions provided that they are winning coalitions.5
Politicians, in dispensing rewards, attempt to employ scarce resources as efficiently
as possible by targeting them to supporters without wasting them on non-supporters,
who do not contribute the votes needed to put or keep the politicians in office.6
Yet politicians do not observe potential constituents’ latent levels of political sup-
port or their voting decisions—according to the letter and spirit of the secret ballot,
votes are in principle completely unobservable—and must instead find alternative
means to infer the composition of their coalitions and distinguish supporters from
non-supporters.
Imperfect Information in the Market for Votes
The situation sketched here, with politicians uncertain about the identities of their
supporters to whom they wish to target rewards, approximates a classic case of asym-
metric information in markets—in this case, the market for votes. In particular, vot-
ers have private information about their levels of political support that politicians
lack, requiring the latter to utilize more easily observable, informative indicators of
5I make this simplifying assumption of indifference in part because assuming ethnocentric be-
havior to explain ethnocentric outcomes is tautological; citing ethnic loyalties or ethnic solidarities
to account for observations of ethnic favoritism does not explain why the loyalties and solidarities
themselves should be ethnically based. Note that doing so makes the implicit non-assumption of
in-group favoritism as a core behavioral principle (Brown 1986, Hewstone, Rubin, and Willis 2002),
although we could of course build ethnocentrism into the model if we so chose (see related discussions
in Akerlof and Kranton 2000, Bawn 1999, and Bueno de Mesquita et al. 2003). Rather than make
in-group favoritism a core behavioral assumption, we can view it more accurately as an emergent
social strategy whose prevalence and robustness indicate its competitiveness in a wide range of social
environments (Hammond and Axelrod 2006).
6I use the term efficient here to mean political efficiency—the optimal deployment of resources to
gain and retain office—rather than utilitarian economic efficiency. Note, in passing, that the coali-
tions being described approximate pork coalitions that focus on the distribution and redistribution
of resources rather than coalitions over what we commonly think of as policy or ideology. Coordina-
tion on ethnic coalitions reduces the salience of many policy dimensions for which we might expect
individuals to hold single-peaked preferences, focusing instead on competition over dimensions such
as pork for which more is always better or worse (i.e., dimensions with monotonically increasing or
decreasing preferences—see Fearon 1999).
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that latent support on which to condition their decisions to dispense or withhold
rewards. To understand the dynamics of this broad class of interactions between
buyers and sellers (here, politicians and voters) under conditions of asymmetric infor-
mation, signaling models—first originating in Spence’s (1973, 1974) seminal analysis
of job market signaling, with numerous subsequent applications (Banks 1991, Spence
2002)—have proven particularly useful.
In this framework, informative signals are those for which the cost of signaling
is related to the latent attribute of interest, making it possible to infer levels of the
latter from the strength of the former. In Spence’s original formulation, for example,
acquiring a given amount of education is more costly for low-ability workers than for
high-ability workers. Although employers may be interested in latent ability rather
than education per se, the latter serves as a credible signal of the former given that
it requires more effort for low-ability workers to acquire a given level of education
compared to high-ability workers, and thus the former require comparatively higher
wages to compensate them for these higher costs.7 In the context of the politicians
and voters discussed here, an informative signal is one that helps politicians categorize
voters as supporters or non-supporters for the purposes of distributing rewards.
Information and Ethnic Coordination
Although signals may help politicians make informed inferences about voters’ levels
of political support, the logical next question to ask is the following: what signals are
available, and how informative are they? The information environment in which social
coordination takes place plays a crucial role in influencing what types of signals exist
7More technically, the marginal cost of education is higher for low-ability workers than high-
ability workers for all levels of education. The substantive interpretation is that, although education
may influence worker productivity, wages vary with education more than can be explained solely
by the effect of education on productivity alone. For a more extensive discussion of equilibrium
conditions and the profusion of equilibria that can occur in signaling models, see, e.g., Spence’s
original papers as well as the commentary in Gibbons (1992).
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by influencing what types of social categories are relevant to politics. Even though
common interests by themselves are insufficient for group coordination (Hardin 1982,
Marwell and Oliver 1993, Olson 1965), when it does take place, coordination occurs
over some set of interests shared by members, even if those members would individ-
ually prefer to coordinate on other issues. Yet interests in the form of ideal points
on policy dimensions are difficult to observe, which in turn makes it difficult to coor-
dinate around them: not only is it challenging to infer what those common interests
are, but also that a putative set of interests is in fact common to a given set of people.
Although we typically expect people to infer interests from observable proxies and
summary measures such as party labels and other heuristic cues (Downs 1957, Lupia
and McCubbins 1998, Sniderman et al. 1991), not all such cues are available or infor-
mative in all societies. This is especially notable in the low-information environments
that characterize many developing countries, where parties are often suppressed or
uninstitutionalized, civil society organizations weak or state-controlled, and indepen-
dent media unavailable, unreliable, or stifled. Under these conditions, many common
political heuristics—party labels, union membership, newspaper readership, and so
on—lose much of their information content. But as reliable political information
becomes more scarce, it becomes increasingly difficult to coordinate on common in-
terests. People lack not only the means to assess what those interests are, but also the
likelihood that others share them and are aware that they share them—that common
interests are common knowledge (Chwe 2001).
As reliable information becomes scarce and other options for coordination are fore-
closed, people are increasingly compelled to utilize ethnic categories to coordinate for
political activity. First, the ascriptive, descent-like rules used to define member-
ship in such categories are simple, intuitive, and definitive (at least in principle).8
8Following the precedent set by Horowitz (1985) and subsequent scholars, I treat ethnic categories
as a broad set of categories within which membership is defined by ascriptive descent or descent-like
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Moreover, ascription defines social categories with very low boundary permeability,
keeping membership coherent—again, in principle if not exactly so in practice.9 Fur-
ther, ethnic membership, although only imperfectly observable, is relatively easy and
inexpensive to infer from a large set of covarying proxies such as names, language,
accent, region of birth, skin color, and so on (Chandra 2004)—cues which in turn are
relatively difficult or costly to disrupt or suppress as compared to, e.g., party labels or
union membership. The combination of high observability, low boundary permeabil-
ity, and a simple, intuitive membership rule helps members coordinate for political
activity—an imagined community whose common interests are common knowledge
(Anderson 1983, Chwe 2001, Hobsbawm 1990).
Coordination on ethnic categories, however, has repercussions for which interests
are, in fact, common to members. Defining categories by ascription rather than choice
grants membership independent of occupation, education, ideological preferences, age,
sex, and so on, in effect creating constituencies that are societies-in-miniature (Bates
1974, Chandra 2004, Horowitz 1985).10 Yet coordinating on such constituencies, in
turn, places non-trivial restrictions on the types of interests that can be salient for cat-
rules. For critiques of the weaknesses and inconsistencies in this approach, however, see Chandra
(2006). Note that I have said nothing about identity or identification (Hardin 1995): ascriptive,
descent-like membership rules merely provide a means to classify people irrespective of their desire
to be so classified. Personal relevance and political relevance are at best imperfectly correlated.
9Ascription, in principle, defines categories with no boundary permeability, although the appli-
cation of this rule is only approximated in practice. The Yemeni tribes, for example, recognize a
practice that may, for lack of a better translation, be glossed as “fraternization” (
è A 	g@ ñÖÏ @ ), in which
a clan or tribal segment seeks protection in and ultimately joins a new tribe, usually in response to
some grave injustice. The practice, although it does not occur with great frequency, is sufficiently
common that terms exist to distinguish the original constituent tribes in the large Hashid and Bakil
tribal confederations from the “Hashidized” and “Bakilized” tribes (
éÊ¾J. JÖÏ @ ÉKAJ.
®Ë @ð èY jJÖÏ @ ÉKAJ.
®Ë @ )
that joined later. See Abu Ghanim (1985¨, 72–74) for details.
10Note that there may in fact be significant and salient differences between communities on dimen-
sions such as occupation or education, but this dynamic will occur in societies with ranked ethnic
systems (Horowitz 1985), which are roughly analogous to caste systems. In perfectly unranked
systems, however, ethnic category membership can tell us nothing about individuals’ occupations,
educational backgrounds, incomes, and vice-versa.
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egory members as category members. Because of heterogeneity within the community
resulting from the ascriptive membership rule, there is considerable within-category
variation over a wide range of policy dimensions. Yet dimensions on which members
vary greatly—issues over which there is widespread internal disagreement—cannot
serve to unify members and constitute common interests. Instead, such issues are
deemphasized in favor of interests on which the bulk of the members can agree. Yet
given that so many dimensions we might consider to be “policy,” “programmatic,” or
“ideological” are, in effect, closed off by this within-community heterogeneity, com-
mon interests default to distribution and redistribution toward the community, and
hence a predisposition to patronage coalitions within which membership is marked
by ethnic category.11 This makes ethnic constituencies somewhat analogous to dei-
deologized catch-all parties (Kirchheimer 1966, Mainwaring 1999), but with a key
difference: whereas the boundaries of catch-all parties are commonly highly perme-
able, there is in principle no entry or exit from ethnic categories (Hirschman 1970).12
Ethnic Subsidies in the Market for Votes
Because ethnic categories are defined by ascriptive, descent-like membership rules,
their boundaries are, in principle, impermeable: entry and exit are closed off.13 This
11Compare Chandra (2004), who argues that the low information environments found in patron-
age democracies compel elites and constituents to conduct “ethnic head counts,” from which an
equilibrium strategy of ethnic favoritism and ethnic voting emerges.
12This is emphatically not to claim that ethnic categories are primordial givens, nor that individu-
als belong to just one such category. The point is that adopting ethnic classifications and ascriptive
membership rules changes how and over what political contestation occurs. Politicians do not com-
pete to win over constituents from rival groups—in principle, they cannot leave their groups nor
join new ones—but rather compete to define what categories are relevant, and the parameters for
membership in those categories (e.g., how inclusive or exclusive they are). Political contestation
using ethnic classifications does not take place over members, but over labels and boundaries.
13An alternate way to consider this is that, in principle, entry and exit do not occur by voluntary
choice, but rather by birth and death. In practice, of course, there is some ambiguity and room for
interpretation on the margins, as evident in such practices as adoption, conversion, excommunication,
marrying into (or out of) a community, honorary membership, and disinheritance. The existence of
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lack of entry and exit options makes ethnic categories qualitatively distinct from other
types of social categories that we commonly view as voluntary. In particular, mass
constituents become a captive audience to their own elites, effectively providing the
latter with subsidized political support. Elites, in turn, enjoy a protected market,
enabling them to act as oligopsonistic, possibly even monopsonistic, buyers of their
coethnics’ votes. In effect, an ethnic subsidy flows from mass constituents to elites.
As a result, coethnic votes are cheap.
To see this, we may return to the signaling framework discussed above and apply
it more rigorously to the market for votes when ethnic categories are salient.14 An
officeholding politician wishes to condition the benefits she pays out on potential
constituents’ degrees of political support. For simplicity, assume that voters may
be either supporters or non-supporters of the politician. To the degree possible, the
politician prefers to dispense resources efficiently by targeting rewards to supporters,
whose votes keep her in office, and not dissipate them on non-supporters, all while
minimizing the total amount of resources expended. Because the degree of political
support is latent and unobservable, the politician must instead attempt to infer it
from costly signals of support sent by individuals, which in practice could include such
actions as attending a campaign rally, displaying her political poster, electioneering
on her behalf, and so on.
The first important assumption is that supporters find these activities less costly
than do non-supporters: the marginal cost of signaling support is lower for supporters
than it is for non-supporters.15 Yet ethnic categories, due to their salience and the
ambiguity and the possibility of multiple interpretations opens up space for political contestation
over the “proper” reading of formally definitive membership rules, and to which set of individuals
such rules “actually” apply.
14The exposition here draws considerable inspiration from Spence’s (1973, 1974) seminal papers
and utilizes his basic model framework.
15This mirrors Spence’s critical assumption in his job-market signaling studies that it is less costly
for high-ability workers to acquire education than it is for low-ability workers.
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coordination logic described above, also carry information about individuals’ levels
of political support.16 Again for simplicity, assume that voters, in their degrees of
ethnic similarity to the politician, may be either coethnics (E) or non-coethnics (N)
and, further, that coethnics are more likely to be political supporters than are non-
coethnics. The implication of these reasonably innocuous assumptions is that it is
cheaper for a coethnic to send signals of support than it is for a non-coethnic, or
equivalently, a coethnic may send a stronger signal of support for a given cost than
can a non-coethnic.17
Figure 4.1 illustrates this dynamic by depicting indifferences curves between the
costs of signaling (S) and the rewards gained from it (R) for coethnic (IE in solid
black) and non-coethnic (IN in dashed grey) voters. At signal strength s1, both co-
ethnics and non-coethnics require a reward of r1 to compensate them for the costs
they bear to send the signal. Increasing the signal strength to s2, however, requires
a comparatively smaller reward paid out to coethnics than to non-coethnics to keep
16Spence distinguishes between indices, which are immutable characteristics such as sex or race,
and signals, which are alterable. Using this terminology, one could argue that ethnic categories
are technically indices rather than signals, albeit indices which contain information about the latent
variable of interest (political support). I choose not to pursue this distinction for several reasons, the
most important of which is as follows. Individuals may, in principle, signal their identification with
their ethnic categories to different degrees, e.g., by emphasizing their identities via conscientious
efforts to use group slang and adopt its distinctive dress, or else by downplaying or attempting
to conceal their memberships (passing, dissimulation, etc.). By treating ethnic observability as
a given—politicians know rather than infer voters’ ethnic memberships—the analysis here leans
toward examining categories as informative indices rather than signals. In future work, however,
I will explicitly analyze the more complicated environment with multiple signals—both political
support and ethnic membership—and examine the conditions under which either signal becomes
more or less informative, and the decisions made to invest in the one or the other.
17More formally, the cost of signaling c is a function of political support π and the strength of the
signal s, c = c(π, s), and political support is a function of the degree of ethnic similarity ǫ, π = π(ǫ).
Assume that cost decreases in political support, i.e., that holding signal strength constant, cπ < 0.
Assume as well that support increases in ethnic similarity, πǫ > 0. Differentiating for cost and
political support yields dc = cπdπ + csds and dπ = πǫdǫ, and substituting the latter into the former
results in dc = cππǫdǫ + csds. Hence, the total derivative of signal cost with respect to ethnic
similarity is dc
dǫ
= cππǫ + cs
ds
dǫ
, and the partial total derivative holding signal strength constant (i.e.,
ds = 0) is equal to cππǫ, which is negative due to the assumptions that cπ < 0 and πǫ > 0. Hence,
the cost of sending a given signal decreases as ethnic similarity increases, the graphical interpretation










Figure 4.1: Signaling Indifference Curves for Coethnics (E) and Non-Coethnics (N)
them on the same indifference curve—rE as compared to rN—the latter of whom re-
quire relatively greater rewards to compensate them for the greater marginal signaling
costs they bear.
Coethnics, in other words, require less compensation for their political support
than do non-coethnics: coethnic votes are cheap. This, in turn, has several implica-
tions for how politicians in societies where ethnic coordination is prominent choose
to distribute state resources, as well as ramifications for how the benefits of in-group
solidarity and ethnic unity are shared out between elites and masses. First, the polit-
ical allocation of state resources should appear to follow patterns of ethnic favoritism,
with politicians packing the civil service with coethnics, fixing their parking tickets,
and providing various other rewards to members of their own communities. Accord-
ing to these dynamics, however, ethnic favoritism occurs not because coethnics are
coethnics—that politicians feel empathy for them or want to “do right” by their own
communities—but because coethnics are cheaper sources of political support than are
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non-coethnics.
The second major implication follows from the first: although resources may flow
along community lines as politicians target coethnics, these rewards can be remark-
ably stingy, at least at the mass level. Coethnics may get jobs in the bureaucracy,
but are paid next to nothing to perform them; a school building for their village, but
no books, desks, or teachers; exemptions from paying negligible monetary fines, and
so on. The difference between the costs of rewarding coethnics and non-coethnics—in
figure 4.1, rN − rE—amounts to an ethnic subsidy flowing from mass constituents to
elites. The returns to in-group solidarity, in other words, go disproportionately to
elites at the expense of their coethnics.
The political allocation of scarce resources in societies with salient ethnic cate-
gories and coalitions, in other words, should concentrate resources at the elite level
over and above the level possible in societies in which ethnic categories are not polit-
ically relevant. Yet these outcomes do not obtain unconditionally. In particular, gov-
ernment institutions may exaggerate or mitigate this concentration of resources at the
elite level. First, they may do so by expanding or contracting the scope of elite discre-
tionary powers in distributing state resources, such as civil service exams, closed-bid
contracting, independent judiciaries and auditing agencies, community quotas, and
so on. Yet government institutions may also influence the competitive environment
within ethnic communities, which conditions the degree to which elites may capture
and privatize ethnic subsidies or be forced to return the subsidy to constituents in
competition with other elites for their coethnics’ votes.
4.3 Ethnic Monopsonies in Lebanon and Yemen
Ethnic social categories are highly conspicuous in both Lebanese and Yemeni society,
and form the principle constituencies and building blocks of political coalitions in
either country. The most prominent lines of distinction are sectarian, tribal, and
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regional—albeit with the latter two more prominent in Yemen than in Lebanon—
and these distinctions overlap in politically significant ways.18 Further, the relative
importance of these categories compared to each other varies with the locus of political
contestation, with sub-national conflicts commonly activating narrower constituencies
and national competition activating broader, more encompassing categories.19 Due to
the nonexistence of effective administrative decentralization measures or meaningful
local governance in either country, however, competition over scarce resources centers
on control of and influence in the national government. Here, I concentrate on sects
as the mass constituencies most relevant in terms of size for the purposes of national-
level competition over scarce resources, as well as smaller units within the sects—
constituencies within constituences—that form the building blocks of these broader
coalitions.
The sects in both Lebanon and Yemen are social categories whose nominal bound-
18Sectarian and regional categories are based on implicit descent-like membership rules, and al-
though it is possible to change one’s membership—conversion, moving, and so on—doing so imposes
significant material and social costs on individuals and their families, making these category mem-
berships largely ascriptive. Tribal categories in Yemen are based on explicit descent rules that trace
ancestry back to eponymous forefathers, and although there is room on the margins to change tribal
affiliations, it is a costly procedure and occurs infrequently. On Yemeni tribes and the connection of
tribalism to sectarian communities and geographic regions, see, e.g., Abu Ghanim (1985¨, 1990¨),
Sharjabi (1986¨, 1990¨), Sumayri (2001¨), and Zahiri (1996¨, 2004¨). Although there are some
kin groups in Lebanon’s Bekaa Valley that roughly approximate Yemen’s tribes, the Lebanese more
frequently refer to the country’s sects as “tribes” in a pejorative sense, or else refer to local families
(especially the notable political families) as tribes or clans. Compare the use of the term “tribal-
ism” in Lebanese scholarly writing such as el Khazen (2000¨) and Salibi (1988) to the use of the
term in Kassir (2006), Muhsin (2000¨), and Sulayman (1998¨)—which are collections of essays and
newspaper columns—and to its use in a series of interviews with prominent Shia religious leader
Muhammad Fadlallah (2001¨).
19Thus, for example, the relevant cleavages differ at the national versus local levels. Tribal wars
in Yemen are largely fought in the north of the country between Zaydi Shia tribes, making tribal
affiliation salient and deemphasizing regional and sectarian categories, which in that context do not
serve as relevant distinctions. Lebanese local elections (and parliamentary elections in homogeneous
districts) are also frequently venues for electoral battles between local notable families in which
sect and region do not provide relevant distinctions between contestants or constituents. Compare
Posner (2005), who found evidence that the most politically relevant ethnic category under one-party
rule in Zambia was tribal, but under a multiparty system the relevant category shifted up to more
encompassing regional constituencies.
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aries are defined in religious terms, but whose relevance to politics derives primarily
from political competition rather than doctrinal differences. Further, with weak and
largely uninstitutionalized political parties in both countries, the sects and their con-
stituent subunits provide the most prominent focal points around which to coordi-
nate for political activity in order to compete for scarce resources.20 On this note, a
prominent opposition party leader in Yemen pointed to “all the old divisions, Zaydis
versus Shafais, mountains versus cities, north versus south. . . everyone’s looking for
the money. Where is it? It’s with the regime.”21 Similarly, Muhammad Fadlallah,
one of Lebanon’s most influential Shia religious leaders, notes that “there are no
Lebanese in Lebanon: there are Maronites working on behalf of Maronites, Ortho-
dox for Orthodox, Druze, Sunni, Shia, and so on. . . every one of them goes back to
their sectarian bases because they know they will not get anything except via the
sect.”22 Given this background, let us now consider the competitive environments in
the Lebanese and Yemeni markets for votes.
20On parties and elections in Lebanon, see el Khazen (2000¨, 2002¨), Hashishu (1998¨), and
Madini (1999¨). In Yemen, see Farah (2002¨, 2005¨), Mansour (2004¨), Saqqaf (2004¨), Republic
of Yemen (2004¨), and Zahiri (2004¨).
21Note that “mountains versus cities” is one of several standard phrases used to refer to political
competition between the (Zaydi) tribesmen of the mountains and the (Shafai) townsmen and city
dwellers. “North versus south,” depending on context, can take on the meaning of either the former
northern republic versus the former southern republic, or the far north (i.e., the north of the former
northern republic) compared to the rest of the country. Interview, Sanaa, 27 September 2005.
22Fadlallah interview with al-Ahd (Hizballah’s party paper), reprinted in Fadlallah (2001¨, 223–
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Institutional Incentives to Competition and Monopsony
As argued in Section 4.2, formal government institutions can have a significant im-
pact on the competitive environments in the market for votes, which in turn has
ramifications both for how resources are distributed between communities as well
as for how they are shared out between elites and their mass constituents. Here,
I focus on two key institutional differences that derive from Lebanon’s adoption of
consociational arrangements as compared to the disuse of formal power-sharing pro-
visions in Yemen. First, Lebanon employs a quota system to allocate government
positions explicitly among its sectarian communities. In addition to designating all
seats in the parliament according to sect and reserving certain high executive offices
for particular communities, the quota system extends to public employment in the
civil service, diplomatic corps, the judiciary, and so on. Yemen, meanwhile, makes no
such formal provisions to share power among its communities, although occasionally
uses informal, non-binding arrangements to do so.23
Second, the electoral systems used in Lebanon and Yemen differ in how they
structure competition for seats in the legislatures, with important ramifications for
the degree of competitiveness in those elections. Lebanon, in light of its power-sharing
principles, uses an unorthodox system that combines plurality voting, open lists, and,
most importantly for the purposes here, the principle by which only cosectarians com-
pete against each other for any given seat.24 This practice, in effect, provides a strong,
23The most prominent example has been the repeated re-election of Abdallah bin Hussein al-
Ahmar, paramount shaykh of the Hashid confederation and titular head of the Islah Party, as speaker
of parliament, despite the ruling party holding a majority of the seats since the 1997 parliamentary
elections. Other examples include the conspicuous appointment of southerners as prime ministers,
most recently Abd al-Qadir Bajammal, who was elected secretary-general of the ruling party in its
seventh general congress in December 2005.
24Electoral districts vary in the number of seats they contain, each of which is assigned to a
particular sect. Voters cast ballots for every seat in the district, not just those of their own sect, the
winner of which is the candidate who wins a simple plurality. This has given rise to the practice of
creating electoral lists headed by a local notable or party, although voters may mix candidates freely.
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institutionally-defined stimulus to within-sect competition among elites for their sects’
seats and, consequently, their cosectarians’ votes. Yemen, meanwhile, uses a more
conventional plurality system with single-member districts, and makes no special
provisions to encourage similar within-community competition. Hence, whereas the
quota system influences the distribution of power and resources between communities,
the electoral system has implications for the distribution within communities.
Competition and Monopsony in the Market for Votes
Lebanon’s August 2007 parliamentary by-elections, held to replace two assassinated
deputies affiliated with the ruling coalition, underscored the stark differences that
exist in the competitive environments within the country’s Christian and Sunni com-
munities. Despite repeated attempts over a period of months to find a consensus
candidate for the Christian seat—including a proposal to give the seat to the assas-
sinated deputy’s father by acclamation in order to avoid the election altogether—
government- and opposition-affiliated Christian factions both put forward candidates
for what was expected to be an extremely close election. Simultaneously, however,
no such uncertainty lingered over the outcome of the election for the Sunni seat: it
was universally acknowledged that whichever candidate was selected by assassinated
former Prime Minister Rafik Hariri’s Future Movement (now headed by his son, Saad)
would win in a landslide.25
Electoral alliances, in effect, amount to vote-trading between elites, who instruct their cosectarian
supporters to vote for allied non-cosectarian candidates. They are usually extremely temporary in
nature and often contradict candidate policy positions or party platforms (el Khazen 2000¨, 2002¨),
as with many of the lists that formed with Syrian “encouragement” in the postwar elections. The
practice continued in the 2005 elections: see, e.g., “Hizballah with Jumblatt in Baabda and with
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25Recall that, in Lebanon’s electoral system, parliamentary seats are assigned explicitly to each
of the sectarian communities, and candidates run only against their co-sectarians. The by-elections
were held to fill Walid Eido’s Sunni seat in Beirut and Pierre Gemayel’s Maronite Christian seat in
Mount Lebanon. The Christian competition was particularly prominent in part because it pitted
Gemayel’s father, former President Amine Gemayel, against a candidate from Michel Aoun’s Free
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Electoral campaigning was essentially meaningless for the Sunni seat and was
hardly reported in the press, whereas Christian campaign rallies drawing thousands
of spirited supporters received widespread media coverage and seemingly endless po-
litical analysis and speculation. Election results, in turn, reflected the diverging com-
petitiveness of the races. As expected, the Future Movement’s candidate captured the
Sunni seat in a landslide, winning some 23,000 votes (86 percent) against his nearest
opponent’s 3,500 (13 percent). The Christian contest, meanwhile, was decided by an
extremely narrow margin: out of nearly 80,000 ballots cast, the opposition-aligned
candidate won by a mere 418 votes, i.e., one-half of one percent.26 Lebanese Christian
elites have long complained about the lack of unity in their community, arguing that
divisions make it difficult for Christians to balance against the Sunni and Shia com-
munities. Yet the appeal for unity, regardless of its intuitive desirability, sidesteps a
non-obvious question with large ramifications for social welfare: who benefits from
that unity? Which, in fact, is more lamentable: the lack of unity among Christians,
or the lack of competition among Sunnis?
We can ask analogous questions in Yemen where, particularly since the unification
of the former northern and southern republics in 1990, “national unity” has dominated
political discourse and been invoked repeatedly against dissenting voices. As one
prominent Yemeni human rights activist has noted, “lots of people are unthinkingly
in favor of unity,” with the result that “now, we have the idea that there is ‘one
people,’ and many [Yemenis] can’t deal well with multiple ideas of how the state
should work. People look at ‘unity’ as the path to a better future: to be bigger,
Patriotic Movement—the largest Christian party in parliament—with Aoun and Gemayel widely
seen as potential rivals in the country’s presidential elections scheduled to be held later in the year.
26Note, as well, the difference in participation rates: 19 percent for the Sunni contest and 47
percent for the Christian one. For a breakdown of the vote by precinct, see “Fierce confrontation
in Metn draws new political contours: Aoun wins election by 418 votes and Gemayel reaps the
Maronite majority,” ( AKñ 418 K. AJ
K. A
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richer, and so on.”27 As in Lebanon, however, the intuitive appeal and desirability of
unity tend to overshadow the more problematic question of how the returns to unity
should be shared out. Disputes over how to distribute resources between communities
are of course common, but largely lost in the debate is how they are shared out within
communities.
Exogenous Shocks and a Sunni Monopsony in Lebanon
Although the choices that produced Lebanon’s institutions were not free of self-serving
motives, the power-sharing arrangments were designed, nevertheless, to manage the
country’s plural society and channel its sectarian communities into politics in such
a manner as to promote both inter-sect cooperation and within-sect competition.
Hence, Lebanon’s consociational institutions have largely produced oligopsonistic
competition between elites in each sect for their cosectarians’ votes. Yet despite these
institutional inducements to competition, a monopsonistic vote-buyer has emerged in
the Sunni community due to a series of exogenous shocks.
The most prominent parties now competing for influence in the Shia and Chris-
tian communities are effectively descendents of civil war-era militias, and consequently
have organizational structures and support bases.28 In contrast, the Sunni commu-
nity’s main “militia” during the war was, in effect, the Palestine Liberation Orga-
nization (PLO), which was effectively liquidated as a fighting force and its leaders
expelled from Lebanon by the Israeli invasion of 1982, subsequent Syrian attacks on
27Interview, Taiz, 13 August 2005.
28The Amal Movement and Hizballah are the two primary parties in the Shia community, and
both were major militias. Many Christian parties were repressed or split in the postwar period,
including the Lebanese Forces, a wartime militia that in turn had its origins in the Kataib Party,
the “ruling party” in the Christian areas during the war. Michel Aoun’s Free Patriotic Movement
technically does not derive from a militia, but Aoun’s “war of liberation” against Syrian forces as
army commander and one of two competing prime ministers at the end of the civil war, as well as
his rejection of the peace agreement (the Taif Accord), meant that the movement was banned and
kept Aoun in exile in France until May 2005.
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remaining PLO forces loyal to Chairman Yasser Arafat in the north, and Amal’s “war
of the camps.” A smaller Sunni militia that lacked the capacity of the larger forces,
the Mourabitoun, was in turn forcibly disarmed in 1985 when Shia and Druze militias
occupied West Beirut.
Hence, by the end of the war, there was no organizational base within the Sunni
community on which to build, and the traditional political notables had neither the
material resources nor the media empire to compete effectively against Rafik al-Hariri,
whose electoral victories enabled him to serve as prime minister for all but a few years
of the postwar period.29 Hariri’s assassination in February 2005, in turn, further con-
solidated the Sunni constituency behind the Future Movement, now led by his son,
Saad, by implicitly equating opposition to Future, or support of its rivals, with be-
trayal of the community. Hence, whereas significant competition between elites occurs
in the other sectarian communities, Hariri and the Future Movement have become, in
effect, Sunni monopsonists. To substantiate this difference, we can examine Lebanese
self-identification with particular parties across the sectarian communities as summa-
rized in Figure 4.2.
Figure 4.2 reports the two most frequent answers to an open-response question
asking survey participants to indicate the political party or leader to whom they feel
closest politically.30 Among Shiites, 71 percent cite Hizballah (Nasrallah) whereas
29Hariri amassed his personal fortune, well into the billions of dollars, primarily through construc-
tion contracts in Saudi Arabia. On the expanded importance of money and broadcast media in
postwar elections, see the discussion in el Khazen (2000¨). Salim al-Hoss and Omar Karami, tra-
ditional notables from Beirut and Tripoli, respectively, each served short periods as prime minister
primarily when Syria backed them and not because of electoral successes or strong parliamentary
blocs supporting them.
30Note that the number of respondents citing alternative options drops significant in each com-
munity relative to the main two competitors. Respondents were asked to “please tell me which
political party, political movement or gathering, or political leader you feel closest to politically.”




































Figure 4.2: Lebanese Party Identification
22 percent cite Amal (Berri). Among Christians, 47 percent support the Free Patri-
otic Movement (Aoun) and 26 percent support the Lebanese Forces (Geagea). Yet
the distribution of support among Sunnis differs starkly: whereas 70 percent support
the Future Movement (Hariri), the next most frequent response is, in fact, “no one”
(7 percent). Further, only three other identifiably-Sunni organizations or leaders re-
ceived any citations at all, with one response each.31 The key point to take away from
Figure 4.2 is not the particular levels of support attached to each party, which have
presumably shifted since the survey went into the field in fall 2005, but rather these
different dynamics of support: credible competitors exist in the Shia and Christian
communities, whereas no challenge exists to Hariri’s Future Movement in the Sunni
31The three were the Islamic Benevolence Group (al-Ahbash), the Popular Nasirist Organization,




Institutional Choice and a Shia Monopsony in Yemen
Whereas Lebanon’s institutions were promulgated in the name of pluralism, Yemen’s
were adopted in the name of national unity as leaders sought to integrate the two for-
mer republics along with the country’s tribes and sectarian communities. These unity
institutions, however, after the initial optimism that accompanied multipartyism and
democratic elections faded, have been maintained and perpetuated by the president
and ruling party at least in part to maintain their electoral dominance.33 Yet whereas
identifying a monopsonist in the Lebanese Sunni community is reasonably straight-
forward given the degree to which parties are mono-sectarian and elites draw their
support primarily from their own communities (compare fn. 32), the existence of a
comparable monopsonist is not immediately obvious in Yemen where, among other
32Practically speaking, party identification does not transcend community membership. Within
this sample, 72 of 73 (99 percent) of declared Amal supporters are Shiites, as are 237 of 249 (95
percent) of Hizballah’s supporters. Among Future Movement supporters, 222 of 229 (97 percent) are
Sunnis. Lebanese Forces supporters are all Christian (82 of 82), and Christians comprise 151 of 157
(96 percent) of Free Patriotic Movement supporters. Although some ideological parties operate, even
organizations that started on an explicitly non- or anti-sectarian basis have over time become largely
identified with a single religious group—the small but active Communist Party transformed over the
course of the civil war into a Shia-majority party (with around 60 percent of members coming from
that community), while the Progressive Socialist Party, formerly Druze-led but multi-sectarian in
membership, is now almost exclusively Druze. See el Khazen (2002¨) for details.
33Yemen’s basic electoral system, simple plurality in 301 single-member districts, is written into
the constitution and in principle is difficult to change. Yet the ruling party has amended the consti-
tution on several occasions, notably to concentrate greater power in the presidency. The initial unity
constitution defined a collective executive with a five-person presidential council elected by parlia-
ment, which was amended after the 1994 civil war to abolish the council in favor of a single president
elected by the parliament, and then subsequently by direct popular elections with the entire country
as a single district. Notably, numerous ruling party figures reacted with considerable hostility when
the main opposition alliance, the Joint Meeting Parties (JMP), proposed constitutional amendments
to transform Yemen into a parliamentary system with proportional representation. The secretary-
general of the ruling party, in fact, called the proposal “a coup against the constitution.” See, e.g.,
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factors, the political parties law explicitly forbids parties from organizing on the ba-
sis of sect, tribe, or region.34 Yet numerous push and pull factors have enabled the
president, himself a Zaydi tribesman, and the Zaydi-led ruling party to approximate
monopsonistic vote-buyers among the country’s Zaydi Shia community.
The most important pull factor is, no doubt, access to resources. The plurality
system and single-member districts have enabled the president and ruling party to
control the dispensation of patronage as well as utilize state resources and the state
apparati on behalf of ruling party candidates. This dynamic is especially important in
light of their ability to split the opposition vote and the inability of the opposition par-
ties to project effectively into the rural areas.35 This is particularly noteworthy given
that the largest opposition party, Islah, began the multiparty period as a “marriage
of convenience” between (Zaydi) tribal shaykhs—led by the titular party president,
the paramount shaykh of the Hashid tribal confederation—and the (Sunni) Muslim
Brotherhood, leading many commentators to distinguish between the party’s “tribal
wing” and “religious wing.” Over time, however, the party’s tribal constituencies
have shrunk considerably, in large part after the ruling party gained sole control over
patronage resources.
One opposition activist noted that most of Islah’s support in the 1993 and 1997
elections came from the countryside because many tribal shaykhs won seats there
under the Islah label. Yet after the ruling party secured a parliamentary majority
in 1997 and could dispense with Islah’s participation in a coalition government, it
“went and bought off the shaykhs in the countryside, and now they’re [ruling party]
34For details on the parties law, see Mansour (2004¨, 163–180).
35Previous to the emergence of the Joint Meeting Parties, the ruling party was able to capitalize
on animosity between the opposition parties, especially Islah and the Yemeni Socialist Party (the
formerly Marxist ruling party of the southern republic). Further, it provides material and political
backing for splits within the parties themselves in a process known locally as “cloning.”
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MPs,” resulting in a flip in representation whereby most of Islah’s electoral wins in
2003 came from the urban areas—most of which are demographically Sunni.36 One
high official in Islah’s general secretariat, in turn, noted that, at the beginning of the
multiparty period, they were able to attract about 20 percent of the shaykhs to the
party, but after 1997, “they all pulled out. Most of the shaykhs left Islah for the [ruling
party], because it could give resources and money to the shaykhs and the tribes.”37
One prominent leader in the Bakil tribal confederation, in turn, acknowledged that
Bakil leaders made the decision to bring the confederation into the ruling party in the
late-1990s: “We sat and talked with a number of shaykhs and said, look, we share so
many interests with them that it is silly to stay in the opposition. So we all moved
into the [ruling party].”38
Complementing the strong pull factor of patronage resources is an additional push
factor: the political activism of Salafi and Wahhabi groups that target Zaydis. One
high official in the general secretariat of the Haqq Party—a small Zaydi religious party
affiliated with the Joint Meeting Parties—noted that “we’re concerned about the
Wahhabism in Islah. We’re concerned about the sectarian politics of pitting one school
against another.” Other Haqq party leaders, in turn, were considerably less restrained
in their criticism of Wahhabi and Salafi groups, whom they accused of targeting
36Aside from the demographically-mixed capital, Sanaa, the other major cities in Yemen are
located in primarily Sunni areas: Taiz, Ibb, Hudayda, Aden, Mukalla, and (to a smaller extent)
Sayoun. Interview, Sanaa, 26 May 2006.
37Interview, Sanaa, 24 August 2005. A member of Islah’s Consultative Council, in turn, noted
that the “tribal wing” in Islah was really just composed of Ahmar’s supporters. Interview, Sanaa,
19 December 2005.
38He further explained that Bakil was caught on the wrong side of the 1994 civil war because,
in the early-1990s, Bakil was viewed to be lining up with the south because Hashid controlled the
northern government. This was not, however, so much due to Bakil’s support for southern leaders
as it was an attempt to forge an independent way for Bakil. Interview, 13 April 2006.
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Zaydis for conversion as well as with violence and excommunication.39 One journalist
and correspondent on tribal affairs noted that Islah had been increasingly targeting
Zaydis as the Salafi influence grew within the party, and that Zaydis, and especially
the tribes, were turning much more to the ruling party as a result.40 Although
numerous opposition party leaders blamed state security agencies rather than Islah
for supporting Salafi activities, one of Islah’s top leaders acknowledged frankly that
Islah is, nevertheless, increasingly coming to represent Sunni thought.41 Further,
no credible alternative Zaydi parties exist. Although the Haqq Party and Union
of Popular Forces are both members of the opposition Joint Meeting Parties, both
have minimal popular support bases and have been subject to government-sponsored
pressure, splits, and cloning.42
In contrast to the Zaydi Shia community, whose support has become largely
monopsonized by the ruling party, credible competition persists within Sunni con-
stituencies. In addition to Islah, the other two main factions (i.e., those with parlia-
mentary representation) within the Joint Meeting Parties, the Yemeni Socialist Party
39Party leaders acknowledged that they used the terms “Wahhabi” and “Salafi” interchangeably,
but that “Wahhabi” had a more negative connotation. Wahhabism is a particularly puritanical
version of the Hanbali school of Sunni Islam, itself the most conservative of the four recognized
schools. Interviews, Sanaa, 6 January 2006 and 10 January 2006.
40Interview, Sanaa, 15 August 2005.
41Interview, Sanaa, 27 September 2005. On the Muslim Brotherhood in Yemen, see Said (1995¨).
On a roundtable the relationship of the ruling regime to the Islamist movement and Salafi groups,
see Saqqaf (2002¨).
42Neither party holds any of the 301 seats in parliament. Haqq ran 11 candidates in the 2003
elections and secured 4,585 votes nationwide, and the Union of Popular Forces ran 13 candidates
who secured a total of 11,967 votes (Republic of Yemen 2004¨, 186). The latter has been subject
to competition from a regime-supported “clone,” the Democratic Union of Popular Forces, as well
as legal actions taken against leaders. Haqq, meanwhile, faces government pressure in part due to
its links to leaders of a revolt in the northern province of Saada (the original leader of the Houthi
rebellion was elected as a Haqq MP in 1993). Haqq’s secretary-general surprised party members by
dissolving the party in March 2007, which other party leaders who rejected the decision to dissolve
allege was the product of government pressure.
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(YSP) and the Unionist Nasirists,43 draw their support bases respectively from the
provinces of the former southern republic and from the southern provinces of the
former northern republic, all of which are principally Shafai Sunni areas. One key
opposition figure, who was instrumental in bringing together Islah with these parties,
noted that the new generation in Islah has begun to realize that their opponents are
not the leftists, but rather the ruling party: “They’re starting to get closer to the
YSP and the Nasirists. . . especially because [they] come from the Shafai areas. They
feel that the ruling clique comes from one area and is against the people from other
areas.”44 Furthermore, competition over political support extends into the Salafi con-
stituencies as well. One prominent YSP leader, for example, claimed that the Salafi
influence in Islah has been restrained, and that most of the support for militant Salafi
groups comes not from Islah, but from state security agencies, who are “trying to force
a split in Islah, but Islah realizes this.”45
Although so far the opposition alliance has been unable to translate their ideo-
logical support into electoral gains, the existence of potentially credible challengers
has required the government and ruling party to compete for political support within
these constituencies. One opposition figure, for example, claimed that the government
is currently spending three to four times more money per capita on infrastructure in
the provinces of the former southern republic than in the north. Although this is in
part because they had very little infrastructure to begin with, “the political impera-
43At one point there were nine declared Nasirist factions—those citing the pan-Arab nationalist
ideology of former Egyptian president Gamal abd al-Nasir—in Yemen, although now only three
such parties operate: the true opposition Unionist Nasirists (the largest), and two others without
parliamentary representation that are members of a ruling party-sponsored alternative opposition
alliance. See Mansour (2004¨) for details.
44Interview, Sanaa, 25 September 2005.
45He further noted that “the Muslim Brotherhood was able to sideline Zindani [a prominent Salafi
leader in the party] and the Salafis, and now Zindani is closer to the president than to the rest of
Islah.” Interview, Sanaa, 28 December 2005.
149
tive comes first and foremost: to prove to the southern population that they’re better
off in a united Yemen.” Similarly, an official in the Ministry of Planning claimed that
southern complaints of favoritism toward the north are unfounded: “I’m from the
south, and I don’t see it. Sometimes I think it’s the other way around as we try to do
too much for ‘southern equality.’”46 In short, the government and ruling party have
been compelled to attend to the material demands of these areas, at least in part, to
shore up political support.
Hypotheses
Lebanon’s consociational institutions stimulate intra-community competition between
elites for their coethnics’ votes, but due to exogenous shocks a monopsonist vote-buyer
has emerged in the Sunni community. Yemen’s plurality institutions, meanwhile, have
enabled the ruling party, led by Shia tribal figures, to become the dominant electoral
force in the country, permitting it to approximate a monopsonist among the minority
Zaydi Shia community. Further, Lebanon’s consociational arrangements constrain
elites’ capacities to reward their cosectarian supporters at the expense of members of
other communities, whereas Yemen makes no such provisions and permits governing
elites to target their supporters disproportionately.
Two hypotheses follow from these institutional differences. First, Lebanon’s conso-
ciational institutions prevent elites from rewarding coethnics at the expense of other
communities, whereas Yemen’s plurality institutions do not. Although by itself this
makes no predictions about the overall pervasiveness of patronage relationships in
either society, it does imply that members of all communities in Lebanon should
observe such relationships as equally important, whereas in Yemen members of the
Sunni community should view political connections and patronage as more important
46Interviews, Sanaa, 17 November 2005 and 9 May 2006.
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than its putative beneficiaries in the Zaydi Shia community. This gives rise to the
following hypothesis:
Hypothesis 6 (Constraints) Between-community differences in assess-
ments of the importance of patronage narrow in quota systems and widen
in non-quota systems.
Second, mass constituents in monopsonized communities largely receive low-value
rewards for their votes, compelling them to signal especially strong support for their
elites in order to raise the value of the political rewards they receive. Empirically,
we should expect to see signals of support respond strongly to assessments of the
importance of patronage relationships among mass constituents in the monopsonized
communities, Lebanese Sunnis and Yemeni Shiites, and not in the other communities,
within which competition over their votes occurs. This, in turn, gives rise to the
second hypothesis:
Hypothesis 7 (Monopsony) Constituent propensities to signal politi-
cal support for elites increase more strongly with constituents’ material
and patronage considerations in monopsonized communities than in more
competitive communities.
4.4 Empirical Analysis
Section 4.4 utilizes original survey data from Lebanon and Yemen to test implica-
tions of the theoretical framework developed in Section 4.2 and applied to these two
research venues in Section 4.3. In particular, the empirical analysis here focuses on
repercussions that are observable to mass constituents. Favoritism, patronage spend-
ing, rent-seeking, and corruption, because they are widely viewed with disdain as
illegitimate and wasteful when they are not actually illegal, are largely camouflaged
or otherwise hidden from public view, making it difficult to obtain reliable, system-
atic data about such practices. As an alternative, I utilize these survey data to
study implications of favoritism and patronage processes that should be perceptible
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to the constituents who are the putative winners and losers, relative to each other, of
dispensations of favoritism and patronage.
The Data
The data used for the empirical analyses that follow come from original face-to-
face mass attitude surveys conducted in both Lebanon (fall 2005) and Yemen (spring
2007). In Lebanon, Beirut-based MADMA Co. drew the sample and administered the
interviews. Respondents were drawn randomly from a stratified sample of Lebanese
adults across all provinces, for a sample size of N = 1000. MADMA’s sample frame is
based on household demographics surveys conducted in the late-1990s by the Lebanese
government on tens of thousands of households, for which the president of MADMA
was a consultant. It is among the most reliable sample frames available in the absence
of official censuses, which are too politically sensitive to conduct. In Yemen, mean-
while, the Sanaa-based Yemen Polling Center, the country’s first licensed independent
polling agency, drew the sample and administered the interviews, with a sample size
of N = 1440. Given the greater difficulties of acquiring a reasonable sample frame,
we utilized a combination of area and cluster sampling techniques, drawing from half
of the country’s provinces and stratifying within them.47
Key Empirical Indicators
Here, I describe the empirical indicators I use when testing implications of the the-
ory developed in Section 4.2. In particular, I describe measures for signal strength,
the importance of connections to obtain material rewards, and understanding of the
47The provinces sampled were Aden, Amran, Dhamar, Hadramawt, Hajja, Hudayda, Ibb, Marib,
Sanaa (capital), and Taiz. Selection of particular provinces into the sample was semi-random, with
their probability of inclusion based on their weighted population shares, subject to the constraint that
both the capital (Sanaa) and at least two provinces from the former southern republic (in the sample,
Aden and Hadramawt) be represented. Clustering and stratification were based on preliminary
figures from the 2004 census down to the village or city neighborhood level, with individuals sampled
via random-walk patterns.
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political process. I motivate each indicator in turn, describe the survey instruments
used to collect the data for each measure, and then present basic summary statistics
for each of the communities in both Lebanon and Yemen.
Signal Indicator: Display of Political Posters
Because the theory developed in Section 4.2 utilizes a signaling framework, testing
implications of that theory requires an empirical indicator that specifically measures
an observable signal of latent political support rather than that latent political sup-
port itself. As it relates to the theory, the signal is the empirical proxy a politician
(rather than a data analyst) would use to assess individuals’ latent levels of political
support for the purpose of distributing rewards, and so it is a measure of the signal
itself, rather than the support it purportedly denotes, that we need. Consequently,
standard survey items designed to assess party identification, placement on salient
ideological dimensions, feeling thermometers, and so forth are inappropriate: they
represent measures that are observable to the data analyst but unobservable to the
politicians who are the signal’s recipients.48
For the empirical analysis that follows, I utilize data on an indicator of a signal
sent overtly by respondents, but collected unobtrusively, drawing on the propensity
of Lebanese and Yemenis to reveal their political loyalties and party affiliations via
political posters, symbols, and other paraphernelia displayed outside their homes. As
one travels around the different quarters of the capital cities or among the mountain
villages, one is subject to an array of colorful political posters and party flags, al-
though Hariri-related items go virtually unchallenged in the Sunni areas of Lebanon
while pictures of President Salih predominate in Yemen. These data were collected
by instructing survey interviewers to note and describe any political paraphernalia
48In other words, the measures and the estimates derived from them exist only in the survey data,
which the signal receivers do not see.
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(“such as political party flags, campaign posters, or militia symbols,” according to the
instructions) displayed outside the respondent’s home.49 In Lebanon, the indicator
is a picture or poster of a political party or leader, and in Yemen, for which more
detailed descriptions of the items are available, the indicator is a picture or poster of
the president.50
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Figure 4.3: Display of Political Posters by Community
Figure 4.3 reports summary statistics of respondent propensity to signal sup-
port via a political poster across communities in both Lebanon and Yemen. Within
49The militia symbols example was only relevant in Lebanon, where allegiance to civil war-era
militias/parties is still relevant. Interviewers were instructed to keep separate notes and descriptions
of displays of religious iconography, such as Quranic verses, statues of the Virgin Mary, and so forth.
50This survey was first conducted in Lebanon, and not all interviewers supplied the level of detail in
their descriptions as requested. When the survey was subsequently administered in Yemen, heavier
stress was laid on the request for more detailed information, resulting in more precise classifications
of the visible posters and political paraphernalia.
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Lebanon, Sunni respondents are most likely to display political paraphernelia (almost
entirely Hariri-related), followed by Shiites and, after a noticeable dropoff, Christians.
Within Yemen, meanwhile, Shafai Sunnis are considerably less likely to display a
poster of the president than are Zaydi Shiites or the Shafai Sunnis’ ostensible core-
ligionists in the “Other” category, the bulk of whom are likely Wahhabis.51 Rather
than concentrate on variation between communities, however, I turn the focus instead
on within-community sources of variation over the decision to signal support for a po-
litical leader, which according to the theory should respond to politically-distributed
rewards and benefits. In doing so, I utilize two indicators designed to measure re-
spondents’ assessments of the need for personal connections and political patronage
to secure employment.
Rewards Indicator: Importance of Connections
Two related implications of the theory developed in Section 4.2 is that coethnics of
officeholding elites should disproportionately receive political rewards, but that these
rewards should be cheap. To test these implications, I utilize two empirical indicators
designed to measure respondents’ appraisals of the importance of having connections
to obtain jobs in the government sector, where political patronage likely plays a role
an employment decisions, and jobs in the private sector, where employment should
51Yemeni respondents, when asked to state their religious denomination, were given the options
of “Shafai” (Sunni), “Zaydi” (Shia), “Ismaili,” and “Other.” The last category was included due to
the potential social and political sensitivity associated with professing Wahhabi Islam, a particularly
puritanical interpretation of the Hanbali school, itself widely acknowledged as the most conservative
of the four recognized Sunni schools of jurisprudence. Wahhabism is not native to Yemen, but
rather enters largely via Yemeni converts who had migrated to Saudi Arabia to work in the oil
industry, and allegedly receives considerable Saudi funding for its propagation. The ruling regime
has a long history, going back to the era of the two republics, of cultivating ties with such groups as
counterweights to leftist and secular forces, so much so that officials from several opposition parties
echoed a widespread view in interviews that the regime now has “a Sadat problem” (referring to
Egyptian President Anwar Sadat’s use of religious groups and militants against leftist opponents).
For a recent roundtable discussion of the connections between the Islamist groups in Yemen and the
ruling regime, see Saqqaf (2002¨).
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in principle be more likely to respond to market forces. Separating out the two indi-
cators is important given the common tendency for people to cite “connections” in
casual conversation as a general indictment of “the way things work here,” yet to ac-
knowledge when pressed that connections are more important in some circumstances
than others.
Although the outcome of interest is measured by the first indicator, connections
in the government sector, the second indicator, connections in the private sector, is
necessary to scale the values on the government-sector indicator. In particular, the
private-sector indicator provides a means to distinguish between respondents who
cite connections for everything, and those who believe that different criteria exist for
employment in the government and private sectors. Most importantly, respondents
who cite connections for employment in both sectors essentially see no difference in
the criteria used to allocate jobs in and out of government, whereas those who cite
connections for the government sector but merit for the private sector are the respon-
dents who most clearly observe the role of patronage specifically in the distribution
of political rewards.
Respondents answered two forced-choice questions regarding their assessments of
the criteria used to allocate jobs in the government and private sectors. In particular,
respondents were asked which of two statements they agreed with more, one citing
personal connections and the other citing merit and ability, and then a follow-up on
whether they agreed strongly or just somewhat.52 The questions were composed to
prompt respondents to assess government and private-sector criteria separately from
each other, rather than conflate them. The question texts, not including the initial
boldface mnemonic summary labels, were presented in the following order:
52The forced-choice format was used in part to help ameliorate aquiescence bias (the tendency
to agree with all questions asked), which tends to grow stronger at lower levels of education. “Not
agree with either statement” answers were accepted, although not prompted.
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• Government: “What is the most important thing to get a good government
job, as opposed to a job in the private sector?”
• Private: “How about the private sector?”
The forced-choice options with which respondents answered each of the two employ-
ment questions, text adjusted according, were presented in the following order (again,
not including the mnemonic summary labels):
• Connections: “Personal connections are the most important things in getting
[a government job; a job in business or the private sector ]”
• Merit: “The most important factors in getting [a government job; a job in
business or the private sector ] are merit and ability”
Figures 4.4 and 4.5 report summary statistics of responses to the government-
sector and private-sector questions, respectively, across the communities in Lebanon
and Yemen, denoting within-community median responses with an M . There are
two broad observations to make from these figures. First, there is more variation in
responses to the private-sector question than the government-sector question, partic-
ularly in Lebanon but also in Yemen to a somewhat less dramatic degree.53 Note
that, in practice, the large skew among Lebanese respondents raises a practical is-
sue of possible inference difficulties when estimating the statistical models using the
Lebanese data. When estimating the models, I use a dichotomized version of the
government-sector indicator, which takes on the value of 1 for respondents who an-
53We should stop short of interpreting these broad differences between Lebanon and Yemen as
indicative that connections are necessarily more important in Lebanon than they are in Yemen,
nor that ability is necessarily more discounted. Although question wording is the same across both
systems, respondents’ points of reference are not, with a larger pool of job aspirants per capita
qualified for civil service positions in Lebanon as compared to Yemen. Attempting to draw explicit
conclusions about these broad differences would require that respondents use a common scale and
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Figure 4.5: Criteria to Obtain a Private-Sector Job
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swered “strongly connections” and 0 for all else.54 Summary statistics for the dummy
variable version of the government-sector employment question are reported in Figure
4.6.
Lebanon Yemen

































Figure 4.6: Criteria to Obtain a Government Job (Dichotomous)
Second, there are suggestive differences in the within-community median responses
between communities. Although the median response on the government-sector ques-
tion is the top of the scale (“strongly connections”) in all Lebanese communities, in
Yemen the Zaydi Shiite median is located toward the merit end of the scale whereas
the medians for the other communities are located on the connections end of the scale.
Further, the median response for Lebanese Sunnis on the private-sector question is
located on the merit end, whereas the Lebanese Shiite and Christian medians are
54The dummy variable indicator is used for both Lebanese and Yemeni respondents for compara-
bility purposes. Model results for Yemeni respondents are qualitatively similar and, in fact, stronger
when using the five-point scale in place of the dummy variable indicator.
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located on the connections end. Meanwhile, the median response for Zaydi Shiites in
Yemen is at the bottom of the scale (“strongly merit”), which compares especially to
Shafai Sunnis, whose median is located on the connections end.
Variation on these connections indicators serves two purposes. As explanatory
variables, they help test one of the implications of the signaling dynamics by ex-
plaining variation in respondents’ propensities to signal political support. Yet the
government-sector indicator also serves as an outcome variable, with another im-
plication of the theory suggesting that connections will appear more necessary to
members of some communities as compared to others. To help explain some of this
variation I utilize a measure of how well respondents understand the political process
in their country.
Political Understanding Indicator
As argued in Section 4.2, elites target rewards to coethnics disproportionately not
out of empathy, but because coethnic political support is relatively cheap compared
to that of non-coethnics. One of the implications of this argument is that members of
some communities are more likely than others to observe favoritism and connections at
work: members of out-of-power communities see state resources funneled to members
of communities in power, and attribute these observations to ethnic favoritism and
ethnic-based patronage perpetuated at their expense.55 Yet we might expect that the
size of the gap in assessments between communities varies with the degree to which
individuals understand politics and the political process that channels resources along
ethnic lines.
55Note that this implication is observationally equivalent to ethnic favoritism explanations based
on some form of elite empathy, or else on the argument that elites derive personal satisfaction or
utility from augmenting the welfare of their coethnics. What distinguishes the theory developed here
from these more standard explanations is the prediction that the rewards coethnics receive are small
in value, whereas empathy-based arguments would predict that coethnics should receive lucrative
benefits.
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Respondents were also asked to provide a self-assessment of the degree to which
they understand politics and the political process in their country, although the ques-
tion format differed somewhat between Lebanon and Yemen. In the former, respon-
dents answered the forced-choice question, “how difficult is it to understand politics in
this country?” Their options were, first, “political life is often difficult for someone like
you to understand,” and second, “you usually have a good understanding of what’s
going on politically in this country,” and after selecting one of the two statements,
noted whether they agreed strongly with it or just somewhat.56 In Yemen, respon-
dents used a five-point scale to answer the question, “to what extent are government
and political affairs so complicated that people like yourself often cannot understand
what is happening?” Their options were “always,” “usually,” “sometimes,” “rarely,”
and “never.” Due to the different formats and the counterintuitive labeling of the
response options on the Yemen question—where greater political understanding is
associated with responses on the “rarely” and “never” side of the scale—I refer from
here on simply to a five-point “political understanding” scale, ranging from low to
high.57
Figure 4.7 reports summary statistics for the political understanding scale across
the communities, again denoting within-community median responses an M . In broad
terms, the median responses for the different communities cluster around the mid-
point of the scale.58 One mild surprise emerges in Lebanon. Christians, traditionally
56“Not agree with either statement” answers were not prompted, but were accepted and treated
as the midpoint response on the implied five-point scale.
57Although not ideal, the question wording and intent are similar enough conceptually between the
two surveys to make them roughly comparable. The use of the exact same question formats across
the samples would, of course, increase confidence in comparability. The Yemen version, selected well
after the Lebanon survey went into the field, differs from the version used in Lebanon primarily for
comparability purposes to legacy questions used on prior surveys conducted in other countries.
58Recall that the forced-response format used in Lebanon makes responses in the third category,






















































Figure 4.7: Political Understanding
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better educated and more politically engaged than members of the other communities,
appear to be least confident in their ability to understand the political process in
their country. Meanwhile, Shiites, traditionally among the least educated members
of Lebanese society, appear particularly comfortable in their understanding of politics
in Lebanon.
Empirical Expectations in Lebanon and Yemen
Having described the empirical indicators to be used in the data analysis, we can now
revisit the hypotheses presented conceptually above and restate them as empirical
expectations given the particular indicators I use here. First, I present the expectation
for between-community differences traceable to the quota system that is used in
Lebanon but not in Yemen. Second, I describe the expectation for differences in
incentives to signal support for elites in monopsonized as opposed to competitive
communities in both countries.
Expectation 1: Quota System Constraints
Recall that Hypothesis 6 predicts that institutional constraints can be used to limit
elite discretionary powers in the dispensation of state resources. Of particular rele-
vance for comparative purposes between Lebanon and Yemen, quota systems defining
set quantities of appointments per community can prevent elites from rewarding co-
ethnic constituents with civil service appointments and other government sector jobs
at the expense of members of other communities.
Among the consociational elements found in Lebanon’s institutions is an explicit
quota system that explicitly allocates not only seats in the parliament and key po-
sitions in the executive branch according to membership in the country’s sectarian
communities, but also for appointments to state jobs such as those in the civil ser-
answer that was not read to respondents but accepted if they themselves offered it.
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vice and diplomatic corps. Yemen, meanwhile, makes no such formal provisions for
community representation—either elected or appointed—in the state apparatus. In
practice, this grants officeholders in Yemen relatively greater discretion in how to dis-
tribute government sector jobs to supporters compared to officeholders in Lebanon.
In particular, it allows Yemeni officeholders to privilege coethnics above members of
other communities in their appointments, but prevents Lebanese officeholders from
rewarding coethnics with jobs at the expense of other communities.
Mass constituents can be expected to observe different appointment processes at
work depending on the presence or absence of a quota system for government sector
positions. With no quota system in place, there should be clear differences between
communities in perceptions of the importance of patronage and political connections
in the appointment process. Members of out-of-power communities, who observe
members of in-power communities taking a disproportionate share of the government
positions, can be expected to place greater emphasis on connections than members of
in-power communities, the purported beneficiaries of these connections. With a quota
system in place, there should be no discernible differences between communities in
constituent assessments of the role played by patronage and connections in the hiring
process. Whatever the average prevailing level of importance individuals attach to
connections—and it may in fact be very high—this level should be the same across
communities. Although constituents may observe patronage at work in terms of who
gets appointments and who does not, they do not observe disproportionality between
communities due to the constraints imposed by the quota system on the officeholders
making the appointments.
Note, however, that these perceptions are likely to vary systematically with the
degree to which individuals understand how the political system functions. Those
individuals with a relatively strong understanding should be better able to assess the
role of patronage and connections in government appointments compared to individ-
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uals with a weak understanding of how politics works. Consequently, differences in
perceptions across communities should become increasingly accurate as constituents
become increasingly politically well-informed. Given the above arguments, we may
translate Hypothesis 6 into the following empirical expectation:
Expectation 1 (Constraints) Conditional on how well respondents un-
derstand politics, assessments of the need for connections to obtain gov-
ernment jobs do not vary by community membership in Lebanon, whereas
in Yemen non-Shiites are more likely than Shiites to cite connections as
necessary to obtain a government job.
Table 4.1 summarizes the expected between-community differences in Lebanon,
with Sunnis as the baseline community, and in Yemen, with Shiites serving as the
baseline.59
Shia Sunni Other
Lebanon 0 · · · 0
Yemen · · · + +
Table 4.1: Summarized Expectations, Constraints
Expectation 2: Signaling Under Monopsony
Recall that Hypothesis 7 predicts that decisions to signal support for elites differ be-
tween members of monopsonized communities and those in more competitive commu-
nities. More particularly, it predicts that material considerations and assessments of
the importance of patronage connections figure more strongly into the decision to sig-
nal among monopsonized constituents as compared to members of non-monopsonized
communities. Of particular importance for comparative purposes is the existence
of monopsonized communities in both countries, Sunnis in Lebanon and Shiites in
59Note that the “Other” category in Table 4.1 in Lebanon refers to Christians, and in Yemen
literally to the “Other” category presented to respondents in classifying themselves by sectarian
community (and most likely to be Wahhabis). For the latter, see fn. 51.
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Yemen, alongside communities for whose political support greater competition be-
tween elites occurs. Of additional importance is the source of these monopsonies:
exogenous shocks in Lebanon and institutional choice in Yemen.
As described above, Lebanon’s institutions utilize a number of consociational ar-
rangements, including explicit quotas for the sectarian communities in parliament.
The electoral system, further, only permits cosectarians to run against one another
for a given seat, which provides a strong inducement to intra-sect competition be-
tween elites for their cosectarians’ votes. In principle, Lebanon’s institutions stimulate
oligopsonistic competition between elites rather than monopsonistic vote-buying, as
is evident in the credible elite alternatives available in the Shia and Christian com-
munities. Yet due in large measure to exogenous shocks, Hariri’s Future Movement
has emerged as a monopsonist in the Sunni community.
Yemen’s electoral system, meanwhile, makes no such provision for explicit com-
munity representation in state institutions, and provides no special incentives to stim-
ulate within-community competition between elites for constituent support. Yet the
concentration of resources in the center, coupled with the lack of constraints on elite
discretion in the distribution of those resources, has permitted the Shia-led dominant
ruling party to approximate a monopsonist in the minority Zaydi Shia community.
The lack of viable alternatives available to Shia voters, in turn, compares to the more
credible competition that occurs over Sunni votes, especially in urban areas, where
Sunni-preponderant opposition parties provide plausible electoral alternatives to the
ruling party.
Yemen’s governing institutions are the product of past choices made in the name of
national unity, albeit with increasingly visible self-interested manipulations designed
to expand the control of the president and ruling party. Although it is implausible
to suggest that these institutions were consciously chosen specifically to create a vote
monopsony in the Zaydi Shia community, this monopsony is an unanticipated but
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theoretically unsurprising by-product of the drive to concentrate political power in a
hegemonic ruling party. Lebanon’s consociational governing institutions, meanwhile,
are also the product of deliberate choices, but choices made in the name of pluralism,
designed to induce intra-community competition and cross-community cooperation
in an environment where non-sectarian coalitions and competition were largely non-
credible.
Yet the emergence of a monopsonist in Lebanon, although perhaps out of equil-
brium in that system, provides useful comparative leverage to test one of the implica-
tions of the theoretical framework contained in Hypothesis 7. Ordinarily, institutional
incentives should produce oligopsonistic competition in Lebanon but monopsonistic
vote-buying in Yemen. Empirical comparisons should reveal between-systems differ-
ences that reflect these different competitive environments, but within-system vari-
ation between communities only in Yemen. Yet monopsony-stimulating exogenous
shocks mean that we should now also see within-system variation in Lebanon as well,
with qualitatively different competitive dynamics occuring among Sunnis as compared
to Shiites and Christians. Given these arguments, we may translate Hypothesis 7 into
the following empirical expectation:
Expectation 2 (Monopsony) Propensities to signal support for elites
increase among respondents in the monopsonized communities, Lebanese
Sunnis and Yemeni Shiites, as their assessments of the need for connec-
tions to obtain government jobs increase, whereas this relationship does
not exist among respondents in the more competitive communities.
Table 4.2 summarizes the expected within-community relationships in both coun-
tries in terms of the influence of the effect of increasing importance of connections on
the propensity to signal support.
Model Results
To test Hypotheses 6 and 7 and assess the validity of their corresponding Empirical
Expectations 1 and 2, I estimate two central statistical models with the empirical
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Shia Sunni Other
Lebanon 0 + 0
Yemen + 0 0
Table 4.2: Summarized Expectations, Monopsony
indicators described previously, summarized here as
S Signal
JG Criteria for a Government-Sector Job
JP Criteria for a Private-Sector Job
U Political Understanding
C Vector of Community Indicators
Z Vector of Control Variables.60
Assessments of the necessity of connections for a government-sector job, JG, is, as
described previously, a five-point ordinal scale reduced to two categories for practical
estimation reasons, whereas the signal of political support, S, is also a binary variable.









, as generalized linear models with a probit link function, i.e., binary probit models.
I use two core equations in testing Hypotheses (Empirical Expectations) 1 and 2,















JG + JP + JGJP + Z
)
, where Φ is the normal cumulative density function and the
subscript on the Monopsony equation indicates that estimations are performed within
each community sub-sample.
Note that both equations utilize interaction terms, CU in Constraints and JGJP
in Monopsony, the former to capture a predicted conditional effect and the latter as
60Z is a vector of control variables for basic demographics, education, and socioeconomic status. It
includes dummy variables for sex and urban residence, age with a square-root transformation, a five-
point education scale, and a count of the number of hours per day respondents’ homes were without
electricity (also with a square-root transformation). The latter serves as a proxy for socioeconomic
status in place of the more standard income indicators, used in large part because nearly twenty
percent of Lebanese respondents refused to state their income.
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a scaling factor, both of which are described in more detail below. Because it can
be difficult to interpret the substantive effects of key explanatory variables in the
presence of interaction terms via tables of coefficient estimates and standard errors,
I present results graphically in the main text as well as in tabular format. I report
results for each of the two core models below.
Constraints Model Results
I first examine the effect of institutional constraints, operationalized here as the pres-
ence or absence of a formal quota system for government-sector employment, on elite
discretionary powers, with observable implications for patronage distribution dynam-
ics across communities. Here, I test the validity of Empirical Expectation 1, which
predicts qualitatively different dynamics in Lebanon and Yemen in the distribution
of government patronage, and consequently different perceptions of ethnic favoritism
at the constituent level. In particular, Expectation 1 posits that, due to the explicit
quota system used in Lebanon, there should be no discernible differences between
communities in assessments of the importance of connections for obtaining a govern-
ment job, whereas in Yemen, which does not utilize a quota system, Sunnis should
observe government jobs going disproportionately to Zaydi Shiites and consequently
perceive greater need for connections in obtaining those jobs.
Further, Expectation 1 posits that differences in perception between communities
are conditional on the degree to which constituents understand the political process
(and, by extension, the patronage process), with greater understanding enabling in-
dividuals to assess the importance of connections more accurately. This, in turn,
implies the expectation that perceptions across communities should become more
similar in Lebanon, and more different in Yemen, as respondent political understand-
ing increases. Mechanically, I include the interaction term JU in the Constraints











































Criteria to Obtain a Government Job















Figure 4.8: Constraints Model Community Effect (First Differences)
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Lebanon b se(b) Yemen b se(b)
U −1.03 0.26‡ U −0.98 0.30†
Shia −0.35 0.26 Sunni 0.11 0.20
Shia × U 0.92 0.37⋆ Sunni × U 0.75 0.34⋆
Christian −0.63 0.22† Other −0.15 0.29
Christian × U 0.43 0.33 Other × U 0.70 0.48
Rural −0.41 0.12‡ Rural −0.13 0.09
Female 0.02 0.11 Female 0.09 0.08
Education 0.16 0.27 Education 0.06 0.12
Age −0.12 0.05⋆ Age 0.05 0.04
Electricity 0.26 0.05‡ Electricity 0.01 0.02
Intercept 1.49 0.43‡ Intercept −0.07 0.31
N 897 N 1214
ln L −440.60 ln L −814.67
p ≤ 0.001‡ p ≤ 0.01† p ≤ 0.05⋆
Table 4.3: Constraints Results
I present results for the Constraints model graphically in Figure 4.8, and report
the corresponding coefficient estimates and standard errors, which are less easily
comprehensible at a glance, in Table 4.3. Figure 4.8 plots the effects of commu-
nity membership as differences in probabilities between the comparison communities
against a baseline—Sunnis in Lebanon, Shiites in Yemen—as respondent political
understanding increases, along with confidence intervals around those effects at the
conventional 95-percent level.61 For comparative purposes and a measure of central
tendencies among respondents, I indicate median levels of political understanding for
the baseline communities on the graph with an M . Substantively, positive differences
mean that a given comparison community is more likely than the baseline community
to cite connections as very important in obtaining a government job, and negative
differences mean that the comparison community is less likely than the baseline to
cite connections.
61The results reported in Figure 4.8 were calculated with sex set to male and residency set to
non-city dwellers. Remaining control variables were set to their community sub-sample means and
medians, as applicable.
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The evidence presented in Figure 4.8 largely supports the predictions made in
Expectation 1. Let us first examine the estimated community differences in Lebanon,
displayed in the left panel. As anticipated, perceptions of the importance of con-
nections converge to no difference across communities as respondents increasingly
understand politics. At the median level of political understanding, in fact, the dif-
ferences in perception for both Shiites and Christians against baseline Sunnis are
neither substantively nor statistically significant. These findings are consistent with
the argument advanced above that Lebanon’s quota system prevents elites from re-
warding cosectarians at the expense of members of other communities: although
constituents may perceive an important role for connections in the distribution of
government jobs, they do not perceive these connections to privilege one community
disproportionately over others.
In comparison, let us now turn to the estimated community differences in Yemen—
plotted in the right panel of Figure 1—which reveal dynamics that differ starkly from
those found in Lebanon. Whereas perceptions converge to no difference between
communities the better individuals understand politics in Lebanon, perceptions in
Yemen diverge between communities as respondents increasingly understand how the
political system works. In particular, Sunnis are increasingly more likely than baseline
Zaydi Shiites to cite connections as important to obtain a government job. Although
there is no discernible difference between communities at very low levels of political
understanding, a divergence in perceptions emerges almost immediately thereafter.
By median levels of understanding, Sunnis (Shafai Sunnis) are notably more likely
to cite connections than are Shiites. The difference between “Other” respondents—
many of whom, as suggested before, are likely to be Wahhabi Sunnis—and baseline
Shiites is positive and barely misses statistical significance at the median, with this
community difference becoming statistically significant in the categories above the
median. These findings, in turn, are consistent with the argument that Yemen’s
173
institutions permit the Shia-led ruling party to reward comparatively inexpensive
Shiite supporters with government jobs, and to do so at the expense of non-Shiites.
Although constituents in all communities may perceive connections to be important
determinants of government employment, the divergence in these perceptions suggests
that Sunnis observe Shiites to be winning such jobs disproportionately.
Overall, then, assessments of the importance of connections converge to no differ-
ence between communities in Lebanon, and diverge to large differences in Yemen, as
individuals increasingly understand how politics work in their respective countries.
These starkly different dynamics, in turn, are consistent with Empirical Expecta-
tion 1, which predicts no differences across communities under quota systems and
differences in favor of in-power communities when quota systems are not in use. Al-
though this interpretation may technically be open to debate given the small number
of systems under study here—an issue to which I return in the general discussion
that follows—in the absence of plausible rival alternatives, these data provide strong
confirmatory evidence that formal institutional constraints can magnify or disrupt
the influence of ethnic divisions on the distribution of scarce resources according to
how those institutions channel ethnic links.
Monopsony Model Results
I now turn to the effect of the competitive environment in the market for votes on
the cost to elites of mass constituent political support, and consequently patterns of
the distribution of political rewards within communities, with observable implications
in constituent assessments of the value of their support and strategies employed to
increase the value of the rewards they receive. Here, I test the validity of Empirical
Expectation 2, which predicts qualitatively different signaling dynamics in monop-
sonized communities, Sunnis in Lebanon and Zaydi Shiites in Yemen, as compared to
communities for whose political support there is greater elite competition: Shiites and
Christians in Lebanon, and Sunnis in Yemen. In terms of observable implications,
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Expectation 2 posits that, given their different competitive environments, members of
monopsonized communities should be more likely to signal political support as their
assessments of the importance for connections to obtain government jobs increase,
whereas there should be no such discernible relationship among members of more
competitive communities.
Although Expectation 2 predicts that monopsonized respondents’ propensity to
signal political support increases as their assessments of the importance of connections
in obtaining government jobs increase, it is important for inferential purposes to scale
these assessments rather than take them in isolation. In particular, we must be able to
distinguish between individuals who cite connections for everything from those who
cite connections specifically for acquiring political rewards. In order to make this
distinction, we may scale respondents’ perceptions of the importance of connections
in the government sector by their assessments of the importance of connections in
the private sector, where merit is likely to play a comparatively more important role
in hiring decisions. This, in turn, implies the expectation that propensities to signal
become greatest among respondents who observe the greatest gap between the criteria
for obtaining government jobs and jobs in the private sector: individuals who assess
connections to be the most decisive factor in government, but merit to be the most
important criterion in the private sector. Mechanically, I include the interaction term
JGJP in the Monopsony equation to capture this scaling effect.
As before, I present results for the Monopsony model graphically in Figure 4.9,
reporting the corresponding coefficient estimates and standard errors as Tables 4.4 and
4.5. Figure 4.9 is analogous in layout to Figure 4.8, plotting probability differences
in the propensity to signal against the baseline along with 95-percent confidence
intervals around those differences.62 Again for comparative purposes and measures
62As before, the results reported in Figure 4.9 were calculated with sex set to male and residency
set to non-city dwellers, with the remaining control variables set to community means and medians.
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Shia Sunni Christian
b se(b) b se(b) b se(b)
JG 0.23 0.37 1.66 0.46
‡ −0.15 0.30
JP −0.31 0.12
† 0.03 0.18 −0.33 0.18
JG × JP −0.09 0.16 −0.52 0.19
† 0.21 0.19
Rural −0.20 0.29 0.04 0.22 0.43 0.22
Female −0.02 0.19 0.16 0.20 −0.44 0.24
Education 0.06 0.59 0.29 0.44 0.42 0.50
Age 0.04 0.11 −0.10 0.09 0.00 0.11
Electricity −0.34 0.12† 0.05 0.07 −0.31 0.14⋆
Intercept 1.04 0.89 −0.68 0.77 −0.37 0.87
N 310 299 304
lnL −128.91 −147.02 −102.84
p ≤ 0.001‡ p ≤ 0.01† p ≤ 0.05⋆
Table 4.4: Lebanon Monopsony Results
Shia Sunni Other
b se(b) b se(b) b se(b) b se(b)
JG 0.76 0.26
† −0.09 0.18 −0.06 0.19 −0.57 0.41
JP 0.14 0.09 −0.03 0.06 −0.02 0.06 −0.02 0.13
JG × JP −0.24 0.12
⋆ −0.01 0.08 −0.03 0.08 0.04 0.18
Rural −0.24 0.22 0.40 0.15† 0.34 0.15⋆ −0.45 0.34
Female −0.47 0.19⋆ 0.16 0.13 0.20 0.13 0.73 0.29⋆
Education 0.09 0.31 0.22 0.19 0.22 0.19 −0.21 0.46
Age 0.04 0.08 −0.04 0.06 −0.03 0.06 0.02 0.16
Electricity −0.04 0.06 −0.01 0.03 −0.02 0.04 0.30 0.11†
South −0.75 0.27†
Intercept −0.75 0.59 −1.26 0.43† −1.25 0.43† −1.07 1.09
N 267 836 836 122
ln L −142.45 −295.73 −290.70 −59.89
p ≤ 0.001‡ p ≤ 0.01† p ≤ 0.05⋆









































Connections Effect on Propensity to Signal












Figure 4.9: Monopsony Model Community Effect (First Differences)
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of central tendency, I indicate with an M community median assessments of the
importance of connections to obtain private-sector jobs. The nature of the baseline
against which probability differences are calculated differs from Figure 4.8, however.
The Monopsony model is estimated within each of the community sub-samples, and
the probability differences reported in Figure 4.9 constitute the estimated differences
between individuals who perceive connections to be very important for obtaining
a government job and their baseline cosectarians who assess connections to be less
important.
The evidence presented in Figure 4.9 strongly supports the predictions made in
Expectation 2. Let us first examine the estimated effects by community in Lebanon,
which are plotted in the top row. As anticipated, respondent propensities to sig-
nal political support in both the Shia and Christian communities do not vary with
their assessments of the importance of connections in obtaining government jobs at
any level of the scaling variable, private-sector connections. Yet the dynamics are
starkly different in the Sunni community, where the propensity to signal support in-
creases in government-sector connections as it decreases private-sector connections.
Put another way, as the perceived gap in criteria for obtaining jobs in the two sectors
grows—as respondents increasingly perceive connections to be the deciding factor in
government but merit to be the key criterion in the private sector—Sunni respon-
dents become increasingly likely to signal political support. Although no government
connections effect is discernible when respondents cite connections as important in
both government and the private sector, i.e., when they perceive no gap between the
two sectors, the government connections effect is easily significant both substantively
and statistically at the Sunni sample median for private-sector job criteria.
In Yemen, meanwhile, we observe similar dynamics in the analogous monopsonized
and competitive communities, as plotted in the bottom row of Figure 4.9. As pre-
dicted, respondent propensities to signal political support among individuals in the
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Sunni (Shafai Sunni) community and those in the “Other” category—again, likely to
be largely composed of Wahhabi Sunnis—show no indication of varying with their
perceptions of the importance of connections for obtaining government jobs at any
level of their assessments of private-sector connections. In contrast, a government
connections effect is both substantively significant and statistically discernible among
Zaydi Shiite respondents, for whom the propensity to signal support increases in
government-sector connections as it decreases in private-sector connections. Just
as occurs among Lebanese Sunnis, as the perceived criteria gap between the two
sectors grows—as connections increasingly become decisive for government jobs in
comparison to merit in the private sector—Zaydi Shiite respondents in Yemen be-
come increasingly likely to signal political support. Again, just as is the case among
Lebanese Sunnis, no government connections effect is evident when respondents cite
connections as important for both government and private-sector jobs, that is, when
they perceive no gap in employment criteria between the sectors, the government
connections effect is both substantively and statistically significant at the Zaydi Shia
sample median for private-sector criteria.
Overall, then, in none of the competitive communities in either Lebanon or Yemen
is there any evidence that signaling propensities respond to assessments of the im-
portance of government connections, whereas a substantively and statistically signif-
icant connections effect is evident in both of the monopsonized communities. These
starkly different dynamics between monopsonized and competitive communities, evi-
dent across systems, provide strong confirmatory evidence for Empirical Expectation
2. These data, in other words, are consistent with the argument advanced above that
differing competitive environments in the market for votes help determine whether
scarce resources are concentrated at the elite level or distributed to mass constituents,
depending on how well formal government institutions stimulate within-community
elite competition for their coethnics’ votes.
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Implications for Development in Diverse Societies
What can we take from the empirical evidence presented above? Here, I discuss the
results in terms of overall themes and implications for the theoretical framework devel-
oped in Section 4.2. First, evidence from the Constraints model suggests that formal
institutional constraints can serve to limit the scope of elite discretionary powers in
the distribution of scarce resources as political patronage. The particular constraint
examined, an explicit quota system to allocate government jobs among putatively
competing ethnic communities, is used in Lebanon but not in Yemen. Lebanese
elites, in other words, cannot reward cosectarians with government appointments at
the expense of members of other communities, whereas Yemeni elites are under no
such constraint.
The empirical evidence, in turn, suggests that mass constituents, the potential
beneficiaries of government patronage, do observe these differing dynamics in prac-
tice. Lebanese respondents converge to no differences between communities in their
perceptions of the importance of connections to obtain government jobs, whereas
Yemeni respondents diverge in their perceptions in such a way as to indicate pref-
erential appointment practices that favor Zaydi Shiites. Note that a quota system,
by itself, does not remove politics or patronage considerations from the process of
distributing government jobs and benefits to constituents: assessments of the impor-
tance of connections in obtaining government jobs are in fact high in both Lebanon
and Yemen.63 It does, however, prevent whatever favoritism that emerges from be-
coming ethnic favoritism, and prevents elites from rewarding coethnic supporters at
the expense of members of other communities.
Second, evidence from the Monopsony model suggests that formal institutional
63Note further that, to the degree we are comfortable with comparing responses directly across
systems, Lebanese respondents actually perceive connections to be more important than Yemeni
respondents.
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rules can influence the degree of competitiveness in the market for coethnic votes,
which can in turn magnify or disrupt the impact of the ethnic subsidy described in
Section 4.2. Lebanon explicitly incorporates sectarianism into elected office by allo-
cating all parliamentary seats according to sectarian community and permitting only
cosectarians to run against each other for their assigned seats, which in turn provides
a strong stimulus to intra-sect competition among elites for their cosectarians’ votes.
Yemen, meanwhile, makes no particular provisions to induce within-community com-
petition, and in fact forbids political mobilization on behalf of its constituent com-
munities in the name of strengthening national unity. Lebanese elites, in other words,
must compete against one another for their cosectarians’ votes, whereas no such stim-
ulus exists for Yemeni elites.
As described above, although oligopsonistic competition among elites is the insti-
tutionally-induced norm in Lebanon, a series of exogenous shocks have produced a
monopsonist in the Sunni community where one would otherwise be unlikely to exist.
These exogenous shocks, in turn, provide leverage in comparing outcomes in Lebanon
and Yemen, where in the latter a set of reinforcing factors has enabled the Shia-led
dominant ruling party to approximate a monopsonist in the Zaydi Shia community.
Thus, whereas we would ordinarily expect to observe competition within each sect in
Lebanon but monopsonistic vote-buying among Shiites in Yemen, due to exogenous
shocks we may expect to observe a monopsony among Lebanese Sunnis as well.
The empirical evidence, in turn, suggests that mass constituents utilize different
signaling strategies—or alternately, signal for different reasons—depending the com-
petitive environments within their communities. Among members of the competitive
communities—Shiites and Christians in Lebanon, and Sunnis in Yemen—the propen-
sity to signal support for elites shows no relationship to their perceptions of the need
for connections to obtain government rewards. In contrast, the propensity to signal
support among members of the monopsonized communities—Sunnis in Lebanon and
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Zaydi Shiites in Yemen—responds strongly to material and patronage considerations,
consistent with the argument that members are compelled to find additional ways
to demonstrate their support in order to increase the value of their otherwise scanty
rewards. This, in turn, suggests that decisions to signal in competitive communities
are largely expressive, but under monopsony serve much more overtly instrumental,
rent-seeking purposes.
Inducing intra-ethnic competition between elites for their coethnics’ votes does
not, by itself, necessarily break up ethnic coalitions, nor prevent patronage from
flowing along ethnic lines. One of the often-repeated criticisms of Lebanon’s sectarian
system, in fact, is that it perpetuates the relevance of sectarian social categories in
politics. Rather, in the absence of credible non-ethnic competition, it reduces the
impact of the ethnic subsidy that flows from mass constituents to coethnic elites on
the distribution of scarce resources. In particular, it prevents elites from capturing
the ethnic subsidy and concentrating resources at the elite level by forcing them to
return a larger share of it to their mass constituents than would be necessary under
monopsony by distributing better rewards in order to remain competitive against rival
elites.
Although I have drawn these inferences from original survey data comprising thou-
sands of individuals as data points, in some respects the critical explanatory variables
are institutional. Consequently, with two systems under study, these conclusions are
subject to many of the familiar inferential challenges facing small-N comparative re-
search.64 Lebanon and Yemen of course differ on other dimensions besides their for-
mal institutions. Although some of the most important potential confounders have
been addressed in case selection for comparative study, the degrees of freedom are
64Were we to consider countries as the units of analysis, N = 2, and were we to consider ethnic
communities within countries as the units of analysis, N = 6. Either way, whatever inferences we
hope to draw are subject to the challenges of small-N research.
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inevitably fewer in number than the remaining differences between the two countries.
Although in principle it is possible that some other, unexamined difference between
Lebanon and Yemen accounts for the outcomes we observe, plausible rival hypotheses
are not immediately obvious. In explaining between-community differences in per-
ceptions of the importance of connections in obtaining government jobs, the quota
system that operates in Lebanon but not in Yemen is certainly the most relevant in-
stitutional characteristic, and plausible alternative explanations for the convergence
of perceptions in Lebanon and their divergence in Yemen do not immediately present
themselves. Further, electoral system differences that induce intra-ethnic elite com-
petition in Lebanon but not in Yemen provide the most parsimonious and plausible
explanation for where monopsonistic vote-buyers are likely to emerge. Alternative ex-
planations that can account for the emergence of monopsonists in the two particular
communities we observe are not readily apparent.
Overall, then, the arguments and evidence presented in this essay suggest that
formal government institutions may serve as key intervening factors in societies char-
acterized by highly salient ethnic cleavages. Institutions can magnify or disrupt the
effect of ethnic divisions on development outcomes according to their capacities to
channel those ethnic divisions into or away from politics and the political allocation
of scarce resources. In general, the evidence presented above suggests that institu-
tions designed to place constraints on elite discretionary powers can place important
limits on the degree to which elites can channel government resources into patronage
rewards to supporters by limiting the extent to which they can privilege coethnics at
the expense of non-coethnics. Further, institutions designed to stimulate intra-ethnic
competition among elites for their coethnics’ votes can have important ramifications
for the degree to which elites can capture scarce resources as opposed to circulate
them among the mass constituents whom they purportedly represent. Although a
perfectly competitive vote market is of course the gold standard—certainly as far
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as mass constituents are concerned—approximations to perfect vote markets do not
exist in many societies, notably those within which the prominence of ethnic social
categories provides captive audiences and ethnic subsidies to elites. Under these
conditions, oligopsonistic competition between elites over their coethnics’ support is
preferable to monopsonistic vote-buying.
What are the implications of these findings beyond Lebanon and Yemen? First,
people respond to incentives, and we should not expect this to change simply when
ethnicity and ethnic cleavages are salient. Coordinating on ethnic coalitions for po-
litical activity, rather than an irrational or otherwise unexplainable act, is in fact a
rational solution to a difficult coordination problem. If we find these outcomes un-
desirable for developmental or normative reasons and wish to change them, we must
do so by changing people’s choice sets. As suggested here, we may use government
institutions to change people’s incentive structures by changing the feasible options
they have.
Second, in terms of the developmental outcomes themselves, there are, in fact,
qualitatively different processes at work when cleavages and coalitions are based on
ethnicity rather than on other forms of social categories we might otherwise consider
voluntary in membership. Structurally, ethnic coalitions privilege redistribution, rent-
seeking, and other unproductive activities which dissipate scarce resources that could
otherwise be put to productive use in the development process. Ethnic coalitions run
largely on patronage, but particularly problematic is the fact that clients, because they
are captive audiences, have very little leverage over patrons. Again, we may hope to
change these undesirable outcomes by changing incentives. In particular, inducing
development may largely be a matter of inducing competition, at least to the degree
feasible. Societies within which ethnic cleavages are salient cannot be expected to
recoordinate in the short term around non-ethnic coalitions simply with a change in
institutions. Yet if competition between non-ethnic coalitions is not feasible, a second-
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best solution is to make ethnic constituencies competitive internally to break vote
monopsonies. Full competition may be the ideal, but barring that, some competition
is far better than none.
To expand on the initial findings from this research, the next plausible step is
to investigate the impact of additional institutional constraints and rules that can
provide alternate mechanisms to channel ethnic divisions. Corruption, for example,
is endemic in both Lebanon and Yemen, which both dissipates these states’ scarce
government resources on non-productive activities as well as largely withdraws them
from circulation. Further, elite discretion over the dispensation of government licenses
and permits, as well as exemptions from the rule of law, provide additional means by
which elites can reward supporters whether or not they are coethnics. Future research
can study the effect of constraints such as independent judiciaries, autonomous over-
sight and auditing bodies, civil service exams, and privately-operated free media. Yet,
to the degree that we wish to maintain focus specifically on ethnic divisions as qual-
itatively different from other forms of social divisions, the institutions that we must
study are those that influence social coordination on ethnic and non-ethnic social




What can we conclude from the three essays collected in this dissertation? Chap-
ter 5 reviews the concepts and findings from the essays and attempts to connect them
to each other as well as to the larger agenda of diversity and development as described
in the introductory chapter. In doing so, I highlight two broad themes. First, I discuss
the importance of the descent principle to ethnic constituencies and its ramifications
for coalition interests and dynamics. Second, I highlight the importance of govern-
ment institutions, both as means to channel ethnic politics, as well as loci of political
contestation when ethnic cleavages are salient to politics. Finally, I conclude with
a short preview of future research topics on institutions when ethnicity is a salient
social cleavage—their origins and the incentives they generate—with implications for
the use and misuse of scarce resources in diverse societies.
5.1 Findings in the Essays
Section 5.1 provides a brief review of the essays presented in this dissertation. Each
of the three selections takes up different but overlapping aspects of ethnic politics.
Thematically, these include considerations of underlying motivations for what we ob-
serve to be “ethnic” choices and attitudes, preferences over some of the institutions
that impact the distribution of political power and scarce resources between ethnic
communities, and the influence of institutions on ethnic coordination and the com-
petitive environments that obtain within ethnic communities. Here, I review each
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essay in terms of thematic focus, the underlying propositions developed within them,
and their central empirical findings. Subsequently, in Section 5.2, I will synthesize
these findings and tie them to the narrative emerging from them.
Chapter 2: Democratic Talk and the Democratic Walk
Themes. Thematically, Chapter 2 addresses both methodological and substantive
issues of import. As its methodological point of reference, it takes up the issue of the
practical difficulties of studying sensitive topics such as ethnic politics when relying
on self-reported attitudes and behaviors. Sensitivity provides incentives for people to
misrepresent themselves in a systematic and unmeasurable fashion, and this response
bias leads to huge inferential problems. Substantively, Chapter 2 addresses attitudes
toward voting rights when ethnicity is a salient cleavage, that is, attitudes toward
institutions when the institutions themselves have important ramifications for the
distribution of political influence and scarce resources between ethnic communities.
When ethnicity provides the classificatory scheme for political coalitions, it implies
that such coalitions are internally heterogeneous over a range of policy dimensions,
which in turn means that ethnic group interests and personal interests will likely
diverge in predictable ways. Within the essay, I use the methodological innovations
I develop with an augmented list experiment to provide one way to enable people to
stop “toeing the ethnic line” and voice their non-public preferences.
Propositions. When ethnicity is salient and ascriptive descent is the underlying
membership principle, the constituencies that ethnicity defines are likely to be very
internally heterogeneous over a range of policy dimensions. When using ethnicity
as the basis for political coalitions, members have coordinated on a set of salient
issues and deemphasized another set over which they may have differing preferences.
Because of this, and because much of ethnic politics is sensitive for normative reasons,
empirical studies based on self-reported attitudes is a challenge due to systematic
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and unmeasurable misrepresentation on the part of respondents. These difficulties
can be overcome, or at least mitigated, by utilizing unobtrusive and low-impact data
measurement and analysis techniques that seek to neutralize respondents’ incentives
to misreport their attitudes and behavior.
Empirics. Empirically, Chapter 2 examines Lebanese attitudes toward voting rights
for illiterate individuals. This is clearly a sensitive topic, not only normatively, but
also because of the sectarian and distributional ramifications of the question, with
Shiites the poorest, least educated, and most underrepresented community in the
country. Despite their comparative disadvantages in the aggregate, however, the Shia
community is internally heterogeneous, as are the other communities: all have sizable
poor constituencies and middle classes, and for many people, the interests of the sect
writ large can be inconsistent with their own material interests. Given the sensitivity
of the question, I employ the newly augmented list experiment to attempt to nullify
individuals’ incentives to misrepresent themselves. The results are as follows. When
respondents are asked directly whether or not illiterate people should have the right
to vote, they give sectarian answers. Community membership alone has a system-
atic effect on answers—Shiites are more supportive than others—whereas material
conditions have no influence on attitudes. Yet when the same question is asked indi-
rectly via the list experiment, the polar opposite occurs. Community membership has
no influence on attitudes, whereas material conditions have a strong effect—poorer,
more neglected respondents are systematically more likely to support voting rights
for illiterates, who presumably share many of their material deprivations.
Chapter 3: What Divides Unites
Themes. Thematically, Chapter 3 addresses the intersection of ethnic politics and
religious politics, which is particularly salient for Middle Eastern societies where sec-
tarian competition and conflict are prominent. This essay takes as its point of depar-
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ture the “Islam and democracy” question, asking how religion, rather than specifically
Islam, influences attitudes toward different government institutions. This question is
best addressed in multireligious research venues, but this requires us to separate out
some of the multiple, possibly conflicting influences of religion: as a raw marker of
community membership (sectarianism), and as a set of behavioral prescriptions and
ideals that may be shared across particular doctrines (religiosity). The underlying
substantive theme is preferences over institutions when ethnicity (here, sect) provides
the classificatory scheme for key social categories and political coalitions, as well as
the use of religion to define and imagine more inclusive conceptions of community
beyond the sect.
Propositions. Preferences over institutions follow from how particular institutional
configurations will favor or disfavor particular ethnic communities, yet these prefer-
ences are also subject to how individuals conceive of the relevant community. Re-
ligion influences attitudes toward different institutional configurations in multiple
ways, both as a nominal marker of group boundaries and membership (sectarianism)
and as a set of behavioral prescriptions and ideals that are potentially shared among
members of different religious communities (religiosity). As the basis for a social clas-
sificatory scheme, religion as the nominal marker of sect is a dividing factor. Yet the
classificatory scheme is more flexible than it might first appear, and people may use
the logic and language of the scheme to both widen and contract the relevant polity
by invoking shared religious ideals to imagine a community beyond the sect. In this
respect, that which divides, religion, also unites.
Empirics. Empirically, Chapter 3 examines Lebanese preferences over a set of auto-
cratic institutional configurations, over which there is significant variation, as opposed
to a preference for democracy, over which variation is all but nonexistent. Given the
plausible sensitivity of the topics of religiosity and politicization, I turn to unobtru-
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sive measures—displays of religious icons and political symbols about the home—to
provide the empirical indicators. The results show that, at base, Shiites, the largest
single community and Lebanon as well as the most underrepresented, are least sup-
portive of autocracy, but that a radicalized subset of Shiites are considerably more
open to autocratic options, as they are blocked from making root changes to the
Lebanese system by democratic means. More interesting, however, is the effect of
religiosity, which moderates sectarian attitudes among all communities by invoking
shared religious ideals and a wider community beyond the sect. Religious, politi-
cally active individuals may be mobilized into Lebanon’s sectarian framework, but
are willing to accept pluralism by opposing autocracy and, conversely, incorporating
members of other communities into the larger polity via democracy.
Chapter 4: Why Sunni Votes are Cheap in Lebanon but Dear in Yemen
Themes. Thematically, Chapter 4 addresses the curious combination of empirical
regularities that resources tend to flow along ethnic lines in diverse societies, but that
constituents appear to get so little out of their political support for their leaders—
ethnic favoritism seems to coexist with ethnic neglect. This essay examines how
information constraints privilege the use of ethnic heuristics for the purposes of coor-
dination on political coalitions, as well as the ramifications of basing coalitions on eth-
nicity. In addition to defining patronage-friendly rewards-for-support bargains, ethnic
coordination defines coalitions in which constituents are captive audiences, with im-
portant implications for the distribution of resources and rewards within communities,
depending on the degree of competition to which elites are subjected. Competition,
in turn, is influenced by government institutions and the incentives they define.
Propositions. When ethnicity provides the underlying basis for political coalitions,
several important implications follow. Structurally, membership in ethnic categories
is easy to infer, and because such categories are relatively fixed in the short run due to
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the ascriptive descent principle, coalition membership is not subject to opportunistic
joining and leaving. This enables elites to target resources and rewards as patronage to
supporters without dissipating them on non-supporters. Yet because ethnicity defines
coalitions for which entry and exit are difficult and costly, constituents effectively
comprise captive audiences to their elites in a situation of imperfect competition.
Yet the degree of that competition is, in turn, quite important: whether elites must
compete against each other for their coethnics’ votes (ethnic oligopsony), or else there
is a single, monopsonistic vote-buyer, requiring constituents to compete for patronage.
Institutional incentives and constraints can stimulate competition, or protect ethnic
vote markets, as explored via the different institutional environments in Lebanon and
Yemen.
Empirics. Empirically, Chapter 4 examines Lebanese and Yemeni perceptions of
the importance of patronage links—proxied by the perceived importance of connec-
tions to obtain a government job—and the behavior that results from these percep-
tions. The results show that, first, patronage perceptions converge to no difference
between communities in Lebanon, but diverge in favor the Shia community in Yemen.
This result follows from the explicit quota system for government positions used in
Lebanon that prevents elites from rewarding cosectarians at the expense of other com-
munities, but not in place in Yemen where the Shia-dominated ruling party is under
no such constraint. Secondly, the results show that constituents in monopsonized
communities display overt signals of support for political leaders—proxied by dis-
play of political posters and flags—for instrumental reasons in pursuit of patronage,
whereas no such dynamic is evident among members of other communities. This is
consistent with the proposition that monopsonized constituents must compete against
one another for patronage, and consequently seek to outdo each other in indicating
their political support for patrons.
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5.2 Integrating the Essays
What are some of the unifying themes that run through the three essays presented
in this dissertation? In this section, I attempt to integrate the findings from these
essays in the context of a broader research agenda on development in diverse societies.
I do so by focusing here on two broad component themes addressed by the essays:
first, the characteristics of ethnic political coalitions that make them qualitatively
different from coalitions formed on the basis of other social categories, and second,
the centrality of government institutions to ethnic political dynamics, both as loci
of political contestation and as filters that channel ethnicity into or away from poli-
tics and the political allocation of scarce resources. The findings presented in these
essays, in turn, serve as building blocks for future research on the empirical puzzles
and questions that initially inspired this dissertation: does ethnic diversity cause un-
derdevelopment, and if so, how? These findings, as I will suggest here, provide key
component parts to a more integrated answer on both how and under what conditions
ethnicity impacts development.
Throughout the essays, I examine political constituencies and coalitions that are
based specifically on ethnicity. In order to understand how ethnicity influences devel-
opment outcomes, we must first understand how ethnic constituencies and coalitions
differ qualitatively from their non-ethnic peers, if they do so at all. Without an
adequate comprehension of this distinction, we do not know if “ethnic political dy-
namics” are simply political dynamics with an adjective appended to the front—e.g.,
whether or not ethnic diversity is just another interchangeable form of “social di-
versity” or “preference heterogeneity”—and consequently it is difficult to justify a
separate, specialized study of ethnicity, at least as it pertains to development. One
recurring argument throughout the essays is that ethnic constituencies are, in fact,
qualitatively different from their non-ethnic peers. This difference follows from the
use of ascriptive descent as the core membership principle upon which ethnic social
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categories are based, and the implications that follow from this principle in terms of
constituency characteristics, structure, and interests.
For scholars of ethnic politics, ascriptive descent has, by now, become the widely-
accepted core membership principle upon which ethnicity is based. The principle of
descent provides the conceptual underpinning that unites ethnicity’s particular in-
stantiations from society to society—such as social divisions based on race, sect, lan-
guage, or region—and makes it reasonable to discuss social categories that otherwise
differ in their specifics. Hence, for example, the essays presented in this disserta-
tion utilize Lebanon and Yemen as their primary research venues, within which sects,
tribes, and regions are all politically salient to greater or lesser degrees. The descent
principle provides a means through which it becomes comprehensible to conceive of
these collectivities as structurally similar to one another—as particular instances of
ethnic social categories—enabling us to make comparisons and discuss them using a
common vocabulary.
Descent defines constituencies with considerable within-community heterogeneity
in preferences and ideal points. For ethnic constituencies and coalitions, utilizing
descent as the key membership principle means that membership is granted to in-
dividuals without regard to socioeconomic, demographic, and ideological features.1
Yet these are some of the characteristics that we commonly believe influence people’s
broad policy preferences, which suggests that there is a much greater variance in the
distribution of ideal points within an ethnic community as compared, for example, to
a constituency such as a labor union or a chamber of commerce. This implies, first,
1Note that this is not to suggest that there are not differences between communities writ large—
the average level of education or income may be higher in one community than another, for example—
but merely that membership is conditional only on the appropriate descent marker and is not
conditional on these other characteristics. Except in cases with a stark ethnic ranking system—such
as extremely rigid caste systems—there is likely to be significant between-community overlap in
the distribution of preferences found within each community. As societies more closely approximate
unranked ethnic systems, variation in policy preferences within communities can become significantly
wider than variation in preferences between communities.
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that ethnic coalitions must deemphasize issue dimensions over which their members
hold widely varying opinions and focus instead on interests from which most members
can hope to benefit: patronage and group-targeted redistribution. Yet it also implies
that individual interests and group interests may diverge on many issue dimensions,
and possibly quite widely.
Community membership is not a deterministic trump in attitude and preference
formation, as Chapter 2 implies. In investigating attitudes toward the extension of the
franchise to illiterate people in Lebanon, this essay provides evidence that, in the form
of openly-stated discourse, attitudes vary for sectarian reasons. Yet, as suggested,
there is considerable heterogeneity within sectarian communities. Although Lebanon
is a ranked ethnic system, the rankings are not nearly as stark now as they once
were, and there is considerable overlap between sectarian communities in material
conditions: there are significant numbers of rich and middle class individuals in each
sect, as well as sizable quantities of poor people. Given this reality, “toeing the ethnic
line” in public can belie individual preferences, be they material interests or otherwise,
that are held in private. Whereas Lebanese respondents give sectarian answers to
direct, open questions, Chapter 2 also provides evidence that, underneath the veneer
of open sectarian discourse, there also lie strong material interests that cross sectarian
communities and influence attitudes and responses strongly—once respondents are
provided with a means of expressing themselves freed of their discursive obligations
in the sectarian system. Sectarian coalitions, in other words, are imperfect substitutes
for many Lebanese. Although sectarian coordination is better than no coordination
at all, many Lebanese might individually prefer coordination over coalitions stressing
different policy dimensions—such as the traditional left-right or rich-poor axes—were
such coalition options available or credible.
Studies of the political economy of ethnic competition commonly focus on the
distributive implications of that competition, examining the “who gets what” and
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“how much” questions of day-to-day politics. The most immediately obvious point
of interest is the distribution of resources between communities, and this is in fact
what most studies examine. Yet the understandable focus on between-community
disparities, or the lack thereof, ignores a complementary point of interest: the distri-
bution of resources within communities. Ethnic coalitions are particularly well-suited
for patronage relationships. Supporters are easy to target for rewards because ethnic
memberships are easily inferable, and ethnicity’s low boundary permeability miti-
gates against the opportunistic joining and leaving of political coalitions—helping to
overcome the time-inconsistency problems of sequential rewards-for-support bargains.
Yet the descent principle, by closing off entry and exit options, has important rami-
fications for intraethnic political dynamics. In particular, it transforms constituents
into captive audiences for their coethnic elites, in effect providing subsidized polit-
ical support for leaders. Distributionally, this implies that resources concentrate at
the elite level to a greater degree than would be the case were membership in po-
litical coalitions not based on ethnicity’s descent principle: elites need not reward
constituents as lucratively because they have nowhere else to go.
As Chapter 4 suggests, institutions can have an important impact on the distri-
bution of resources by influencing how much discretion elites have to reward their
supporters with state resources, and by stimulating or retarding elite competition for
constituent support within communities. The essay first focuses on the explicit quota
system used in Lebanon but not in Yemen, showing that an ethnic quota on govern-
ment employment slots constrains elites from rewarding supporters at the expense of
other communities. Institutional constraints, in other words, can modify incentives
and prevent (or enable) disparities between communities in access to state resources.
Secondly, and more importantly, the essay suggests that tangible differences exist in
patron-client relationships between communities within which there is credible elite
competition for votes (oligopsonies), and those within which there is only a single
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credible vote-buyer (monopsonies). In the former, elites must compete for their co-
ethnics’ votes and consequently must offer them competitive rewards, whereas in the
latter, constituents must compete for patronage. As suggested, Lebanon’s consocia-
tional institutions stimulate elite competition within communities, whereas Yemen’s
plurality institutions provide no special incentive. Whatever the other merits or
demerits of the two institutional configurations, on this dimension the stimulus to
intraethnic competition makes the distribution of resources within communities more
egalitarian.
Ethnic coalitions, based as they are on the logic of descent, are fixed in their
short-run membership compositions. This property has implications not only for
the “who gets what” and “how much” questions of day-to-day politics, but also for
the more far-reaching, existential questions of the nature of the polity and the way
it governs itself. Put another way, ethnicity impacts not only the distribution of
resources between and within communities, but also which communities are relevant
and which institutions can or should be employed to govern them. In particular,
when ethnic coalitions compete in politics, the goal of winning over members of a rival
coalition to one’s own coalition is largely non-credible and non-achievable. Switching
coalitions is incongruent with the logic of descent categories, and conceptually, there
are no real analogues to swing voters, and practically, there are likely to be very few.
This implication is consistent with the often-stated observations that, in societies
where ethnic cleavages are highly salient, elections act as censuses and censuses as
elections: political blocs do not change significantly unless demographic balances do
so.2 Political contestation, in other words, is not about winning over new members,
2This is also consistent with the severity of the sensitivity of official censuses in diverse societies,
where for political reasons questions on race, tribe, religion, and language are often not included,
or official censuses are simply not conducted at all. Yemen is an example of the former, with no
questions about tribal or sectarian affiliations, and Lebanon is an example of the latter, with the
last official census conducted in 1932 in the pre-independence era.
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but rather about the constituent make-up of the contests themselves: over community
borders and over the institutions that translate demography into political power and
access to resources.
Ascriptive descent appears, at first glance, to provide a very rigid classificatory
system with which to divide a population into social categories: membership is the-
oretically deterministic and not the product of choice. Yet the descent principle can
be surprisingly flexible within its own framework, and permits a great deal of politi-
cal contestation over the borders between and meanings of social categories, both in
terms of those that are salient already and those that activists might hope to make
salient. Simply utilizing descent as the classificatory principle does not presuppose
which particular descent-based categories are relevant to politics, either in terms of
their levels of aggregation (what proportion of the population belongs to them) or in
terms of their inclusiveness or exclusiveness. Rather than striving to convert members
of rival coalitions to one’s own coalition—e.g., Democrats seeking to win over Repub-
licans, and vice-versa—political contestation takes an alternate dynamic of defining
and redefining the relevant social categories, as well as debating and interpreting the
membership principles by which they are composed. Put another way, it is the politics
of moving borders given people rather than moving people given borders.
These dynamics are evident, for example, in Chapter 3. Religion provides the
nominal marker that divides the Lebanese into sectarian communities. Yet it does
not immediately follow that this is the only social category of relevance in Lebanon,
as evident by the undercurrents of regionalism as well as family and village loyalties
to which Lebanese are subject. More importantly, however, the Lebanese are able
to invoke shared religious ideals to overcome sectarian divisions and imagine commu-
nities beyond the sect: religion, that which divides the Lebanese, also unites them.
Christians and Muslims do not convince each other to convert to different doctrinal
traditions—people do not move across borders—but rather attempt to expand the
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borders of the relevant communities themselves. Likewise, in evidence not presented
systematically in this dissertation, a similar discursive maneuver occurs in Yemen.
Religious leaders frequently cite the common principles in the country’s different Is-
lamic denominations to deemphasize sectarian divisions, and tribal leaders commonly
use a tribal register to classify people more or less exclusively by simply moving up
or down the ladder of the segmentary system to larger or smaller aggregations. As in
Lebanon, it is the politics of moving borders rather than moving people: individuals
do not change their sectarian or tribal affiliations, but the borders that divide sects
and tribes expand and contract.
Which ethnic communities are relevant, and how they are composed, can often
take on the discursive features of an existential question. Another set of questions
with far-reaching ramifications focus on government institutions and, more broadly,
how the polity governs itself. A running theme throughout this dissertation is the im-
portance of institutions as a means to channel ethnicity through the political system,
and both politicians and their constituents are at least broadly aware that different
institutions can impact their own interests and welfare in favorable or unfavorable
ways, even if they are unsure about the details of how they would do so. Simply
put, descent-based ethnic coalitions do not change in the short run, and unless a real
change in the relevant communities along the lines discussed above becomes possible,
the only other way to effect political change is to change the institutions themselves.
Institutions and constitutions, in other words, are themselves on the table far more
frequently and seriously in societies where ethnicity is highly salient than in societies
where it is less so. Hence, rather than contesting policy given institutions, the loci
of political contestation are frequently the institutions themselves. Again, given the
importance of institutions as means to channel ethnicity, the frequency, intensity, and
outcomes of these contests can have large subsequent ramifications for development
in terms of political instability, uncertainty, and use of resources.
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Some of the ramifications of particular institutional configurations can be seen in
Chapter 4, in which institutions constraint (or fail to constrain) elite discretion in
the use of state resources to reward supporters, and stimulate (or fail to stimulate)
competition among elites for political support within their own ethnic communities.
Chapters 2 and 3, meanwhile, provide evidence of the salience of institutions as points
of political contestation. Chapter 2 examines voting rights when who gets to vote has
implications for the balance of political power between ethnic communities and the
distribution of resources among them. Chapter 3 examines preferences over differ-
ent autocratic institutional configurations, with attitudes broadly predictable given
individuals’ ethnic (sectarian) affiliations. These are particular instances of debate
over institutional choice, and fit into a larger pattern evident in both Lebanon and
Yemen, where institutions perennially occupy a central position in political discourse
and contestation. Constitutional changes are frequent, electoral laws change, some-
times dramatically, practically from election to election, whether and how to use
quotas to represent communities continues to be debated, and even the constituent
nature of the political system—consociational or majoritarian, plurality or propor-
tional representation, presidential or parliamentary—have been recurring items on
the national political agenda in both countries since independence.
5.3 Conclusion
The study of ethnic competition, and the political economy of diversity and devel-
opment, must be a study of politics: ethnicity is not an economic variable, but is
explicitly a political one. To understand development in diverse societies, we must
understand how and why ethnic political coalitions emerge, and how ethnicity influ-
ences how societies utilize their scarce resources. As I have suggested above, utiliz-
ing ascriptive descent as their core membership principle, and the ramifications of
descent, make ethnic coalitions qualitatively different from their non-ethnic competi-
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tors. Ethnic coalitions are structurally predisposed to favor non-productive uses of
scarce resources via patronage, redistribution, and rent-seeking. Further, they are
predisposed to concentrate resources at the elite level and hindering their circula-
tion within the polity. Institutions, meanwhile, can mediate the influence of ethnic
competition by channeling ethnicity into or away from politics and the political al-
location of scarce resources. Institutions can either constrain or grant discretionary
powers to elites over the use and distribution of scarce resources, and can stimulate
or hinder the need to compete for constituent support. Given their importance when
political competition occurs between relatively unchanging coalitions, however, it is
unsurprising that institutions themselves are loci of political contestation when ethnic
cleavages are salient.
Future research on diversity and development must focus, at least in part, on
institutions: who chooses them, the constraints under which such choices are made,
the incentives they generate, and how well they function once chosen. Research, in
other words, must focus not only on ethnic politics given institutions, but the origins
of those institutions as well. Further, it must incorporate an understanding not only
of how elites shape institutional outcomes, but also mass constituent preferences over
these outcomes, and the conditions under which constituent preferences constrain the
choices that their elites may take. Further, future research must consider institutions
beyond electoral systems. We commonly, and with considerable justification, focus
on the influence of electoral laws and rules on which coalitions win elections. Yet
we must also consider how institutions may constrain elites once in power, which
requires additional research on oversight and judicial institutions, as well as the rules
and regulations that enable or retard the development of autonomous civil society
organizations equipped to challenge leaders and politicians rather than simply acqui-
esce to them. How diverse societies utilize their scarce resources—investing them in
development or dissipating them non-productively—depends on politics and political
200
incentives. Institutions may help build the rule of law and good government, but we
must understand how and under what conditions they do so. Understanding insti-
tutions and institutional choice, in turn, can help us understand how some diverse
societies emerge as success stories and others stagnate—whether the outcomes we
observe are diversity and development or fragmentation and failure.
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